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OWNING DIGITAL COPIES: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE
INCIDENTS OF COPY OWNERSHIP
JOSEPH P. Liu*
ABSTRACT
As copyrighted works are increasingly distributed in digital
form over the Internet, our conventional print-based
understandings ofthe rights associated with copy ownership are
coming into increasing conflict with the copyright owner's right
to restrict copying. Specifically, certain common activities, such
as reading and transferring physical copies of copyrighted
works (such as books), are increasingly being viewed as
potential acts of copyright infringement when applied to digital
copies. This Article explores this conflict by taking a close look
at the concept of copy ownership. It argues that conventional
notions of physical property ownership play an important,
unrecognized role in copyright law. It further argues that, in
order to preserve this role, copyright law should recognize an
unlimited right to access digital copies in one's possession and
a more limited right to transfer such copies to others.

* Assistant Professor, U.C. Hastings College of Law. Thanks to Vik Amar, Margareth
Barrett, StaceyfDogan, Allen Ferrell, William Fisher III, Mark Lemley, Michael Madison, R.
Anthony Reese, Aaron Rappaport, Marc Spindelman, and Alfred Yen for helpful comments
and suggestions. All errors are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law places a number of limits on what I can do with
my dog-eared copy of William Faulkner's As I Lay Dying.'I cannot
run it through the photocopier to make another copy. I cannot read
from it aloud in a public place. Nor can I translate the book into a
foreign language (assuming I could speak one). These are things
that I simply cannot do with my book, at least not without
permission from the copyright owner or some statutory privilege. At
the same time, copyright law permits me to do many, if not most,
other things with my copy of that book. I can read it as many times
as I want. I can lend it to a friend. I can destroy it. I can sell it to a
stranger. I can even rent it out for a fee. All these things I can do
without asking the copyright owner for permission or relying on
some notion of fair use.2 What explains the differences in these
activities? Why can I do some things with my book, but not others?
One standard explanation is that copyright law picks and chooses
among different permissible uses in order to strike a careful balance
between the rights of the producers of works and the rights of
consumers.3 Accordingto this view, copyright law has never granted
producers the right to control all uses of their works. Instead, it
confers only a limited bundle of rights: the rights to reproduce,
1. WILL4IA FAULKNER, As I LAY DYING (1930).
2. Much academic attention has been focused on the precise scope of the fair use
privilege. See, e.g., William W. Fisher Ill, Reconstructing the FairUse Doctrine, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1659 (1988) [hereinafter Fisher, FairUse Doctrine];Wendy J. Gordon, FairUse as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its

Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a FairUse Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); Lloyd L. Weinreb, FairsFair:A Comment on the FairUse
Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1137 (1990). Comparatively less sustained attention has been
paid to the limitations built into the rights established under section 106 of the Copyright

Act. But see, e.g., William W. Fisher III,Propertyand Contracton the Internet,73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1203, 1206 (1998) [hereinafter Fisher, Propertyand Contract].

3. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Revising CopyrightLaw for the InformationAge, 75 OR. L.
REV. 19, 31 (1996) ("Copyright owners, however, have never been entitled to control all uses
oftheir works. Instead, Congress has accorded copyright owners some exclusive rights, and
reserved other rights to the general public."); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT.
PRINCIS, LAw AND PRACTICE § 1.14 (1998) (noting that the Copyright Act contains "a
scheme of carefully balanced property rights" between authors, publishers, and consumers);
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYIG-T. A LAw OF USERS'

RIGHTS (1991) (discussing the historical context of copyright law and the balance of rights
among the author, producer, and user).
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publicly perform, publicly display, publicly distribute, and make
derivative works.4 These rights are designed to give producers an
incentive to keep producing. But, according to this explanation,
giving producers any additional rights (such as the right to control
reading or resale) would unduly restrict the access to, and the wide
dissemination of, copyrighted works that the copyright laws are
designed to foster. The particular bundle of copyright rights is thus
determined through this careful balancing of incentives and access.
Yet, upon closer examination, this account does not completely
explain why we have struck the balance that we have. For example,
the ability to sell a copy of a book to another would appear to reduce
the incentives to create works. After all, by selling the book to
another individual, I potentially deprive the author of royalties
from a sale of the book. The sale is nearly a perfect substitute. Why
does copyright law not restrict this activity? Conversely, prohibiting
the public performance of a piece of music would appear to restrict
wide access to, and broad dissemination of, that work. Why does
copyright law bar this kind of dissemination? It may be that the
current bundle of rights, as a descriptive matter, leads to a certain
balance of rights and access, but this balance seems contingent. If
a balance needs to be struck, there would appear to be any number
of ways to strike it. What accounts for the particular balance struck
by our existing copy copyright laws, the particular division of rights
between copyright owner and copy owner?
Another possible explanation, and one that seems more
convincing to me, is that the bundle ofrights, and the corresponding
limits on that bundle, are determined in part by certain conventions
and understandings that we commonly hold about the ownership of
physical property.5 For example, I own my copy of As I Lay Dying.
Once I buy my copy, I should be entitled to dispose of it as I wish.
This is, after all, what it ordinarily means to own a piece of physical
property. While this entitlement may not extend to running it
through the copy machine, it surely should include my right to read
the copy, to sell the copy, or to lend it to a friend. Under the
common law, restraints on the free alienation of physical property
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
5. I do not suggest that these are the only two possible explanations. In fact, later in this
Article I expressly consider, in much more detail, a number of different possible explanations
for the bundle of rights. See infra Part III.
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are generally disfavored. In copyright law, this disfavoring finds
doctrinal expression in the "first sale" doctrine, which generally
bars copyright owners from exerting certain types of control over
copies of their works once they have parted with title over a
particular copy.6 Thus, under this explanation, the bundle of
copyright rights is limited by our conventional understandings
about physical personal property. Such conventional understandings help draw the line between the rights of copy owners and
copyright owners. Or, perhaps more accurately, these understandings provide the physical baseline upon which copyright law
is imposed.
But if this is the explanation, or at least an explanation, for the
current bundle of copyright rights, how should we think about the
bundle when our copies of copyrighted works begin to lose their
physical characteristics?' It should be clear by now to just about
everyone that we are currently in the midst of a dramatic
transformation in the way in which copyrighted works are
distributed.8 Whereas such works were once distributed primarily
in the form of physical, tangible copies, today such works are
increasingly taking on intangible form. Specifically, with the advent
of the Internet, more and more copies of copyrighted works are
being distributed in digital form-digitally encoded in an
electromagnetic pattern of ones and zeros. Today, it is not at all
uncommon to find not only text, but also pictures, sound clips,
software, and, increasingly, video clips distributed over the Internet
in digital form. And as the capacity of networks increases and
compression technologies improve, this trend will only accelerate.

6. See 17 U.S.C. § 109; Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135, 152 (1998) ("The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright
owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted
his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.").
7. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of the Mind, WIED 2.03 (Mar. 1994), available
(using the term
at http:/www.wired.comlwiredlarchive/2.03/economy.ideas.pr.html
"vaporous cargo" to describe the "galloping digitization of everythingnot obstinately physical,
[which is] sailing into the future ona sinking ship"); Charles Mann, Who Will Own YourNext
Good Idea?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Sept. 1998).

8. See Jane Ginsburg, From HavingCopies to ExperiencingWorks: The Development of
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY
(Hugh Hansen ed., 2000); NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995).
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As more and more content becomes distributed in digital form,
however, our instincts about physical personal property begin to
have less and less purchase.9 The conventional understandings we
possess about physical copies-the ones that seem to explain and
help define much of the existing balance of copyright law-do not
seem so applicable to copies that take intangible, electronic form.
The physical baseline upon which copyright law acted no longer
exists. The result is that the appropriate balance of rights between
copy owner and copyright owner becomes less clear. For example,
assume that I download a copy of As I Lay Dying onto the hard
drive of my computer so I can read it later. No physical property
has changed hands. What rights have I acquired in the digital copy?
What rights have I acquired over the magnetic pattern of ones and
zeros that currently rests on a portion of my hard drive? Can I
access it as many times as I want? Can I send those ones and zeros
to a friend? Can I sell my computer to another person, along with
the embedded copy of As I Lay Dying? What, exactly, do I now
"own"?
Surprisingly, under existing law, the answer is not at all clear.
Some have argued that I physically own exactly what I have always
owned-the actual piece of magnetic disk that holds the ones and
zeros that represent the novel.1 ° I can do with that piece of disk
whatever I could have done with it in the past. If I want to clip out
that portion of my disk and hand it to another, I am fully entitled
to do so. If I want to remove the hard drive and send it to a friend,
I can do so. But if I want to send the work to my friend over the
Internet, I will be infringing upon the copyright, because my
9. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13
CARDOZO ARTS &ENT. L.J. 345,383 (1995) ("The notion of'copy' in a digitized environment
may impact the implementation of copyright policy. This concept is central to the economic
rationale of copyright law.").
10. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993);
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]; see also Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.) (amending the Copyright Act); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the
"InformationSuperhighway":Authors,Exploiters,and CopyrightInfringement in Cyberspace,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1475 (1995) ("[R]ights copyright confers will be the same whatever
the format of the work, whether originally created in hard copy orin digital format....").
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sending the work will necessarily entail the creation of a copy of
that digital pattern of ones and zeros." Indeed, several courts have
held that even my accessing the document by computer may
constitute an infringement, because this leads to the creation of a
copy of the work in my computer's random access memory (RAM).' 2
Yet something about this seems very odd. Why should the scope of
my rights, as a practical matter, depend so dramatically on the
particular medium in which I have captured the copy? Why should
what I can do with a book depend so dramatically upon whether I
have downloaded the book onto a hard disk or purchased a copy in
a bookstore?
Others argue that copyright law should be interpreted or
translated, not literally, but functionally, so as to preserve the3
substantive rights that I formerly enjoyed with physical copies.'
Thus, for example, I should be entitled to send my digital copy ofAs
ILay Dying to a friend over the Internet as long as I am careful to
delete the original copy from my hard disk.'" I should also be
entitled to read the work as many times as I want, just as I can
read a book as many times as I want, even if it means making
multiple copies of the work in the RAM of my computer. Yet
precisely why should we be so concerned about preserving in the
11. See NeilWeinstockNetanel, Copyrightand a DemocraticCivil Society, 106YALEL.J.
283,301 (1996) ("TheNII White Paper also concludes, in contrast to the spiritifnot the letter

of the first sale doctrine, that the unlicensed electronic transmission of a work from one
person to another does and should constitute an infringement, even if the transmitter has

simultaneously deleted his copy from his computer.").
12. See MAI, 991 F.2d at 517-19; see also DSC Communications v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81
F.3d 597,600 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing MAl); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64
F.3d 1330,1335-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d
231,235 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.,
75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999) (same); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe
Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1120-21 (D. Nev. 1999) (same); Marobie-FL, Inc. v.
National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1177-78 (N.D. IMI.1997) (same);
Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox, 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan. 1995)

(same).
13. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 273, 277; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to
Read, 13 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); Netanel, supra note 11, at 371-76; David
oftheDigitalAge, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 31-45
Ninmer, BrainsandOtherParaphernalia
(1996).

14. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Dealingwith Overlapping Copyrightson the Internet, 22
U. DAYTON L. REv. 547,584 (1997) ("There may be a reasonable middle ground in this case,
such as permitting the transfer of an electronic work to a single party provided the sender
deletes her copies of the work within a reasonable time.").
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digital world the exact bundle of functional rights I enjoyed in the
physical world?"5 If those rights were based on our understandings
about physical property, what justifies transposing those
understandings into the digital world? Indeed, some commentators
suggest that the novelty of the digital medium warrants a
substantial reconsideration of copyright law, breaking it free from
its historically constrained, print-based model. 6 Instead of focusing
on a technologically outdated notion of"copying," perhaps copyright
law should focus instead on "access" or17some other activity more
appropriate to the digital environment.
In this Article, I argue that this debate over digital copies raises,
but largely fails to address, a fundamental question in copyright
law about the relationship between the rights of owners of copies
and rights of copyright owners. Put more simply, what does it mean
to own a copy of a copyrighted work? A basic disagreement exists
over the status of users' existing ability to read, access, lend, and
rent physical copies of copyrighted works, all without consulting the
copyright owner or infringing upon the copyright owner's rights.
Are these "incidents of copy ownership" simply an accident of
technology, an artifact of a print-based model of distribution? Or
are they an inherent and fundamental feature of copyright law's
balance of access and incentives? If the former, then perhaps we
15. Throughout this Article, I draw a rough distinction between "physical" copies and
"digital" copies. Admittedly, this formulation is less than completely precise, as digital copies
are still, strictly speaking, physical in the sense that they are embodied in a magnetic
pattern that is physically perceptible with the aid of a machine. However, the distinction
does at least roughly capture the difference between a tangible, human-readable, fixed,
physical copy and a largely intangible, evanescent, manipulable digital copy.
16. See JAMESBOYLE, SHAMANS, SoFrWARE,ANDSPLEENS: LAWAND-THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); Ginsburg, supra note 8; Jessica Litman, Copyright

Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't 'Just Say Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. hIT L. & POL.
237, 243 (1996-97) ("But, the truth is, we all need to give it up. That balance is gone.
Whatever way we go, we will need to find a different balance."); Litman, supranote 3, at 39
(calling for the creation of an exclusive right to commercial exploitation); Raymond T.
Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Copyrighton the Information Superhighway:Requiem
foraMiddleweight,6 STAN. L. &POL REv. 25 (1994) (calling for replacement ofcopyingwith
access).
17. I do not expressly address this debate in this Article. However, the approach ofthis
Article implicitly assumes that copyright law will not entirely abandon its focus on the copy
anytime soon. This assumption is not unreasonable, given the scope of such a potential
change and the historical difficulty that Congress has had in making significant changes to
the Copyright Act. See generallyJessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, andLegislatioe
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (detailing the process that led to the 1976 Act).
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should not be so concerned about shifts in the distribution of rights
caused by changes in technology and instead be content with
applying copyright law literally to the new environment. If the
latter, then perhaps we should do more to ensure that these
features are preserved despite changes in technology. Up until now,
this question about the role played by these incidents of copy
ownership has not been expressly addressed, because, until
recently, copies of copyrighted works almost invariably took
physical form and the incidents of copy ownership were simply a
feature of the physical environment within which copyright law
operated.
In this Article, I seek to answer this question expressly by
examining what it means to own a copy of a copyrighted work. To
do so, I move beyond the positions that have been staked out thus
far in order to examine what support, if any, exists for these
incidents of copy ownership among a number of major theoretical
frameworks that have been offered in support of copyright law more
generally. After applying these frameworks, I argue that these
incidents of physical copy ownership-the ability to freely read and
transfer physical copies of copyrighted works-in fact serve
important economic and noneconomic values that are worth
preserving in some form in the digital environment, namely, (1) an
important economic value in accounting for transactions costs and
information asymmetries involved in licensing small-scale uses of
works and (2) important noneconomic values relating to the manner
in which individuals consume and derive meaning from creative
works through preservation of some degree of freedom and
autonomy in the consumption of such works.
Accordingly, this Article ultimately recommends that copyright
law expressly recognize an unlimited right to access digital copies
in one's possession, and a more limited right to transfer such copies,
under certain circumstances. It also suggests a number of concrete
ways in which to implement such rights. Although the conclusion
of this Article provides additional support for those who have been
most critical of the recent federal court opinions and recent federal
legislation, it advances a number of new arguments and, in a
number of cases, proposes results that differ somewhat from such
critics. Moreover, it attempts to Provide a more solid, substantive
basis for resisting these expansions of copyright owner rights, based
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on an affirmative view of the rights of copy owners. In part, this
reflects a belief that arguments based on maintaining or preserving
a preexisting "balance" are weakened by the fact that different
constituencies have radically different views about the optimality
of any given balance.
This Article begins, in Part I, by defining the unique challenges
presented by digital technology to the concept of copy ownership.
Specifically, it discusses the Ninth Circuit's influential decision in
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,i" its implications for
digital copies, the numerous critiques of the decision, and the
subsequent legal history. It also discusses the recently enacted
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). It then sets forth the
broad framework for the subsequent analysis. Part II takes a close,
descriptive look at the meaning of ownership of physical copies
under existing copyright law. It examines the distribution of rights
between copy owner and copyright owner and charts the changes in
this distribution over time. Part IlI explores a number of possible
normative rationales for this distribution, looking in particular at
a number of major theoretical frameworks that have been advanced
in support of copyright law. 9 It ultimately concludes that the
incidents of physical copy ownership help preserve certain economic
and noneconomic values. Part IV then applies these insights to the
question of ownership of digital copies, proposing that copyright law
recognize these incidents to some degree in the online environment,
in the form of an unlimited right to access, and a more limited right
to transfer, digital copies in one's possession. This Part then
examines different ways of implementing these conclusions
doctrinally and, finally, addresses a number of anticipated

objections.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH DIGITAL COPIES

The advent of digital technology and the distribution of content
over digital networks is disrupting the existing balance of rights
between copyright owners and users." In many ways, this is
18. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
19. A side benefit of this analysis, as explained below, is that it highlights the relative
value of these different frameworks in adapting to technological change.
20. See Litman, supra note 3, at 19 ("Our current copyright law is based on a model
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nothing new. Copyright law has always been forced to adapt to
changes in technology, from the printing press, to player piano rolls,
to sound recordings, to radio and television broadcasts, to
photocopiers, and now to digital technology. Yet digital technology
presents at least one change that has not been seen before. Up to
now, copyright law has focused primarily (though not exclusively,
as we shall see) on the physical, tangible copy as the basic unit of
consumption and infringement, the main threat to the copyright
owner. For the first time, digital technology is significantly
challenging the very idea of a physical copy. Copies of copyrighted
works can now be distributed in digital form, without the exchange
of any physical object, without any title in physical property
changing hands, and all indications suggest that this will only
increase over time, as computer network capacities increase and
compression technologies improve. In this part of the Article, I
examine the implications of this change and some of the doctrinal
challenges it poses. The starting point is the Ninth Circuit's
influential and controversial decision in MAL 2
A CurrentLaw
Years from now, the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI may well be
regarded as a foundational case, the case that established the
underlying conceptual framework and structure for the application
of copyright law to the new digital environment.' But I sincerely
hope not. In fact, I think it is safe to say that many, if not most,
commentators would prefer to see MA! relegated to an obscure
footnote-an aberrant decision subsequently limited, confined to its
facts, or rejected as wrongly decided. Which of these two results will
ultimately win out is currently being hotly contested in the courts,
in Congress, and in law journals. What is beyond dispute, however,
is that the controversial decision has already exerted a powerful
devised for print media, and expanded with some difficulty to embrace a world that includes
live, filmed and taped performances, broadcast media, and, most recently, digital media.").
21. Those already familiar with the details of MA and the debate surrounding the
decision may want to skip ahead to section B.
22. See James Boyle, Intellectual PropertyPolicy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10
HARv.J.L. &TEcH. 47,85-86 (1996) (consideringwhether MAlwill "become the primary legal
method of regulating the Internet-making this widely criticised opinion about software
error logs, in effect, one of the landmark cases of the information society").
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influence on the current debate over the proper scope of copyright
in digital works. The decision thus offers a good introduction to the
new problems and challenges presented by digital copies.
In MAI, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the act of loading
a computer program into a computer's RAM resulted in the creation
of a copy of that program, implicating the copyright owner's
exclusive right to reproduce the work. The plaintiff in the case,
MAI, sold computer systems and licensed software running on those
systems to users under relatively restrictive terms that limited the
ways in which users could use the software.' The defendant, Peak,
provided independent, third-party maintenance and servicing of
users' computers and software. In the course of diagnosing and
correcting a problem with a user's computer, Peak technicians
would run a copy of MAI software residing on the user's computer.'
MAI subsequently sued Peak, arguing that Peak's use of the
software exceeded the terms of the license between MAI and the
user, and that it therefore infringed MAI's copyright in the software
by creating an unauthorized copy of the software in the computer's
RAM.
Peak defended on the ground that the creation of a copy of the
program in the computer's RAM, as a necessary by-product of
running the program, did not constitute the making of a "copy"
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.21 The Act defines a "copy"
as a material object in which a work is "fixed" and from which the
work can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine."2 A work is, in turn,

"fixed" if it is "sufficiently permanent or stable" to be perceived "for
a period of more than transitory duration."' In order to run a
23. The record suggests that the license was not a "shrinkwrap" license, but rather a
standard contract, signed by both parties. See MAI, 991 F.2d at 517.
24. See id. at 518.
25. The RAM ofa computer consists of a computer chip, which the central processing unit
(CPU) of the computer uses to store data that it is manipulating. Thus, for example, when
a user launches a software program, the computer copies portions of the program from the
fixed storage (typically the hard drive) into the RAM. This is a necessary step in the running
of the program (or the accessing of a particular document or image). See id. at 519.
26. See id.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
28. Id.

2001]

OWNING DIGITAL COPIES

1257

software program, a computer must copy portions of that software
from the disk or other medium on which it is stored into the
computer's RAM. These copies exist only temporarily while the
program is running, and are erased once the program is no longer
running or once the computer is turned off. Because the copies in
the computer RAM were only transitory, Peak argued, they were
not "fixed."29
The Ninth Circuit panel rejected this argument. Although it cited
a number of cases holding that copies made on a computer's hard
disk, or read only memory (ROM), were sufficiently "fixed" to
constitute "copies," ' ° the court noted that it found no case
specifically holding that the creation of a copy in computer RAM
was sufficiently 'Tixed."3 ' Nevertheless, the court went on, without
much further discussion, to apply the plain language of the Act,
concluding that a copy made in RAM was sufficiently fixed because
it could be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated"
with the aid of a machine, namely, the computer.3 2 The court
further rejected the argument that Peak's actions were privileged
under section 117 of the Act, which expressly permits "owners" of
software to make or authorize the making of copies of software as
an "essential step in the utilization" of the software."3 The purpose
of the section was to permit the owners of computer software to
both use software they had purchased and to make backup copies
in order to guard against the loss of such copies. The MAI court
concluded, however, that the statutory privilege was not available
because the user in the case was not an "owner" of the program, but

29. See MAJ, 991 F.2d at 519.
30. See id.; Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
31. The court in MAI did not cite ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp.
1310 (N.D. 11. 1990), which appears to have addressed nearly the identical issue (and
reached essentially the same result) three years prior to MA!.
32. MAI, 991 F.2d at 519.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 117. See generally Robert A. Kreiss, Section 117 of the CopyrightAct,
1991 BYU L. REV. 1497.
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merely a licensee.34 The court did not address the question of fair
use, as the defense was not before it. 35
The Ninth Circuit's decision in MA! has received no dearth of
criticism.3 6 Commentators have objected mainly to the court's literal
application of the terms of the Act to a completely novel context
without any consideration of the broader purposes or policies
underlying the statutory fixation requirement.3 Indeed, RAM
copies of computer software would appear to pose little if any threat
to the incentives. of software copyright owners. In selling or
licensing a copy of computer software, copyright owners fully expect
users to run the program, and a necessary incident to running the
program is the creation of copies of the program in a computer's
RAM. Thus, the creation of a RAM copy is an inherent part of the
software's intended use."8 Moreover, the RAM copy is not generally
a substitute for the original program (as would be the case, for
example, with a copy made on a hard disk). Accordingly, it is

34. See MA, 991 F.2d at 518-19; see also DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse
Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reaching same result on nearly
identical facts); Applied Info. Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (same). But see Telecommunications Technical Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rohm
Communications, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding that licensee was
"owner" under section 117).
35. But see Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting fair use under nearly identical facts).
36. See, e.g., Boyle, supranote 22, at 87 (noting in his survey of the literature at least 10
articles criticizingMAI, and no more than one arguing that it was correctly decided); Lemley,
supra note 14, at 557 n.63 (listing articles). But see I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM
"Copies": Hit or Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching As a Microcosm of Current
Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 425, 452-55 (1997) (arguing that courts are
properly interpreting "copy" to extend to "accessr or "use" of digital copies).
37. Many interesting real-world analogies have been drawn in an attempt to shed light
on the novel character of RAM copies. See, e.g., Ira L. Brandriss, Writing in Frost on a
Window Pane:E-Mailand ChattingonRAM and CopyrightFixation,43 J. COPYRIGHTSOC'Y
237 (1996) (writing in the sand, arranging scrabble tiles); Pamela Samuelson, The U.S.
DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INVL L. 369, 382 n.75 (1997) (holding a mirror up to a
book) (citing Pamela Samuelson, The NII Intellectual Property Report, Comm. ACM, Dec.
1994, at 21).
38. MAI of course limited such use through a license with the user. Thus, MAI
presumably had a cause of action against the user for permitting Peak to use its software in
a manner that violated the terms of the license.
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difficult to see why, as a policy matter,3 9 copyright law should be
concerned with preventing RAM copies.40
Commentators have also criticized the legal sources that the MAI
court relied upon."' As the court itself noted, none of the cases it
cited dealt expressly with the creation of copies in a computer's
RAM. Rather, they dealt with the much different context of copies
embedded in computer ROM or magnetic storage (i.e., disk), which
exist in a relatively more permanent state. In addition, the
legislative history behind the 1976 Act gives no indication that
Congress ever intended that RAM copies be considered sufficiently
fixed to trigger the reproduction right. In fact, a House Report
points in the opposite direction: "[The definition of 'fixation' would
exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient
reproductions such as those ... captured* momentarily in the
'memory' of a computer."42 The MAI court did cite, in a footnote,
language from the CONTU Final Report, which, in the course of
recommending other changes to the 1976 Act, asserted that under
then-existing copyright law, "[t]he introduction of a work into a
computer memory would, consistent with the law, be a reproduction
of the work, one of the exclusive rights of the copyright
proprietor."' As numerous commentators have pointed out,
however, this statement is of limited value, as it is inconsistent
with prior authoritative legislative history, may well be an
inaccurate statement of existing law, and has no authoritative

39. Indeed, the result in MA raises a number of antitrust concerns. See MAI, 991 F.2d

at 524.
40. The result in MA41 may have been influenced by the unique posture of the case,

involving the use of the software by a third party who competedwithMAI in offering service.
See Nimmer, supranote 13, at 10.

41. In addition to these criticisms, commentators have also argued that (1) the court
erred in applying section 117; (2) the conduct was privileged under fair use, which the court
failed to consider, and (3) MAI's actions amounted to copyright misuse. See Boyle, supranote
22, at 92.
42. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5666.
43. NATIONALCOMMISSIONONNEwTEcHNoLoGIcALUSES OFCOPYRIGHTEDWORKS, Final
Report 23 (1978).
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weight of its own because Congress did not rely on it to enact any
subsequent changes in the statute."
Despite the wealth of criticism, the result in MAI seems to be
gaining support. The holding has since been adopted by nearly
every federal court that has addressed the issue. 4'5 Another panel of
the Ninth Circuit substantially followed the reasoning laid out in
MAI in a case with substantially similar facts involving a third
party who serviced and maintained computers leased out by the
plaintiff.' This panel furthermore considered and rejected a fair
use defense, holding that the RAM copies were not privileged,
largely because of the commercial purpose of those servicing the
computers, as well as the potential harm to the plaintiffs market
for maintenance and service of its computers .4 A panel of the D.C.
Circuit has also adopted the rule in MAI, in StenographL.L.C. v.
BrossardAssociates, Inc." In that case, the defendant purchased
unauthorized copies of the plaintiffs expensive stenographic
software at below market prices from one of the plaintiffs
employees. Following MAI, the panel held that the defendant's
subsequent use of that software resulted in the creation of RAM
copies of the software, thereby infringing upon the plaintiffs
exclusive right to reproduce. 9 Separate panels of the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits have also adopted the result in passing." Thus,
even in the face of substantial criticism, the rule laid out by MAT
appears to be gaining a foothold in the courts.5 '
44. See Boyle, supra note 22, at 92.
45. See cases cited supranote 12; see also Stenograph L.L.C.v. BossardAssocs., Inc., 144

F.3d96 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citingMAl); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Advanced Computer Serve., Inc. v.
MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same).
46. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
47. This last observation has come under particular criticism, because it is not at all clear
that this interest in a connected market (instead of the primary market for the work itself)
is a relevant one for copyright purposes. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at 54.
48. 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
49. This case presents a clear example of the way in which digital copies are treated
differently from physical copies. If the copy in question had been a physical book, then the
defendant would clearly have had the right to read the book as many times as he or she
wanted, even if it were sold without authorization from the copyright owner.
50. See DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597,600 (5th Cir. 1996);
NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1995).
51. In both MAI andStenograph, it seems relatively clear that the particular facts ofthe
cases had an impact on the ultimate decisions and on the doctrinal moves necessary to reach
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Furthermore, the result in MA received a substantial boost
through the Clinton administration's wholesale adoption of the MA!
decision as settled law and its heavy reliance on it as a basis for
subsequent copyright legislation and as a framework for its
Internet copyright policy as a whole. In 1995, a Working Group
appointed by the Clinton administration issued a White Paper that
set forth a proposed framework for adapting intellectual property
rights to the online environment, what the White Paper called the
"National Information Infrastructure" (NII). 2 Citing the MAI
decision, the White Paper asserted that it has "long been clear
under U.S. law" that RAM copies of copyrighted works, as well as
any other incidental copies made during the transmission of such
works through the Internet, implicated the copyright owner's
exclusive right of reproduction.' The White Paper then went on to
suggest "minor clarification[s] and limited amendment[s]"
to
54
copyright law that would merely reinforce the settled view.
Reflecting the view of the White Paper, the result in MAI now
appears to have received legislative affirmation in the recently
enacted DMCA. Enacted by Congress in 1998, the DMCA
represents Congress's attempt to address some of the perceived
challenges facing copyright law as a result of the advent of digital
technology.' Inserted among the more attention-grabbing
the decision. InMAI, the court was very likelyinfluenced by the fact that the defendant was
providing maintenance services that competed directly with services provided by the
copyright owner, and thus appeared to be, in some sense, free-riding on the plaintiffs
copyright. And in Stenograph,the court was very likely influenced by the clearly improper
(and likely illegal) actions on the part of the plaintiff's employee in selling to the defendant
copies of software that were not authorized for sale. Thus, in both cases, the courts could be
seen as stretching copyright law to reach the desired result. However, this does not change
the fact that copyright law has now been stretched, and subsequent decisions appear to be
reinforcing that stretch.
52. See WHITE PAPER, supranote 10.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id. at 17, 211-20.
55. In particular, the DMCA makes it an infringement to circumvent technological
measures used to prevent copyrighted works from being copied-i.e., copy-protection
mechanisms. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1999). The DMCA also makes itan infringement
to tamper with "copyright management information," information that a copyright owner
attaches to a copy of a work that includes such bits of information as the identity of the
owner of the copyright, how to contact the owner, terms of use, etc. Id. § 1202. The DMCA
contains a number of narrow exemptions to these provisions. See, e.g., id. § 1201(d)-(i)
(including exemptions for nonprofit libraries and educational institutions, law enforcement,
reverse engineering, encryption research, and security testing). Finally, the DMCA contains
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provisions of the DMCA is a small provision amending section 117
of the Copyright Act to overrule legislatively the specific result
reached by the Ninth Circuit in MA!." That provision, the
Computer Maintenance or Repair Copyright Exemption, carves out
a specific exception that allows third-party computer maintenance
companies to run software residing on a given machine for purposes
of repairing the computer:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner or lessee of a machine to make
or authorize the making of a copy of a computer program if
such copy is made solely by virtue of the activation of a machine
that lawfully contains an authorized copy of the computer
program, for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that
machine .... 5'

Yet, in reaching this result, Congress gives added support to MA!'s
holding that RAM copies are copies for the purposes of the
Copyright Act. The provision, by its very terms, assumes that a
copy "made solely by virtue of the activation of a machine"'8 is a
copy for the purposes of the Copyright Act (else, why the
exception?). Although Congress, in the legislative history behind
this provision, did not purport to change the underlying law
regarding the scope of the right to control reproduction, 59 the
provision itself suggests Congress was at least sufficiently
concerned to enact a specific provision guarding against the result.
Thus, in cases arising after the enactment of the DMCA, copyright
owners will be able to draw on additional support for the argument
that RAM copies are copies for the purposes of the Copyright Act.
B. Implications and Questions
Driving the sharp criticism of the result in MA! is a broader
concern that the result drastically and unthinkingly shifts the
rather extensive provisions insulating Internet service providers (ISPs), under certain
circumstances, from liability for carrying infringing material. See id. § 512.
56. See id. § 117(c).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-796, at 76, reprintedin 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 652.
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existing balance of rights in copyrighted works from users to
copyright owners in the digital environment. Because computer
software is copied into RAM as a necessary incident to the use of
that software, the decision in MAI effectively gives copyright
owners the right to control any and all uses of the software, unless
such uses are subject to some statutory privilege.6" In addition,
nothing in the reasoning of the opinion prevents it from being
extended from computer software to any and all works stored in
digital form, such as images, text documents, sound recordings, and
motion pictures.6 1 Indeed, several federal courts have extended the
rule in MAI to just such digital works.62 In accessing a digital work
through a computer, a copy is necessarily made in the computer's
RAM. Temporary copies are also made in numerous computers
whenever a work is transmitted through the Internet. Taken to its
logical conclusion, MA would give copyright owners broad control,
at least in theory, over nearly all computer-aided uses of
copyrighted works encoded in digital form.63 Jessica Litman has in
fact suggested that the rule in MAI effectively restricts the user's
"right to read" digital works."
To appreciate the potential impact of MAI, it may help to
consider a few concrete examples. First, as indicated above, an
individual's ability to access or use a digital copy of a copyrighted
work might be quite restricted under MA!. Say, for example, that
a friend hands you a disk containing a copy of an interesting article
she read and downloaded. Unbeknownst to you, the copy is an
60. Section 117 of the Copyright Act is just such a privilege, for computer software.
61. Copies ofthese types ofworks, unlike software, do not fall within the scope of section

117.
62. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290
(D. Utah 1999) (text on a website); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Speciality, Inc., 55 F.'
Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Nev. 1999) (images); Marobie-FL v. NationalAss'n ofFire Equip. Distribs.,
983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Il. 1997) (clip art); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (text).
63. See Litman, supra note 3, at 37 ("Today, making digital reproductions is an

unavoidable incident ofreading, viewing, listening to, learning from, sharing, improving, and
reusing works embodied in digital media.").
64. Litman, supra note 13, at 40 ("A handful of recent interpretations of the statute,
however, insist that one reproduces a work every time one reads it into a computer's random
access memory. For all works encoded in digital form, any act of reading or viewing the work
would require the use of a computer, and would, under this interpretation, involve an
actionable reproduction.").
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unauthorized copy of the article.6 5 By inserting the disk into your
computer and accessing the article to view it, you are creating a
digital copy of that article in the RAM of your computer. The act of
viewing the article would, under MAI, infringe upon the copyright
owner's exclusive right to reproduce the copy. Or, to take another
example, say that your friend, instead of giving you a copy, told you
where to access that article online. Again unbeknownst to you, the
owner of the website on which the article resides did not obtain
authorization to make it available on the Internet. In the process of
browsing the article, a copy is created in the RAM of your computer,
once again implicating the reproduction right under MA. 66 In each
case, you would be liable for copyright infiingement under the rule
laid down by MAI, unless you could argue some kind of statutory
privilege.6" By contrast, there is no current action against someone
who reads an infringing physical copy of a copyrighted work.
Although the above examples might appear fanciful and of
interest only theoretically (after all, who would sue?), cases are in
fact beginning to appear under precisely such circumstances. For
example, in IntellectualReserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry,
Inc.,6 8 a federal district court held that browsing a website
containing infringing material could constitute copyright
infringement. In that case, the Utah Lighthouse Ministry sued a
website that contained links to a site that contained an
unauthorized copy of the Mormon Church Handbook of
Instructions.6 9 The court found the website liable for contributory
infringement for directing individuals to the site.7" In so finding, the
court expressly (and necessarily) held that the individuals who were
directed to the site, and who browsed the unauthorized copy, were
65. Note that copyright liability does not depend on awareness that the activity is
infringing, although "innocent" infringement may limit the amount of damages. See 17
U.S.C. § 504 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
66. Browsers also often create copies of the work in a "cache" located on the computer's
hard drive. Such copies more clearly implicate the reproduction right, even absent MA.!,
because they are quite clearly fixed. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,
260 (5th Cir. 1988); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 321 (C.D.
Cal. 1984). See generally Hardy, supra note 36.
67. I discuss these privileges in more detail below.
68. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D. Utah. 1999).
69. See id. at 1292.
70. See id. at 1292-95.
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committing direct infringement when their computers created
copies of the work in the RAM of their computers.7 1 Thus, under the
rule in MA!, unauthorized browsing could constitute infringement.
Second, transmission of digital documents over the Internet could
well result in multiple infringements. When a digital work is sent
over the Internet, numerous temporary copies are made in the
many computers on the Internet through which the work passes.
So, if I send a copy of a work to a friend, temporary copies will be
made on the computers of my Internet service provider (ISP), on
various routers on the Internet, on my friend's service provider, and
on my friend's computer. Each of these copies could potentially
result in infringement under MAI. Thus, in the second example
offered above, by pointing my browser at a certain web page, I
request that the contents of the article be transmitted to my
computer. Copies of portions of the article will be transmitted
temporarily through many different computers on the Internet on
their way to my computer.7 2 Thus, under the rule in MAI,
temporary copies made in the transmission of a digital copy over
the Internet might potentially give rise to liability. This unhappy
consequence of the MA! decision was in fact expressly addressed by
Congress in the portions of the DMCA that provide certain safe
harbors for ISPs that satisfy certain criteria.7 3 Accordingly, it is now
of comparably less concern, at least for those who fall within the
safe harbor. The DMCA's response to this issue, however, again
reflects its implicit acceptance of the result in MA.
71. See id. at 1294.
72. See Lemley, supranote 14, at 550.
73. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp.V 1999), which notes that a service provider is not
liable if(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a
person other than the service provider,
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried
out through an automatic technical process without selection of the
material by the service provider,
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients ofthe material except as
an automatic response to the request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider... is maintained on
the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other
than anticipated recipients, and . . . for [no] longer period than is

reasonably necessary for transmission...; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without
modification of its content.
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Third, the first sale doctrine is essentially eliminated, or at least
greatly limited, under the holding of MAI. Whereas, in the physical
world, I could transfer, lend, or sell a physical copy to another
person, in the digital environment, each of these actions would
result in the creation of a copy, both in the RAM of my computer
and on the recipient's computer, thus implicating the reproduction
right. Therefore, if I wish to sell my digital copy of an article that I
have legitimately downloaded (and paid for) from the Web by
transmitting the article to the purchaser by e-mail, I will be
creating a copy of that article in the RAM of my computer, on
various computers throughout the Internet, and ultimately on the
purchaser's computer. Similarly, copying the article onto a disk and
handing her the disk will also result in numerous copies, again in
my RAM, on the disk, and in the RAM of the purchaser's computer
when she views it. Deleting my copy shortly after copying it74 will not
change the fact that additional copies have been created.
These are just a few examples of the way in which, as a result of
the ubiquitous copying that attends digital copies, copyright owners
may have substantially increased control over the use and
disposition of digital copies under the rule of MAT. Indeed,
whereas physical copy owners retain broad residual rights over
their copies as a result of physical property laws, digital copy
owners appear to have hardly any rights at all, because nearly
every use involves copying. Although possession is usually thought
to be nine-tenths of the law, it appears to amount to much less in
the digital environment. And perhaps the most disturbing feature
of such a shift in the balance of rights and access is the fact that
this shift results almost entirely from an accident of technology,
rather than from any careful or thoughtful consideration of
copyright policy. If the result in MA! is taken seriously, copyright
74. Note that the problem exists even in the absence of the rule laid down by MA!,
because in this case, a second, permanently fixed copy is created (i.e., the copy on your
friend's hard drive or disk). The rule in MAI merely exacerbates the problem.
75. I have here focused almost exclusively on the right to reproduce. Other rights in the
bundle of copyright owner rights might well be implicated in many of the above examples.
For example, the right to distribute copies to the public and the right to display the work
publicly are likely implicated in some of the above examples. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999); see also Lemley, supra note 14, at 550-67 (discussing how browsing or
transmitting information over the Internet can potentially violate every right listed in the
Copyright Act). I will consider the interaction of these various rights in more detail below.
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owners will be given potentially greater control over the uses of
their works simply because computer technology happens to create
temporary and incidental copies of digital works in the process of
accessing and transmitting them, and not because such an
extension of rights furthers the policies underlying copyright law.76
In particular, commentators argue that the MAI decision, if taken
seriously, would greatly increase the potential scope of liability of
nearly all participants on the existing Internet, as temporary copies
of documents are constantly made as a necessary incident to
transmission of, and access to, documents through the Internet."
In fact, however, the implications of MA!, though troubling, are
likely somewhat less radical than they might at first appear. First,
despite the trend in the case law and the recent enactment of the
DMCA, 78 it is not completely clear that the decision in MA.! is
settled law. MAT represents the rule in only two circuits (four, if you
count dicta), and rests on a sufficiently fragile legal foundation that
it could be overturned by subsequent judicial or legislative
developments.7" Moreover, a few decisions from other circuits have
pointed the other way. 0 Thus, despite the added support conferred
by the DMCA and several district court decisions, the courts will
ultimately decide whether the rule is in fact well settled (though,
admittedly, the trend suggests that MA! currently has the bulk'of
the support). Second, even if the result in MA.! survives, the net
impact of MA! on the balance of rights between copyright owners
and users cannot accurately be assessed without careful
consideration of other avenues of escaping liability, such as fair use
and implied licenses.8 " Such avenues of escaping liability help
76. See Sean R. Calvert, Note, A Digital World Out of Balance, 13 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 545, 553-55 (1997) (discussing the ramifications of allowing

copyright owners to control the temporary incidental copies created through Internet
transmission).
77. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting the potential for "unreasonable liability").
78. See supranotes 45-55 and accompanying text.
79. This is not, however, to underestimate the potentially adverse consequences resulting
from legislation based on an inaccurate assumption that the rule in MAI is in fact well
settled.
80. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
81. See Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformationof CopyrightLaw, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1395, 1402-10 (1996) (reviewing possible defenses); Lemley, supra note 14, at 567
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ameliorate some of the most disturbing implications of MAI,
although, as we see, they do not go far enough.
Indeed, some notion of implied license may excuse many
temporary copies of copyrighted works, such as those created in
RAM when a computer loads a web page. By making the page
accessible on the Web, the author almost certainly grants those who
access the page an implied license to create a RAM copy, and any
other technologically incidental copies, when they view it. 82
Similarly, in sending an e-mail, an author may grant the recipient
an implied license to copy the text of the e-mail in a reply or when
forwarding it to a third person (though this is substantially less
certain). Finally, in selling a piece of software to a user, the seller
implicitly (if not expressly) licenses the user to make any copies
necessary to make use of the program. 3 Many current problems
may thus be settled through creative application ofimplied licenses
and through careful examination of the customs and conventions
that exist in various online environments.
Implied licenses are limited, however, in a number of ways. First,
implied licenses can be expressly disavowed by the copyright
owner.' Thus, the copyright owner still has potentially extensive
control over how copies of the work are used.' Second, and perhaps
more problematically, implied licenses can be granted only by the
rightful copyright owner."6 Implied license, therefore, would be no
defense to the browsing or use of an unauthorized copy of a work.87
(acknowledging these avenues, but expressing doubt about their practical significance);
Nimmer, supra note 13, at 51 (arguing that these avenues in fact take care of many of the
concerns raised by MAI).

82. See Kara Beal, Comment, The Potential Liability of Linking on the Internet: An
Examinationof PossibleLegal Solutions, 1998 BYU L. R.V. 703, 723-24.

83. Thus rendering 17 U.S.C. § 117 largely unnecessary. If anything, the enactment of
section 117 has had the effect of casting doubt on the argument that fair use or implied
licenses operate to privilege the type of use specified in section 117.
84. See Lemley, supranote 14, at 567; see also Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the
Merits of Copyright:The Challengesof Consistency,Consent,and EncouragementTheory, 41

STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) (noting thata copyright owner has the ability to forbid others from
using her words in certain ways).
85. Indeed, ifthe default rule is that access is infringement, thenimplied licenses permit
copyright owners to impose conditions on access that might not be enforceable under

ordinary contract law principles.
86. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 567.
87. Even ifimplied licenses did in fact take care ofmany ofthe potential problems raised
by MAT, they provide no theoretically satisfying answer to the question posed by MA!. The
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For example, say that a person incorporates another person's
copyrighted image in her web page, without having obtained
permission to do so. By browsing that image, a visitor creates a copy
of that image in the RAM of his or her computer. No implied license
operates to privilege the use, however, because the owner of the
copyright is not responsible for making it available on the Web.8 8
Similarly, if a friend sends you an unauthorized copy of a work by
e-mail (say, for example, a Far Side or Dilbert cartoon), viewing
that work will not be subject to any implied license from the
copyright owner.
Fair use potentially provides a better basis for such situations, 9
because the defense does not depend on any relationship (express
or implied) between the author and user. Under the fair use
doctrine, many RAM or other temporary copies of digital works
might well be privileged."0 For example, the temporary copies made
on many computers on the Internet as an incident to sending a
work over the Internet would, in all likelihood, constitute fair use,
even absent the specific provisions laid down by the DMCA.9 1 They
typically are not, by themselves, substitutes for the original work.
Similarly, though perhaps a closer call, accessing even an
unauthorized copy of an image or other document on one's hard
drive or on someone else's website might constitute fair use.9 2
Although the Ninth Circuit in TriadSystems Corp. v. Southeastern

potential existence oflicensing does nothelp answer the underlying question of whether the
copyright owner properly possesses a right that requires licensing. Thus, for example, the
sale of a book could be interpreted as conferring an unlimited implied license to read that
book. This says nothing, however, about whether the copyright owner possesses (or should
possess) any right to control reading.
88. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1290, 1295 (D. Utah 1999).
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also Lemley, supranote 14, at 566 (maintaining that
fair use is a good defense in the context of computer networks).
90. See Keith Kupferschmid, Lost in Cyberspace:The Digital Demise of the First-Sale
Doctrine, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COmPUTER & INFO. L. 824, 841 n.60 (1998) (arguing that "[i]n
many caes, temporary, incidental reproductions, such as when copies are made in RAM when
browsing the Internet will constitute a fair use").
91. See Lemley, supranote 14, at 566.
92. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361,1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that browsingis likely fair use). But see Triad
Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330,1336 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejectingfair use
defense).
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Express Co. held that the making of a RAM copy was not fair use, 93
the commercial setting of that case likely played a substantial part
in the decision, and more private access to digital works might well
be privileged. Similarly, it is possible that incidental copies created
in the transfer of a digital copy might be privileged if the original
copy is quickly deleted, thereby preserving functionally a sort of
first sale doctrine. 9' The courts would be required to flesh out the
precise outlines of the fair use defense in these numerous
situations. Each of these defenses, however, at least suggests that
the direst predictions about the MAI decision need not come to
may well be quite robust, even
pass.9 5 Users' access to digital works
96
MA!.
by
down
laid
rule
the
under
Nevertheless, fair use, too, has substantial limitations as a
mechanism for tempering some of the potentially radical effects of
the rule in MAI. Most obviously, fair use is an affirmative defense
and may require costly litigation before a given use is recognized as
fair.97 Thus, under the rule in MAI, once the copyright owner has
established that the defendant accessed the work, the burden rests
upon the defendant to establish the defense affirmatively.
93. 64 F.3d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. See David L. Hayes,Advanced CopyrightIssues on the Internet,7 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 1, 98 (1998). Hayes maintains:
One could readily argue that in such instances the first sale doctrine should
apply by analogy..

so long as the purchaser deletes his or her original copy

from storage, because in that instance, as in the case of traditional distributions
of physical copies, no more total copies end up in circulation than were
originally sold by or under authority of the copyright owner.
Id.
95. Moreover, one might well ask whether the uncertainty that inevitably attends caseby-case adjudication in an area of rapid change is preferable to the certainty offered by
premature legislation.
96. Both Mark Lemley and Jessica Litman have expressed concern about the ability of
fair use to provide an adequate safe harbor for many of these technologically incidental
copies, pointing to the cost, difficulty, and uncertainty of the defense. See Lemley, supranote
14, at 567; Litman, supra note 3, at 21.
97. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 566 (noting that fair use is only a defense and
defendants face a strongevidentiaryburden). Perhaps more likely, infi-ngement proceedings
would rarely be brought (and even more rarely defended) against many ofthe personal and
distributed uses discussed above, and the status of the particular use would remain
substantially unclear. For example, the fair use status of home taping of recorded music was
never definitively settled in the courts, and was only expressly privileged, in the end, through
legislative action. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563,106 Stat. 4237
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)).
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Furthermore, the fair use defense is a notoriously fuzzy and
complex privilege, requiring the case-by-case balancing of multiple
statutory factors, often resulting in outcomes that are hard to
predict."8 In particular, the opinion in Triadsuggests that whether
accessing a digital work is fair use may depend to a large extent
on the particular circumstances surrounding the use. Thus,
substantial uncertainty will likely attend many of the uses
mentioned above, and such uncertainty can have a chilling effect on
behavior we might find desirable. Even if we might believe rather
strongly that a given use (say, viewing a copy of a Far Side cartoon
that you received in your e-mail) is fair use, a degree of uncertainty
will continue to exist concerning that use. Put more generally, even
if the scope of users' rights in the digital environment is, in the end,
roughly and practically equivalent to the rights in the physical
environment, there may well be reasons to be concerned about the
way in which .ALI shifts these very basic users' "rights" (for
example, to read, transfer, etc.) from a clearly privileged realm into
the much fuzzier and contextual realm of fair use.9 9 Whereas in the
hard-copy world, I had a clear right to read my book as many times
as I wished, in the digital world, my right to read my digital copy
will depend on a number of factors, such as how much of it I read,
whether I am reading it for a commercial purpose, the impact on
the market, etc.' Or, to put it more simply, do we want reading
and accessing a digital work to be a matter of fair use?
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); Steven D. Smit, Esq., "Make a Copy for the File..
Copyright Infringement By Attorneys, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) (noting "the Copyright

Act adopted [a] Tuzzy' equitable test" relying on "four case-specific factors to be considered
in determining whether an author's work is being used fairly by another").
99. Moreover, fuzzy rules maytendto advantage parties thathave greater resources, and
to the extent one is concerned about distributional implications, such a change in the nature
of the right may be of concern.
100. As a general matter, most economic analyses of property rights regimes support
establishment of clear property rights entitlements, in order to facilitate market
transactions, reduce the potential for dispute over such rights, and lower the costs of
adjudicating such disputes, if brought. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed,
PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L.
REV. 1089 (1972); Carol Rose, CrystalsandMud in PropertyLaw, 40 STANL. REV. 577 (1988).
But see Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995) (exploring a different way of
dividingan entitlement); DanL. BurkMuddyRules for Cyberspace,21 CARDOZOL. REV. 121,
170 (1999) (suggesting that muddy rules may in fact be preferable under certain
circumstances).
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Finally, individuals might take some comfort in lack of
enforcement of the rights set forth inMAI. In many cases, copyright
owners will have no idea whether an individual is browsing an
unauthorized copy of their work or loading a copy into RAM, and,
even if they are aware, may not have sufficient incentives to pursue
such individuals if the damages are minimal. Indeed, if some of the
infringers are innocent infringers, then copyright owners would
essentially be limited to nominal damages and injunctive relief, and
would not be entitled to statutory damages, further reducing the
incentive to sue.'0 1 The cases that have been brought so far suggest
rather unusual circumstances. At the same time, however, cases are
beginning to arise in the more common circumstances of Web
browsing and access to software. 0 2 Moreover, there may well be
reason to be troubled by a rule that relies too heavily on
underenforcement (along with implied licenses and fair use
defenses) to mitigate undesirable and irrational results. If such
escape hatches are frequently necessary to make the underlying
entitlement reasonable, then it seems as though the original
allocation of the entitlement should be called into question.
Even more broadly, regardless of whether the ultimate effects of
the rule announced in MAI are as dire as predicted, MAI raises a
fundamental question about what, as a matter of copyright law
policy and purposes, the appropriate balance of rights between
copyright owners and the owners of digital copies should be. That
is, the ultimate impact of MAI may or may not drastically shift the
balance of rights and access between copy owners and copyright
owners." 3 Neither MAI nor many of the commentators, however,
expressly address the reasons for supporting or resisting such a
shift."0 ' As noted above, neither the MA court nor the White Paper
expressly addresses the policy implications of their rote application
of the terms of the Copyright Act to the new circumstances
surrounding digital technology.' 5 Equally troubling, however, is
101. See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. V 1999).
102. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1290 (D. Utah 1999).
103. See Calvert, supra note 76, at 554-55 (maintaining that MA could upset the
traditional balance between users and copyright owners).
104. But see id. (arguing against this shift because it could grant owners substantially
greater power, enabling them to control both public and private displays of works).
105. But see Boyle, supra note 22, at 89-90.
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many of the commentators' failure to justify adequately why it is so
important to preserve the existing distribution of rights that exists
with respect to physical copies. Rather, it is largely assumed that
the ability of copy owners to access, read, transfer, and lend copies
is an important part of copyright law worth preserving.
The issue raised in MA! thus presents us with the opportunity to
examine the role these incidents of copy ownership play in current
copyright law. As noted above, up to now we have not had much
occasion to examine the status of these incidents of copy ownership,
because their existence and status have never really been
questioned in the world of physical copies. Of course people have a
right to read books in their possession. (What could be more
obvious?) The advent of digital technology, however, now forces us
to examine these questions as these incidents of copy ownership
come into conflict with the underlying right to reproduce. Are these
incidents of physical copy ownership an inherent part of the
existing copyright balance? Are they an accident of our current
print-based technology? Or is the answer more complicated than
that? Only after these more fundamental questions are addressed
does it make sense to think about how, if at all, to translate these
"rights" into the digital environment."'
C. Framework for Analysis
To begin to answer these questions, we need to examine and
understand the source and justification for the existing distribution
of rights and access in physical copies and, in particular, the status
of the ability of the owner of a physical copy to access, read, lend,
and sell his or her copy of a copyrighted work. Such a consideration
is necessary because straightforward doctrinal legal analysis is
unlikely to yield a satisfactory answer to the puzzles presented by
digital copies. Although literal application of the terms of the
statute is possible, as MA demonstrates, the novel challenges
presented by digital technology give reason at least to question
whether such application coincides with the underlying policies and

106. Indeed, a strong argument canbe made that the lack ofexpress justification for these
physical incidents of copy ownership explains, in part, the ease with which the MAlcourt and
the DMCA gloss over such incidents.
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purposes of the Copyright Act."0 7 After all, as discussed above, it is
clear that Congress in 1976 gave little or no thought to the specific
results that flow from the MAI decision. Accordingly, it is fair to ask
whether those results are in fact consistent with the broader
policies underlying the Copyright Act.' Indeed, consideration of
such broader policy issues is characteristic of the constant judicial
attempts to grapple with the implications of new technologies in
copyright law as a whole, in the absence of clear legislative
guidance. 09
In the following Parts of this Article, I expand the scope of the
discussion to examine what theoretical justifications might provide
support for the incidents of copy ownership. I start by setting forth
and charting the development of the familiar bundle of rights the
Copyright Act confers upon the authors of copyrighted works. I
continue on to give a descriptive account of what the Copyright Act
does not give to authors, at least with respect to physical copies,
whether through omission, through gaps in the structure of the
statute, or expressly in the form of legislatively created exceptions
to the bundle of copyright rights. Having descriptively set forth this
distribution of rights, I then look at various possible normative
justifications for this distribution drawn from the primary
theoretical frameworks developed to explain copyright law in
general. In particular, I focus on whether various economic and
noneconomic theories can justify the specific distribution of rights
between copy owners and copyright owners.
107. See Boyle, supranote 22, at 89-90 (discussinghow MAT contradicts the proposed goals

of copyright law because it restricted access to works, rather than promoting dissemination
of works).

108. See id. Adherents to certain theories of statutory interpretation might object that
such an inquiry is inappropriate, and that the MA panel's literal application of the plain

terms of the statute is entirely proper. See generally ANTONIN SCAuA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). This is not the place to engage in
a lengthy discussion of differing theories of statutory interpretation. Suffice it to say that,

even apart from the significant problems that attend such theories, they are particularly
inapt in situations such as this, which dealwith areas of significant technological change and
corresponding congressional inability to respond to such change. See generallyWILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (arguing that statutory

interpretation is dynamic and that originalist theories are irrelevant).
109. See, e.g., Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (VCR);
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (photocopying);
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Cl. Ct. 1973) (photocopying).
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Throughout this analysis, I frame the question in terms of what
precisely the owners of a copy "own" when they purchase or
otherwise acquire a physical copy of a copyrighted work. That is,
after acquiring a copy, what can they do with it? This is a reversal
of the usual copyright inquiry, which focuses primarily on what
copyright owners own. Although this is a somewhat unconventional
perspective, I believe this shift in perspective is valuable because it
puts emphasis squarely on the issue with which we are concerned:
the status of the ability of owners of physical copies to access, read,
lend, rent, and sell copies in their possession. This approach avoids
the danger, so clearly illustrated byMA.!, of ignoring these features
of copyright law by focusing exclusively on the rights of copyright
owners. It may well be that, after all is said and done, what the
owners of physical copies "own" is little more than an accident of
technology, and that the MA! court is correct in holding that they
own nothing more in the digital context. Adopting the copy owner's
perspective, however, reduces the risk of arriving at this conclusion
without a careful consideration of the policy interests behind it.
In adopting the perspective of the copy owner, I am also
consciously avoiding the conventional copyright notion of a balance
between copyright owners and "users." That is, I am not so much
interested in the rights of users or consumers in the abstrat as I
am interested in the rights of one who has acquired possession of a
given copy of a copyrighted work. Although this may seem a trivial
distinction, it eliminates some of the conceptual confusion that has
tended to surround some of the existing debate. Put more
concretely, a potential problem with the decision in MA is not that
it does away with any abstract users' "right to read" or "right to
access." 110 No such abstract right exists in the physical world: I
have no right to read or access a book locked up in a stranger's
house, or shrink-wrapped in a bookstore, or held by a library of
which I am not a member."' Rather, the potential problem is that
MA.! threatens the right to read or access a copy that is in my
possession, that I "own" or have physical access to. The tension
results from conflicts between copyright owner and copy owner, not
users in the abstract.
110. Litman, supranote 13, at 40.
111. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at 44-45.
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This is not to say that changes in the distribution of rights
between copy owners and copyright owners may not have a global
or systemic influence on the general degree of access enjoyed by
users and consumers as a whole."' Nor is it to say that the global
impact of any distribution of rights is not relevant to the proper
distribution of rights. Indeed, as will be discussed below, a number
of the proposals that call for a functional translation of the existing
bundle of copy owner rights into the digital context rely implicitly
on a desire to maintain some preexisting overall balance of
incentives and access. Rather, my point is simply that these are two
separate (though related) questions, which, as an analytical matter,
warrant careful and separate consideration. As an initial matter,
focusing on the copy owner places emphasis more squarely on the
issue in question.
A few final words should be said on what the following analysis
does not address. The analysis in the following sections focuses on
a particular and rather highly focused question: what rights, if any,
does one obtain when one acquires possession of a digital copy of a
copyrighted work? That is, what can one do with that copy, simply
as a result of one's possession of that copy?1 1 The analysis does not
engage, at least expressly, in a discussion of the ability of copyright
owners to protect their works through contract (that is, "shrinkwrap" licenses) or through technology.11 4 Even if such measures are
used by copyright owners, underlying questions concerning what it
means to own a digital copy will still have relevance, for example,
in cases where third parties have acquired possession of digital
112. See, e.g., NivaElkin-Koren, Cyberlaw andSocial Change:ADemocraticApproachto
CopyrightLaw in Cyberspace,14 CARDozOARTS&ENT. L.J. 215,272 (1996) (discussingvalue
ofbrowsing books in a bookstore, or borrowing books from a library); Litman, supra note 13,
at 81; Netanel, supra note 11, at 375. But see Nimmer, supra note 13, at 44.
113. The analysis is also less concerned with how one obtains such a copy. The manner
in which a copy is obtained may have relevance with respect to the existence (or lack) of
express or implied license. Moreover, the acquisition of a copy may itself involve potential
liability. Copy acquisition issues distract attention from the core copyright question,
however, which centers on the proper scope of prohibitions against unknown third parties
who acquire copies. Once this question is settled, I will turn to consideration of the other
issues.
114. Some commentators have predicted the demise of the sale of copies as the dominant
method of content distribution. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of
AutomatedRights Managementon Copyright'sFairUse Doctrine,76N.C.L. Rxv. 557 (1998);
Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 16.
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copies of copyrighted works not subject to technological protection
or licenses." 5 (For example, consider how much unauthorized
software, unencumbered by either contract or technology, currently
exists). This is, after all, the salient feature of copyright law: it
restricts the rights of unknown third parties with whom the
copyright owner has no relationship.
Moreover, as the debate surrounding the White Paper has
illustrated, our understandings about the default rules clearly
inform how we deal with issues surrounding technological
protection or other copyright "substitutes," such as shrink-wrap
licensing.'1 6 To the extent one adopts the view that nearly every use
is a potential infingement, the desirability of licensing becomes
ever greater. Indeed, licensing becomes almost a necessity in order
to avoid ubiquitous infringement, and one might expect a perceived
need to facilitate such licensing (as evinced, for example, in the
DMCA"7 ). Conversely, to the extent one adopts the view that
certain uses are an inherent part of digital copy ownership and
possession, the need for elaborate licensing provisions becomes less
immediate. Rather, the burden is then placed upon the copyright
owner to establish and enforce restrictions on use. Accordingly, in
the next Part, I attempt to address first the underlying default
rules that should be set by copyright law in the absence of licensing
or technological protection. Only after consideration of this issue
will this Article move on, in Part IV, to consider expressly some of
the broader implications of the analysis for a number of these
118
copyright "substitutes."
115. In fact, the third-party scenario is in many ways the most interesting. Most
interactions between author and copy purchaser pose relatively few practical or conceptual
problems, because many uses can be resolved through licensing, whether express or implied.
Given this, concerns about restricting a "right to read" are, in this context, probably
exaggerated, as few individuals would purchase a copy of a digital work that they could not
subsequently access. The problem becomes much more acute, however, when third parties
acquire copies of digital works.
116. For example, the position adopted by the White Paper lends tremendous support to
licensing, because it is the only way to use a digital work while avoiding infringement.
Technological protection mechanisms lend support to licensing enforcement.
117. Specifically, the provisions protecting "copyright management information,"
information that is attached to copies of copyrighted works, indicating the author, date,
terms of use, etc. 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. V 1999).
118. See Paul Goldstein, Copyrightand its Substitutes, 1997 WIs. L.REV. 865 (1997). I am
generally skeptical ofthe ability of copyright legislation to effect informed, large-scale change
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II. OWNING PHYSICAL COPIES

Changing technology often forces us to examine issues that we
had long taken for granted." 9 This is both a burden and an
opportunity-a burden for obvious reasons, and an opportunity
because such a reexamination expands our perspective and offers
us a chance to better understand the existing state of affairs. Until
now, generally little attention has been paid to the question ofwhat
it means to possess a physical copy of a copyrighted work. Instead,
the focus has been primarily on the bundle of rights copyright law
confers on copyright owners. In many ways, this makes eminent
sense. With respect to physical copies, copyright law places
relatively few, and relatively specific, limits on how the owners of
copies can use and dispose of such copies. Copy owners enjoy
relatively broad residual "rights" with respect to their copies,
simply by virtue of their ownership of physical personal property.
In this Part of the Article, I reverse the perspective and examine
these copy owner "rights" through the lens of copyright law. I lay
out descriptively the existing balance of rights between copyright
owners and copy owners, discuss ways in which the Copyright Act
accounts for this balance, and track changes in this balance over
time.
First, however, a note on terminology. Up to this point, I have
been using "ownership" and "possession" rather interchangeably.
However, the two terms are, of course, not synonymous: if you lend
me a book, I possess it, but you own it. Let me be clear here that,
throughout this Article, I am, strictly speaking, concerned about the
rights that one acquires solely through possession of a digital copy,
whether or not one owns it. That is, whether you acquired the
digital copy of a Far Side cartoon through purchase, through
in copyright law as a whole. The last major revision of the Copyright Act, in 1976, took over
20 years and involved nearly unending negotiation among industry interest groups. See
Litman, supranote 17, at 870-72. Amendments to the act since then have revealed a similar
dynamic. See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994). The
recent enactment ofthe DMCA and the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act offer little
encouragement on this front.
119. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 14-15
(1997) (noting the way in which technology allows for changes in the physical environment);
Lawrence Lessig, The PathofCyberlaw, 104YALEL.J. 1743 (1995) (examining the regulation
of new technology compared to established principles and practices).
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unauthorized copying, through theft, or through a temporary loan
from a friend, the salient feature is the fact that you now have
possession of that copy. I use the terms "ownership" and
"possession" interchangeably, however, for two reasons: first,
because "owner is sometimes less awkward a formulation than
"possessor"; and second, because in the vast majority of situations
involving digital copies, there will be no relevant distinction
between the two. For example, if a friend sends me an unauthorized
copy of a Gary Larson cartoon by e-mail and it now resides on my
hard drive, I own the copy, the material object in which the work is
embodied (that is, my hard drive). In later parts of this Article,
however, I will expressly consider those special cases in which the
two terms might diverge, and how such a divergence should be
treated.
A What Copy Owners Do Not Own
In examining what copy owners own, it is easier to start with
what they do not own, because this is spelled out in rather fine
detail in the Copyright Act. The central right in the copyright
bundle of rights, and the main restriction on the copy owner's use
of a particular copy, is, of course, the right to reproduce the
copyrighted work, that is, the right to make copies. 2 ' More
specifically, as illustrated in MAI, the owner of a particular copy of
the work cannot "fix" that work in another copy. The reason for this
is familiar and goes to the heart of the basic justification for U.S.
copyright law." If owners of copies were permitted to reproduce
copyrighted works, they could create, sell, and distribute additional
copies of the work without incurring any of the costs associated
with creating the work in the first place. The price of copies would
thus be driven down to the marginal cost of reproducing the work,
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994); see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347
(1908) ("[I1t is evident that to secure the author the right to multiply copies of his work may
be said to have been the main purpose of the copyright statutes."); GOLDSTEIN, supra note
3, § 5.1 (discussing the right to reproduce).
121. At least in the United States, this is widely understood as the basic underlying
justification for copyright law. Other legal systems, particularly continental legal systems,
place greater emphasis on the moral rights of the author. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine
ofMoral Right: A Study in the Law ofArtists, Authors and Creators,53 HARv. L. REV. 554,
555-56 (1940).
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and the author of the work would be unable to recoup much, if any,
of his or her original investment in the creation of the work.
Without the possibility of such a return on investment, authors as
a whole would not have sufficient incentives to engage in creative
activity. 2 In focusing on tangible copies, copyright law thus
identifies and focuses upon the primary unit of potential harm to
creative incentives: the physical copy. By and large, the physical
copy is, and has historically been, the basic unit of consumption of
a work, and the unauthorized creation of additional units of
consumption undermines the copyright grant.'
In support of the central exclusive right to reproduce, copyright
law also gives authors the exclusive right to control initial
distribution of copies of the work to the public through sale, rental,
lease, or loan. 124 The primary function of this exclusive right seems
to be to facilitate enforcement of the underlying right to
reproduce.' That is, even without the public distribution right, an
author could intheory control public distribution of copies indirectly
by withholding authorization to make those copies in the first

122. This is not to deny that in specific areas authors may have sufficient incentives, both
monetary and nonmonetary (for example, academic papers), to engage in creative activity.
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 HARv. L. REV. 281,300-32 (1970) (suggesting that,
with specific respect to book publishing, other factors such as lead time may provide authors
with sufficient incentives to engage in creative activity). But see Barry W. Tyerman, The
Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor
Breyer, 18 UCLAL. REv. 1100, 1108-19 (1971) (arguing in favor of copyright protection for
economic reasons).
123. The Copyright Act's fixation requirement helps give specific shape to this basic unit
of harm. Unfixed copies of copyrighted works, that is, copies that exist only in a transitory
fashion, would seem to pose little threat to copyright incentives. As a general matter, unfixed
copies do not last long enough to be transferred or sold to third parties. It is difficult to
market a copy, at least in the physical world, that will last for only a few seconds.
Accordingly, copyright law does not, at least with respect to the reprQduction right, seek to
regulate such ephemeral copies of copyrighted works. As we shall see below, however, this
does not mean that ephemeral copies are not potentially subject to copyright regulation
under other provisions of the Copyright Act.
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
125. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, § 5.5; see also M. Thierry Desurmont, The Author's
Right to Control the Destinationof Copies Reproducing His Work, 12 COLtJm.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 481, 482 (1988) (identifying the right to control production and sale of copies
reproducing an author's work as one of the key means by which an author exploits his or her
work).
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place. 6 However, there may be occasions when an entity is
distributing unauthorized copies to the public, but the source of
those unauthorized copies is unknown or difficult to identify. In
such situations, copyright law gives the author the ability, subject
to the important qualifications discussed below," 7 to proceed
directly against the distributor of the copies. Thus, the public
distribution right, like the reproduction right, focuses on the
distribution of physical copies as the primary mode of consumption
for copyrighted works.' It enhances the copyright owner's ability
to control economic exploitation of the work through the sale of
physical copies by giving the author the ability to control the precise
point at which copies are made available for consumption by the
public at large.? 9
It is important to note, however, that the copyright law's focus on
physical copies is both underinclusive and overinclusive as a proxy
for harm to copyright incentives, and that copyright law recognizes
this in a number of ways. First, the focus is underinclusive in the
sense that other types of activity, not only copying, may also have
a deleterious effect on incentives to create copyrighted works.
126. Conversely, a book printer is unlikely to pay for the right to make copies without also
securing the right to publicly distribute such copies.
127. This right is expressly limited by the first sale doctrine to the first public distribution
of "lawfully made" copies. Thus, once title to a given copy has, with the consent of the
copyright owner, passed to a copy owner, the author generally no longer has control over
subsequent disposition of that particular copy. We will return to the first sale doctrine in the
later sections of this Part.
128. Note that an interesting question is whether making a copyrighted work available
online constitutes a distribution. The exclusive right mentioned in section 106(3) refers to
the distribution of"copies," which are defined in section 101 as "material objects" in which
a work is fixed. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 101. Although the distribution of a work over the
Internet may result in a copy being made at the other end (that is, on the disk on which the
work is stored), it is unclear whether the distributor is distributing "copies" since no
"material objects" are changing hands. See WHTE PAPER, supra note 10 (noting this lack of
clarity and proposing clarification through creation of a transmission right). The confusion
here is another example of the way in which digital copies stretch existing copyright
concepts. My general inclination is to view the transaction as functionally equivalent to a
distribution, that is, it has the same effect as distributing copies on floppy disks. But see R.
Anthony Reese, The PublicDisplayRight: Will It Matter in the Coming Century?, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming) (arguing that no distribution takes place). In any event, even if it
is not a public distribution, other rights, such as the right to reproduce and the right to
public display, are likely implicated. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 549; Reese, supra.
129. The right may also permit authors to license separately to different parties the
manufacturing and distribution of copies.
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Copyright partially accounts for this by adding additional rights to
the bundle of rights, as discussed in more detail below. Second, the
focus is overinclusive in the sense that certain types of copying do
not pose any appreciable threat to copyright incentives. So, for
example, copying only a small portion of a work for private,
noncommercial use poses little or no threat to copyright incentives.
Alternatively, certain types of copying may harm copyright
incentives, but may be justified independently on grounds unrelated
to the concern with providing incentives (for example, criticism).
Many of these modes of copying may be privileged by the Copyright
Act in a specific 1statutory
provision or under the more flexible
30
notion of fair use.
To address the problem ofunderinclusion, the Copyright Act adds
rights to the author's bundle of rights. Among these are the rights
to publicly display and publicly perform copyrighted works.1 31 These
rights, not a part of the original bundle of rights established in the
original Copyright Act, were added through judicial development
and subsequently codified. 3 ' They correspond to modes of publicly
consuming a copyrighted work that do not depend on actually
purchasing a copy of that work. For example, the primary way the
general public consumes a play is not by purchasing a copy of the
play and reading it, although this is certainly one way of consuming
it. Rather, the primary way the public consumes a play involves
going to a theater to watch a performance of it, preferably after a
nice dinner. Similarly, prior to the advent of the VCR, the primary
mode of consuming a movie involved going to a movie theater. Many
television broadcasts are also exclusively (or at least primarily)
exploited through public performance rather than through the sale
of copies. By giving the author the right to control public
performance (and similarly, public display), copyright law permits
individual consumption of that particular copy through a sale, while
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
131. Different categories of works are subject to each of these two exclusive rights.
Between the two of them, these rights cover all of the different types ofworks mentioned in
the Copyright Act, except sound recordings. But see Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (Supp. V 1999) (creating a right of digital
performance for sound recordings). Cf Architectural Works Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 120
(1994) (limiting public display rights for works of architecture).
132. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, 79, 86-89
(discussing the timing and history of these additions).
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preventing the owner of that particular copy from creating
additional opportunities for others to consume the work on a large,
public scale without compensating the original author.
Presumably an author could extract some of this value from the
purchaser of a specific copy through increasing the price of the work
to take into account subsequent performances or other uses. That
is, the owner of the copyright to a motion picture could, in setting
the price of a particular copy of the movie, take into account the
value to the purchaser of subsequent public performances.
However, by expressly giving the author the right to control
subsequent performances, copyright law, at least in some
circumstances, facilitates the copyright owner's ability to engage in
price discrimination. That is, the copyright owner can charge
different prices to users who simply want to read the play privately
and users who would like to put on a Broadway show, thereby
increasing the overall return to the copyright owner. 13 In addition,
like the right to control public distribution, the public performance
and display rights facilitate enforcement by barring certain
performances and displays of unauthorized copies. So, for example,
the public performance right would bar a television broadcast of an
who made the
unauthorized copy of a movie, even if the 1party
34
unauthorized copy were difficult to identify.
The public performance and display rights thus account for a
separate model of economic exploitation of a copyrighted work, a
model that is in no way dependent upon the idea of a physical copy
or the notion of fixation. 1 35 When a musical work is broadcast over

133. See generally Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination,PersonalUse and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997) (describing price
discrimination).
134. Note that the right to publicly perform and the right to publicly display are subject
to a number of statutory limitations. For example, the public reception ofa transmission on
a single receiving apparatus is generally not an infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994
& Supp. V 1999). Similarly, the public display of a given copy of a copyrighted work (for
example, the display of a work of art in a museum) is not an infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §
109(c) (1994). Both of these provisions appear to recognize some underlying interest
possessed by the owner of a particular copy or the owner of a particular "receiving
apparatus."
135. Note that the bundle of rights in section 106 now also includes an exclusive right to
publicly perform sound recordings by means of digital audio transmission. See 17 U.S.C. §
114 (Supp. V 1999).
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the radio, no copies of that work are fixed.' Similarly, when a
movie is broadcast on television, "copies" (inthe nonlegal sense) are
made on the screen of your television, but these copies are
ephemeral, unfixed. 3 ' Thus, the central right to control
reproduction would not permit the copyright owner to prevent such
widespread public consumption of the copyrighted work through
public broadcast. In order to adapt to these new methods of
economically exploiting copyrighted works, copyright law confers
upon copyright owners the right to limit and control such methods
of exploitation.' 8
Finally, the Copyright Act confers upon authors the exclusive
right to make derivative works based on the original work. Again,
this was not one of the rights granted in the original Act. Under
that Act, derivative works could freely be made without
compensation for the author. The right to create a derivative work
was added through judicial innovation and was subsequently
codified.139 The derivative work right reflects yet another expansion
of copyright law to account for yet another avenue through which
a copyrighted work could be exploited economically. For example,
the primary mode of consuming a screenplay is not through
purchase of a copy of the screenplay, but through the creation of a
movie based on that screenplay and subsequent economic
exploitation of that movie. The proper scope of the derivative work
right is an extremely complex question, involving considerations not
generally raised by the other exclusive rights, such as the proper
balance of rights and incentives between original and subsequent
authors. 140
136. But see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining"fixed" to include broadcasts
that are simultaneously fixed).
137. Query, however, whether this might change upon the implementation of digital
television (or radio) broadcast. If and when such a system is implemented, televisions may
well include sophisticated computer chips designed to process the signals, and the reception
ofa digital broadcast signal may result in the creation ofRAM copies in one's television. They
may also permit capture and manipulation of such digital signals, thus raising essentially
the same issues currently being raised in the context of networked computers.
138. For a specific adaptation to new technology, see Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (Supp. V 1999).
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
140. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). Landes and Posner suggest that the derivative work
right facilitates orderly development of derivative works. See id. at 353-57. Without such a
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The bundle of copyright rights listed in section 106 of the
Copyright Act, and the development of this bundle of rights over
time, thus reflect a central concern with protecting the primary
ways in which copyrighted works can be exploited economically by
copyright owners and consumed by the general public. 4 In the
structure of section 106, we see roughly three models of economic
exploitation of copyrighted works: first, through the making and
selling of copies of the work; second, through the public
performance and display of the work; and third, through the
making of works derived from the original work. An interesting
feature of the bundle of rights is the extent to which it rests upon,
and responds to, particular market structures and changes in such
structures. Copyright law originally focused only on the making and
sale of copies, because those activities were, in the era of the
printing press, the primary ways through which copyrighted works
were initially exploited. As new ways of consuming copyrighted
works, and correspondingly new market structures, arose, copyright
law expanded to include these new modes of consumption.'4 2 Thus,
the print-based model has been expanded to encompass
performance, broadcast, and other technologies and economic
143
models.

right, Landes and Posner argue, creators ofunderlyingworks might delaypublication ofsuch
works until they have themselves created or seen to the creation of derivative works. See id.
141. See Goldstein, supranote 132, at 85 ("Putting these cautionary observations to the
side, I think it is historically accurate to say that, in general, Congress has given copyright
owners rights to every market in which consumers derive value from their works and in
which transactions costs do not stand in the way of negotiated payments."); see also Litman,
supranote 3, at 40-43 (proposing a right to economically exploit).
142. Note that in certain limited areas, copyright law also restricts rights that would
normally accompany ownership of the physical copy for noneconomic reasons. In particular,
in 1990, the Visual Artists Rights Act amended the Copyright Act to recognize certain moral
rights of authors who produced certain types ofstatutorily defined "visual art." See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A These rights prevent owners of copies of such works, under certain circumstances,
from physically altering the copy. The scope ofthese provisions is generally limited, however,
to a specific subset of copyrighted works.
143. See Litman, supra note 3, at 19 ("Our current copyright law is based on a model
devised for print media, and expanded with some difficulty to embrace a world that includes
live, filmed and taped performances, broadcastmedia, and, most recently, digitalmedia. That
much is uncontroversial.").

1286

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1245

B. What Copy Owners Do Own
Copyright law stops well short, however, of giving copyright
owners control over all uses of copies of copyrighted works. That is,
even as the rights of authors have been expanded to encompass new
mass markets for exploiting a copyrighted work, copyright law has
refrained from giving authors control over many existing uses of
copies of copyrighted works. For the purposes of this Article, I am
centrally concerned with two of these "rights," or, more accurately,
incidents of copy ownership: (1) the ability to read, play, use, or
otherwise access a copy; 4 and (2) the ability to lend, rent, sell, or
otherwise transfer a copy (collectively, a general ability to
transfer)." 5 For the reasons set forth above, these particular
incidents of copy ownership raise rather tricky questions of
translation into the digital environment, because they run into
potential conflict with the copyright owner's right to control
reproduction. In order to understand whether and how these
incidents of copy ownership should be translated into the digital
environment, we must first understand, as a descriptive matter, the
extent of these incidents of copy ownership and their legal source.
1. The Ability to Read
First and foremost, the owner of a physical copy in practice
acquires an unlimited ability to read, play, or otherwise access the
copyrighted work-in very generic terms, an unlimited "right to

144. As outlined in more detail below, in considering this particular incident of copyright
ownership, I will also consider the extent to which individuals can modify and adapt copies
of copyrighted works in the context of using or consuming such works.
145. In outlining these copy owner "rights," I am focusing only on those that raise difficult
issues in the context of digital copies. Of course, given the limited bundle of rights listed in
section 106, a nearly unlimited number of copy owner "rights" could be identified (for
example, the right to destroy a copy, the right to extract ideas, the more limited rights
associated with "fair use," the right to use a copy as a frisbee, etc.). See Nimmer, supranote
13, at 60. For the purposes of this Article, however, I focus primarily on those "rights" that
pose the most difficult issues of translation in the digital environment. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in IntellectualProperty Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989,
1039 n.242 (1997) ("The most significant rights absent from [section 106] are the rights to
control use and resale of the work once it has first been sold by the copyright owner or a
licensee.").
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read."' Thus, when I obtain possession of a copy of a book, I
acquire the right to read it as many times as I wish; similarly, when
I obtain possession of recorded music on a compact disc (CD) or a
movie on a videotape, I acquire the right to play the music or the
movie as imany times as I wish. There is nothing seemingly
exceptional about this right. Indeed, in many ways, nothing could
be more ordinary. We commonly understand this "right" to
unlimited access to be a natural and inherent part of our possession
of physical copies of a copyrighted work. It is part of what we are
buying; it is a part of what we now own. Moreover, this right does
not attach through anyimplied"license" between the purchaser and
the seller. Rather, the owner of a copy acquires these "rights"
simply because she possesses the copy, however she came to possess
it--even if it were stolen, obtained from a third party, or created
without authorization from the copyright owner.147 These "rights"
are merely the incidents of the individual's ownership of the
physical property that is the copy.
The legal "source" of this unlimited ability to read, to the extent
there is one, can be found in the gaps in the Copyright Act. Section
106 of the Act, as several commentators have noted, does not
include in the bundle of copyright rights the right to control the
reading of a given copy. Rather, section 106 confers upon copyright
owners only the limited bundle of rights mentioned in the previous
section.' Rights that are not mentioned in section 106 are, by
default, retained by the copy owner. So, by virtue of my ownership
or possession of a physical copy of a book, I can read it as many
times as I wish (until the book itself begins to deteriorate), and the
Copyright Act says nothing that would prevent me from engaging
in such an activity.'4 9 The lack of a right to control reading,
combined with the inherent attributes of the physical copy, gives
rise to the copy owner's ability to read or access the copy. The
ability to read and access physical copies is thus part of the physical

146. Litman, supra note 13, at 31-32.
147. These actions may, of course, give rise to other legal claims. However, the actual
right to read or access the copy is not affected.
148. See discussion supra Part H.A.
149. Though if1 read the work aloud in a public place, I may be infringing upon the public
performance right. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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reality that copyright law takes for granted and upon which it
operates.
At the same time, however, it is worth noting that the Act
nowhere preserves or guarantees copy owners any right to read
against other restrictions on reading. 5 ' Therefore, for example, a
book could be written in a special kind of ink that vanishes ten
minutes after being exposed to the air, or a sound recording could
be recorded in such a way that it automatically erases itself, A la
Mission Impossible, after a single playing. Nothing in the Act itself
bars these potential (though unlikely).5 ' methods of limiting my
access to a physical copy in my possession. Rather, my ability to
access and read a book in my physical possession is a function of
both the limited bundle of rights in section 106 and the physical
characteristics of the copies themselves. 5 2 The Act is simply silent
on the issue.
By the same token, the lack of express reference to the ability of
copy owners to read their physical copies does not necessarily mean
that this ability has no significance for copyright law. This is, in
many ways, the presumption underlying the White Paper's position
on accessing digital copies. From the perspective of the White
Paper, technology has changed such that reading a digital
document necessarily entails the creation of a copy of that work in
a computer's RAM. Because the Copyright Act does not expressly
150. Julie Cohen has argued that the First Amendment supports a "right to read
anonymously," which bars the government from enacting measures supporting the
technological protection measures that infringe on such a right. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to
Read Anonymously: A CloserLook at "CopyrightManagement" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L.
REv. 981 (1996).
151. These methods are unlikely because they are costly in the physical world. Moreover,
consumers would likely resist such attempts to control use, or, at the very least, would pay
only a significantly reduced price for a copy that could only be read once or twice. In the
online environment, however, the economics may be such that technologically equivalent
mechanisms for controlling the use of digital copies may be economically attractive. See id.
I discuss this in more detail below.
152. This latter observation is the implicit basis for the White Paper's position on
computer access of digital copies. The reasoning goes something like this: nothing in the Act
guarantees a right to access or read copies in one's possession; accessing a digital copy by
computer results in the creation of a literal copy of the work in the computer's RAM;
therefore, accessing a digital copy implicates the copyright owner's exclusive right to
reproduction. The existing ability of copy owners to access and read physical copies of
copyrighted works is not a legally relevant consideration, as it is nowhere expressly
mentioned in the Copyright Act.
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refer to a "right to read," the existing ability of copy owners to read
physical copies is legally irrelevant. Accordingly, one can apply the
terms of the Copyright Act to digital copies without any concern
about preserving the ability to access or read such copies.
Again, this ultimately may be a sound conclusion, but it can only
be reached, if at all, after careful consideration of the precise role
that the unlimited ability to read physical copies plays in light of
the policy and purposes of copyright law. Indeed, the contrary
conclusion could well be warranted; after examining copyright law
carefully, one might conclude that the capacity to read copies in
one's possession, though not expressly preserved in the Copyright
Act, is a fundamental assumption underlying the Act, one worth
preserving in the online environment. The more general point is
that the advent of digital technology poses a significant challenge
to the assumptions underlying copyright law. Thus, there is no
reason to expect that literal application of the terms of Copyright
Act will reach a result consistent with copyright law as a whole.
Accordingly, more work is necessary before one can decide how to
think about this unlimited ability to read physical copies.
2. The Ability to Transfer
In addition to an unlimited ability to read, the purchaser of a
physical copy also acquires the right to transfer possession of that
copy to another, whether through gift, sale, lease, or loan. For
example, ifI purchase a book, I can subsequently lend it to a friend,
sell it to a used bookstore, or rent it out for a fee. Unlike the "right
to read" mentioned above, this "right"is in fact expressly mentionied
in the Copyright Act in the form of the first sale doctrine. Originally
a judge-made doctrine,'5 3 the first sale doctrine was later
incorporated into the 1909 Act." The statute provides that "the
owner of a particular copy... lawfully made under this title... is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
153. Itwas first recognized bythe Supreme Court inBobbs-MerrillCo. v. Straus,210 U.S.
339, 350-51 (1908), as an exception to the then-existing exclusive right to "vend." See also
Harrisonv. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689,691 (2d Cir. 1894) (recognizing right to vend).
154. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a) (1994)); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Intl, Inc., 523 U.S. 135
(1998).
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otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy."1 55 One of the few
provisions in the Act that expressly mentions the rights of copy
owners, 5 6 the first sale doctrine expressly reserves to the owner of
a lawfully made copy the right to "dispose" of the possession of that
copy, whether through gift, sale, lease, or loan. Without such a
provision, these actions could potentially infringe upon the
copyright owner's exclusive right to control public distribution of
that work.
Note that this right is also limited in a number of important ways
by the terms of the statute. First, it applies only to "owners" of a
copy. 57 As a later portion of section 109 expressly indicates, this
right to lend or transfer does not extend to individuals who acquire
possession of a copy through "rental, lease, loan, or otherwise."'5 8
This right attaches only if one has acquired title in the copy. This
limitation has important ramifications for digital copies, given the
increasing reliance of copyright owners upon licensing, rather than
sale of copies, as a method of distribution. Several federal courts
have held that the. first sale doctrine does not apply to software
users who have licensed the software, because they have not
acquired title to a particular copy. 15 9 If mass-market shrink-wrap
licenses become the norm and are found enforceable, 60 then the

155. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
156. See id. § 202 (drawing express distinction between ownership of the copyright and
ownership of a particular copy); id. § 117 (setting forth owner rights for software).
157. See Little, Brown & Co. v. American Paper Recycling Corp., 824 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.
Masi. 1993).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d).
159. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc., 170 F.3d 1354,
1360-62 (4th Cir. 1999); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th
Cir. 1993); Telecommunications Technical Servs. v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., 66
F. Supp. 2d 1306,1324-25 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs.,
Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208,212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. IIl. 1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976) ("This does
not mean that conditions on future disposition of copies or phonorecords, imposed by a
contract between their buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the parties as a
breach of contract, but it does mean that they could not be enforced by an action for
infringement of copyright."); cf Applied Info. Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149,
155 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that whether a licensee is an "owner" will depend on the
particular details of the licensing agreement).
160. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-54 (7th Cir. 1996); Mark Lemley,
IntellectualProperty and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1259-63 (1995).
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scope and application of the first sale doctrine may be greatly
limited with respect to digital copies.
Second, the first sale doctrine applies only to copies that have
been "lawfully made," that is, authorized by the copyright owner or
otherwise privileged by statute (for example, through the fair use
doctrine or other statutory exceptions, such as the compulsory
licensing provisions). What this means in practice is that the right
to lend or transfer to the public an owned copy does not apply to
pirated or otherwise "unlawfully made" copies. Although an owner
of a pirated copy of a book may lawfully purchase it and read it as
many times as he or she wishes, the subsequent sale of such a copy
to the public would infringe upon the distribution right.Y This
limitation essentially preserves the ability of copyright owners to
restrict sales of unauthorized copies through exercise of the
distribution right.'6 2
Historically, the source of the first sale doctrine appears to have
been the common law reluctance to enforce restraints on the
alienation of physical property. 6 ' Under the common law, such
restraints were generally disfavored because they hindered the free
exchange of property and its eventual transfer to its most socially
productive uses. 164 This concern about the free alienation ofphysical
161. See H.I. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79 ("For example, any resale of an illegally 'pirated'
phonorecord would be an infringement, but the disposition of a phonorecord legally made
under the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115 would not.").
162. A contrary rule effectively would gut the distribution right's role in facilitating
enforcement of the reproduction right.
163. See John D. Park & Sons, Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907) ("A prime
objection to the enforcibility [sic] of such a system of restraint upon sales and prices is that
they offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels or articles which
pass by mere delivery."); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
1378,1388-89 (C.D. Cal. 1993); H.R.REP.No. 98-987, at2 (1984) ("The first sale doctrine has
its roots inthe English common law rule against restraints on alienation of property."); John
M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review and
Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407,1412 (1989) ("The so-called first sale doctrine originated
in general English common-law rules of ancient ancestry disapproving restraints on the
alienation of owned property. The right of alienation was viewed as a basic element of
ownership. It was founded on policies favoring the free transferability of land and, more
particularly, goods.") (citations omitted).
164. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round andRound: EquitableServitudes
and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1261 (1956) ("Where chattels are involved and not just
land or a business, the policy in favor of mobility creates even stronger cause for courts to
hesitate and scrutinize carefully factors of social desirability before imposing novel burdens
on property in the hands of transferees."); Michael D. Kirby, Comment, Restraints on
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property thus acts, through the first sale doctrine, to impose an
express limit on the rights of copyright owners to control
subsequent transfers and uses of copies. Once a copyright owner
has parted with title to a specific copy of that work, the subsequent
owner of that copy can, subject to a few exceptions, dispose of it as
he or she wishes. 6 Even though some uses of that copy (such as a
loan) might in fact deprive the copyright owner of subsequent sales,
copyright law generally ignores such harm in favor of the copy
owner's physical control over the specific copy. 66
There are limits, however, to the extent to which copyright law
takes into consideration this concern about free alienation of
physical property. Most notably, the Copyright Act, notwithstanding the first sale doctrine, bars the commercial rental of two
specific types of creative works: sound recordings and computer
software. The specific limit on renting sound recordings was
enacted in response to concerns that manyrecord rental stores were
in fact thinly veiled facilitators of widespread copyright
infringement. 6 7 A similar provision was passed with respect to
computer software in 1990. In both these cases, the Copyright Act
steps in to limit a copy owner's large-scale commercial use of his or
her physical copies in order to eliminate a specific piracy threat. 6 8
Alienation.Placinga13th Century Doctrineina2lstCenturyPerspective,40 BAYLORL.REV.
413, 415 (1988) (exploring the history of the law on restraints).
165. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) ("It is not denied that one
who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control
the sale of it.").
166. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.12[A]
(2000) ("[Alt this point, the policy favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to the
policy opposing. . . restraints of alienation."). Note, however, that copyright owners have
sought to expand their control over subsequent disposal of copies, but without much success.
For example, the recording industry, motivated by the essentially limitless shelf-life of digital
compact discs, has attempted to exert control over the market for used compact discs. See
Fara Daun, Comment, The ContentShop: Toward anEconomicLegal Structurefor Clearing
and Licensing Multimedia Content, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 215, 253 (1996); Carla M. Miller,
Note, New Technology and OldProtection:The Case for Resale Royalties on the Retail Sale
of Used CDs, 46 HAST. L.J. 217 (1994). Such attempts have thus far failed.
167. See David H. Horowitz, The RecordRental Amendment of 1984:A Case Study in the
Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology, 12 COLtJM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 31, 32-34
(1987). Many stores in fact sold blank tapes and touted the ability to make personal copies
that would make subsequent purchases unnecessary.
168. An interesting side note is that similar legislation with respect to videocassette
rentals failed to pass, primarily because at the time local video rental stores, unlike record
rental stores, constituted a vocal, organized, and well-entrenched interest group. See
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In the course of addressing this piracy threat, however, these
provisions simultaneously restrict uncompensated consumption of
such works through potentially legitimate (that is, nonpiracyinducing) rentals.'69 Noncommercial lending of copies, whether by
individuals or certain nonprofit institutions, is still permissible
under this provision. 7 °
Over the course of the years, numerous additional, and thus far
unsuccessful, attempts have been made to peel back parts of the
first sale doctrine in order to give copyright owners greater control
over subsequent uses of copies. For many years, authors and book
publishers have sought a right to control public lending of copies of
their books, claiming that such lending (through libraries, for
example) greatly decreases the number of copies they sell and thus
reduces the royalties they are able to obtain.' 7 ' Although similar
public lending rights are recognized in a number of other
countries,' 2 the efforts of authors and book publishers have not
been successful in the United States. The music industry has also
sought to obtain a right to control the sale of used CDs, driven in
large part by concern that CDs, unlike prior recording media, are
virtually indestructible and suffer no appreciable loss in quality
over time.17 Attempts to derive fees from the used CD market have
Goldstein, supra note 132, at 82; Kernochan, supra note 163, at 1420. Accordingly,
videocassettes, under the first sale doctrine, can be rented to the public at large without
payment of any royalties to the owners of the copyrights in the underlying movies. Despite

the political explanation forthe difference in treatment between videocassettes and recorded
music, there may in fact be a legitimate policy reason to support a distinction between the
two types of works. Movies tend to be consumed once, whereas recorded music is often
consumed repeatedly. Accordingly, one would expect the piracy incentives to be greater in

the latter context, as consumption patterns increase consumer desire to acquire copies and
build collections.
169. Note that the copyright owners would probably have had a claim against the store
owners for contributory infringement.

170. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have even broader provisions,
conferring upon copyright holders a general right to lend publicly. Thus, for example,
libraries in the United Kingdom must pay a royalty to the copyright owner each time they
lend abook. See GeraldDworkin,Public
LendingRight-The UKExperience, 13 CoLum. J.L.

& ARTS 49, 58 (1988).
171. See Kernochan, supra note 163, at 1424-30.
172. E.g., the United Kingdom.
173. Similar attempts were made bytextbookpublishers, as well as artists. California has
enacted a right to royalties for resale of certain works of fine art. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 986
(West 1982 & Supp. 2001); Jeffrey C. Wu, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: A
Follow-Up Study, 46 J. COPYIGHTS Soc" U.S.A. 531, 532 (1999).
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thus far failed.'74 Virtually all of these attempts, however, leave
undisturbed the very basic first sale right of an individual to
transfer a given, lawfully made copy in a noncommercial context.
3. Other Owner Rights
In addition to the ability to read and the ability to transfer, the
owner of a copy of a copyrighted work may also acquire additional
"rights." For example, the owner of a copy is able to exercise many
of the privileges permitted by "fair use." 175 Thus, the copy owner
may, under certain circumstances, and for certain purposes (such
as education, criticism, etc.), engage in some limited copying or
other uses of the work that would otherwise be infringing. The fair
use privilege, unlike the incidents of copy ownership discussed in
more detail above, is not directly linked to the issue of possession
or ownership of the physical copy. Rather, these privileges are
available more generally to anyone, not only to the individual who
possesses a particular copy of a copyrighted work.
In a few areas, however, fair use does appear specifically to
acknowledge the particular rights of copy owners and to give such
owners perhaps some greater degree of freedom with respect to
copies that they possess. In particular, courts have occasionally
found fair use for certain acts of reproduction that copy owners
engage in during the course of using that copy or adapting that copy
to a particular use. For example, an owner of a particular CD may
be privileged by fair use to make a copy of the album on tape, so
that he or she can play it in a car stereo or Walkman.'7 6 The same
act undertaken by someone who did not own the CD would be more
suspect. Thus, at least in these contexts, it appears that fair use
acknowledges and gives some greater protection to certain uses
engaged in by the owners of copies in the course of using such
copies.
Most importantly, for our purposes, section 117 of the Copyright
Act includes a very specific provision that expressly acknowledges

174. See Daun, supra note 166, at 253.
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
176. This kind ofpersonal tapingis also expressly privileged by the Audio Home Recording
Act. See id. § 1008.
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this interest in the context of computer software.1 77 As already
mentioned briefly above, section 117 grants owners of copies of
computer software the right to make a copy of that software for one
of two purposes: (1) as an "essential step in the utilization of the
computer program"; or (2) for "archival purposes." 7 8 The first
purpose reflects a recognition that software is rarely run from the
specific purchased copy; rather, software is commonly run from a
copy that is installed in the hard drive of a computer. Thus, section
117 expressly privileges this type of copying. In addition, section
117 provides an express exemption for software owners from
potential liability under MA for merely running the software.
Thus, the owner of a copy of software, even if not permitted to do so
under any implied or express license, has the right to run that
software as many times as he or she wants, even if this results in
the creation of "copies" in the RAM of the computer. However, as
noted above, several courts, like the court in MAI, have held that
section 117 by its terms does not apply to mere licensees of
software. Thus, the scope of this exemption may be significantly
narrowed to the extent that most software becomes licensed rather
than owned. The second purpose reflects a recognition that owners
of software may have a legitimate need to create backup copies of
software in case the original copy becomes destroyed or erased.17 9
I will return to section 117 later in this Article, 80 when I discuss
possible methods of implementing the proposals I advance. For
present purposes, however, it is worth noting that section 117
reflects an express recognition of certain unique features of
computer software, features that may be quite applicable to other
copyrighted works in digital form. Section 117 appears to
acknowledge both that utilization of software may sometimes
require reproduction, and that software is evanescent and
potentially fragile. Although section 117 by its terms is limited to
computer software, its recognition of some of the unique aspects of
digital documents may provide a doctrinal basis for implementing
a number of suggested changes.
177. See id. § 117 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

178. Id.
179. The statute further provides that such archival copies may be transferred to others
only as part of a transfer of the original copy to a third party. See id.
180. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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Finally, the Copyright Act also gives copy owners the right to
display publicly a given copy of a copyrighted work under certain
circumstances. Provisions of the Act expressly permit the owner of
a copy of a copyrighted work to display that copy publicly to viewers
who are "present at the place where the copy is located."' 1 Thus, for
example, the owner of a statue may display the statue to the public
in a museum. This right does not extend, however, to displaying the
statue to the broader public, say through a television broadcast.
Like the first sale doctrine, this provision seems to be an express
recognition of certain conventional understandings concerningwhat
it means to own physical personal property. A limitation on the
ability to display a given copy in a public place would seem to
intrude too much on rights of the copy owner's interest in the
physical property.18 2
III. WHY COPY OWNERS OWN WHAT THEY OWN
Having laid out descriptively a number of the incidents of
physical copy ownership, I now ask what role, if any, these
incidents of physical copy ownership play in copyright law. Are the
incidents of copy ownership as set forth above-the ability to read,
lend, rent, and sell physical copies-an important part of the
copyright balance worth preserving in the digital environment? Or
are they merely accidents of a particular technology and market
structure, accidents that deserve no protection in a newly emerging
digital marketplace? Answeringthis question requires an expansion
of the focus outward from the history and doctrine of the Copyright
Act to consideration of a number of broader theoretical frameworks
that have been offered in support of U.S. copyright law. What
support, if any, do these various theoretical frameworks offer for
the existing distribution of rights? Do they help us explain the
existence and role of these incidents of copy ownership?
Before turning to these theoretical frameworks, an initial word
is warranted on the relevance of these frameworks and the role they
play in the analysis of copyright law. As a general matter,
traditional legal materials, such as legislative history, provide
181. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1994).
182. See Reese, supra note 128.
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somewhat less guidance in copyright law than in many other
comparable areas of statutory interpretation. First, the Copyright
Act, even more than many federal statutes, reflects numerous, and
often quite express, legislative compromises reached among various
interest groups.1 83 In many places, detailed statutory provisions set
forth exemptions or other special enactments designed to take into
account particular markets or industry structures. 8 4 Interest
groups were quite directly involved in the crafting of the most
recent comprehensive overhaul of the Act, in 1976. (Indeed, this
involvement was seen as a way of facilitating the difficult and timeconsuming process that led to passage of the Act.'85 ) What this
means in practice is that clear general statements of policy may be
difficult to find or hard to interpret or both. 8 '
Second, these legal materials are little help in adapting the Act
to dramatic changes in technology, which are almost always
unforeseen and often have the effect of substantially disrupting
both existing relationships and the economics underlying the
Copyright Act.8 7 Throughout its history, copyright law has had to
adapt to dramatic changes in copying technology and content
distribution. Broadcast technologies dramatically altered the way
many copyrighted works were consumed or distributed. The
183. See Litman, supra note 17, at 865.
184. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115-116 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring various compulsory
licenses); RobertP. Merges, ContractingintoLiabilityRules:IntellectualPropertyRightsand
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996).
185. More recent amendments have similarly reflected this characteristic ofinterest-group
compromise. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994).
186. Jessica Litman has carefully documented many of the problems raised by the 1976
Act and its legislative history. See Litman, supra note 17, at 865; see generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILLiP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PuBLic CHOICE (1991) (describing influence of

private interest groups). Some have argued that the courts, in interpreting such statutes,
should seek to enforce the interest-group bargains represented by the statutes. See Frank
H. Easterbrook, The State ofMadison'sVision ofthe State:A Public ChoicePerspective, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994). Whether or not one agrees with this view, see Jonathan R. Macey,
PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislationThroughStatutorylnterpretation'AnInterestGroup
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 233-40 (1986) (arguing that courts should instead hold
legislators to their public statements, regardless of the interest-group bargains behind the
legislation), in the case of copyright legislation, there is the additional problem, discussed
infra, regarding what to do when new technologies were never anticipated at the time of the
original bargain.
187. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
GlobalArena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998). But see Reese, supra note 128 (arguing that
Congress anticipated computer networks when it crafted the public display right).
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invention of the photocopier drastically lowered the cost of copying
printed copyrighted materials. The invention of the VCR gave rise
to numerous unforeseen circumstances and situations. Because
copyright legislation has generally been slow to respond to
technological change, courts have frequently been forced to adapt
the existing copyright laws to these new situations and problems,
but without the benefit of any clear statements of policy from the
Copyright Act itself.'8 8 The legislature has often (though not
always) acted after the courts have already established certain legal
89
rules. 1

Finally, the Copyright Act at certain points confers substantial
authority upon the courts to craft judge-made law. One obvious
example is the fair use doctrine. Other than setting forth a number
of broad statutory factors, the Act largely gives courts a broad
degree of discretion in determining what constitutes fair use, an
issue that is central to the overall balance of rights and incentives
it effects. Indeed, the fair use doctrine was originally a judge-made
doctrine, and its subsequently loose codification reflects its origins.
Judicial theorizing and academic commentary has, accordingly,
focused much attention on this area of copyright law. 9 ' Similarly,
other portions of the Act, such as the provision listing the types of
works covered by copyright, also evince a willingness to give courts
substantial room to adapt the Copyright Act to novel circumstances.

188. Indeed,judicial lawmaking in the copyright context has been quite extensive, in part
because of the constant need to adapt the Copyright Act to quite novel circumstances. For
example, the fair use doctrine, perhaps the single most important provision ofthe Act, was
originally a judicial innovation and continues to comprise a significant body of judge-made
law. At the same time, other provisions of the Act contain excruciatingly detailed provisions
carefully tailored to the particular structure ofa particular copyright market. See, e.g., Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1001-1010.
189. Despite these objections, many commentators have, as discussed earlier in this
Article, effectively and exhaustively critiqued the result inMAI on such grounds (thatis, text
and legislative history). See supra notes 36-41. In my view, those critiques have it exactly
right. However, perhaps because of the limitations of such sources, as discussed above in the
text, and in light of dramatic technological change, such arguments have up to now had little
effect on actual legal results. More generally, however, this Article, in expressly examining
the theoretical bases of copyright law, attempts to find a firmer normative basis for
supporting or opposing the result in MA. Thus, the recommendations at the end of this
Article include proposals, not only for judicial interpretation, but also for legislative changes.
190. See, e.g., Fisher, Fair Use Doctrine, supranote 2, at 1659; Gordon, supranote 2, at
1600; Leval, supranote 2, at 1105; Weinreb, supranote 2, at 1137.

20011

OWNING DIGITAL COPIES

1299

As a result, judicial decision making in this area has often looked
to first principles for guidance.' Courts and commentators have
developed various theoretical frameworks to help give structure to
the particular provisions of the Act and to guide courts in their
unavoidable extension of the Act into novel and unforeseen
circumstances. The Act itself does not clearly embody any single
overarching theoretical framework, other than a general bias
toward an instrumental view of copyright law (as reflected in the
Constitutional authorization 92 ). In fact, given the numerous
legislative compromises that gave rise to the Copyright Act, the
existence of a coherent overall framework would be a miraculous
accident. Nevertheless, judicial decision making, driven by the
courts' need to provide justification, has by and large drawn from
various theoretical frameworks in an attempt to rationalize the
pattern of decision making.
At the same time, disagreement currently exists over precisely
which first principles properly underlie copyright law. 93 Although
U.S. copyright law is generally characterized by its instrumental
approach (as opposed to the authors' rights orientation of
continental copyright law),' 9 ' even within the instrumental view
differences of opinion exist over whether copyright law should
provide only minimal incentives for the creation of works, or
whether it should appropriate the maximum return to authors in
order to facilitate economic efficiency. Notions of "desert" also often
figure into both theoretical discussions and particular judicial
decisions, even within the broad instrumental orientation of U.S.
copyright law. In practice, courts draw upon an uneasy and
sometimes conflicting-mix of different theoretical frameworks.
Thus, in looking for "the"justification for the copy owner's ability
to read, lend, and sell copies of copyrighted works, I will consider a
number of different theoretical frameworks that have been
advanced to help explain and structure copyright law. How do these
191. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY (1994); Boyle, supra note 22, at 48.
192. See U.S. CoNST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
193. See BoYLE, supranote 16, at 19 ("fl]n copyright law-to a greater extent than in most
other fields of legal doctrine-there is a routine and acknowledged breakdown of the
simplifying assumptions of the discourse, so that mundane issues force lawyers, judges, and
policy makers to return to first principles.").
194. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, CopyrightHistory andthe Future:What's Culture Got
to Do With It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'YU.S. 209,259 (2000).
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frameworks account for the existing balance of rights between copy
owner and copyright owner (if they do in fact account for this
balance)? Are these accounts persuasive? Do they shed light on the
existing balance and thereby give us guidance on how to translate
copy owner rights into the digital environment? In examining these
frameworks in the particular context of digital copy ownership, the
analysis will shed some light on how effective such frameworks are
as ways of adapting copyright law to new changes in technology.
As this somewhat eclectic theoretical approach suggests, I am
generally skeptical of attempts to find a single theoretical
explanation or justification for copyright law and to derive specific
results solely from such a single framework. Copyright law is
characterized in general by a complex and overlapping mix of
theories, and this seems to me in many ways entirely appropriate.
Our attitude toward creative works, and information in general, is
complex, not easily reducible to a single metric. The conditions that
give rise to the creation of intellectual works, their role in our
society, the way in which we consume such works-these are issues
that are not susceptible to easy categorization. Accordingly, it
should not be surprising to see a multiplicity of theories. At the
same time, however, it is important to articulate what these
competing theories signify and to try at least to make some attempt
to take into account the different implications of these competing
theories.
A. Conventional Understandingsof Property
As an initial matter, the analysis in the previous Part of this
Article strongly suggests that, as a purely descriptive matter, the
incidents of copy ownership can be explained as having arisen from
conventional and deeply embedded understandings about what it
means to own or to possess physical personal property. I can read
my copy of As I Lay Dying as many times as I want because I own
the book. I can sell that copy to a used bookstore, again because I
own the book, in much the same way I own my television or my car.
Under this view, these understandings, and really nothing more, or
more complicated, explain why I can read and transfer the books
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and other copies that I own." 5 The incidents of copy ownership flow
ineluctably from possession and dominion over the physical copy.
They are simply a part of what it means to own physical property.
Copyright law, then, does not so much expressly build in such
incidents of copy ownership, as it accepts and assumes such
incidents as given. That is, under this view, understandings about
physical copy ownership antedate the relatively more recent
development of copyright law. These understandings make up part
of the physical environment within which copyright law operates.
Copyright law structures itself around such understandings about
the physical environment and physical property ownership. It does
this in part by setting up a structure that assumes the sale of the
physical copy as the basic means of exploiting a creative work and,
along with that assumption, assumes that copy ownership will be
accompanied by certain well-established rights or privileges. It also
does this more explicitly in certain areas by formally recognizing
such understandings andpreservingthem against encroachment by
other parts of copyright law, as for example with the first sale
doctrine or the public display right." In both of these cases,
copyright law carves out an exception for certain activities (for
example, selling and displaying) that are tightly bound up with
notions of physical property ownership, in order to keep such
activities from constituting infringement of other enumerated
rights.
In many ways, this view is quite appealing. It seems to explain
much of the uneasiness associated with efforts to control uses of
copies that are too closely tied to or implicate notions of physical
property ownership. So, for example, any attempt to regulate
reading seems to conflict with fundamental notions of what it
means to own a book.' Similarly, attempts to regulate resale of
physical copies conflict with the right of alienation, a fundamental
incident of physical property ownership. To be sure, instincts about
physical property are qualified. For example, I cannot run my copy
of the book through a photocopier despite the fact that I own it. Nor
195. Cf Weinreb, supranote 2, at 1138 (discussing fair use).
196. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
197. The "right to read" could also be explained, in part, by a concern about privacy. That
is, regulating the right to read a book in one's possession may seem too intrusive. I address
this possibility in a later section of this Article.
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can I read my book aloud in a public place. And in other instances,
copyright law trumps these conventional understandings when the
effect would be to undermine significantly the purpose of copyright
law, for example, in the restriction on the commercial renting of
audio tapes. 9 ' Copyright law, however, limits such regulation of the
usual incidents of copy ownership to areas that are most essential
to ensure copyright's incentive-preserving function and, indeed, in
a number of areas, accedes to notions of physical property
ownership even in some circumstances where incentives are clearly
harmed.'99 Put another way, physical copy owner "rights" are
defined primarily by the law of personal property, with copyright
law imposing a few limited restrictions. The idea of physical copy
ownership thus seems to provide a simple and intuitively appealing
explanation for the incidents of physical copy ownership.0
However, there are evident limits to the utility of such a
descriptive explanation in determining how to adapt the law to
fundamental changes in the environment. That is, the descriptive
claim may be entirely true, yet neither shed light on the proper
future direction of copyright law, nor conflict with the other
normative justifications advanced for the existing distribution of
rights. The idea that these incidents of copy ownership are tied to
conventional understandings of physical property ownership does
not seem to help us much when we are trying to figure out how, if
at all, they should apply to copies that are not physical. Thus, such
a descriptive explanation for the incidents of copy ownership would
appear not to answer the question that we are primarily concerned
with, namely, whether and how to translate the incidents of
physical copy ownership to the digital online environment.
At the same time, however, we should not be too quick to dismiss
possible insights derived from such a descriptive view. In
198. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
199. E.g., lending rights.
200. Note that this could also explain some of the uneasiness we feel about shrink-wrap
contracts as applied to physical property. For example, imagine that your phone book came
shrink-wrapped, along with a contract stating that, by removing the shrink-wrap and using
the phone book, you agree to certain contractual terms regarding the use, resale, etc. of the
phone book. Even apart from objections that could be raised based on contract law (for
example, lack of voluntariness, etc.), there is some sense in which imposition of such
contractual terms on personalproperty conflicts with deeply held understandings about what
it means to own personal property.

2001]

OWNING DIGITAL COPIES

1303

particular, it is at least worth asking the following question: if the
incidents of physical copy ownership are based on conventional
understandings of physical property ownership, do we have
corresponding understandings about digital property ownership
that might play a role in our analysis? That is, do we have
corresponding intuitions about what it means to "own a digital
copy of a copyrighted work? And if so, should these intuitions, even
if purely descriptive, affect the shape of copyright law in the same
way intuitions about physical property ownership currently shape
copyright law? There might well be very instrumental reasons for
recognizing these intuitions, and it is worth taking at least a quick
look at these questions.
As to the first question, we might expect conventional
understandings of ownership specific to digital copies to be
relatively underdeveloped, because digital copies are a relatively
recent phenomenon. Certainly any conventional understandings
that do exist would probably not be as firmly ingrained as the
understandings we hold about physical property, which has been
around for centuries. At the same time, however, I think it is safe
to say that, as a purely descriptive matter, Internet users in a
relatively strong sense do in fact think of digital copies in their
possession as their "property." I admit that I have no surveys to
prove this assertion as an empirical matter, but I believe it is
supported by common experience." 1 The digital pattern of ones and
zeros that I download to my computer seems, in some very real
sense, "mine," in that I have physical dominion over it and no other
indicia prevent me from exercising this dominion. Possession, after
all, has historically been one of the most fundamental bases of
ownership.
A couple of examples may serve to help support, or at least lend
some shape, to this observation. As an initial matter, it seems
pretty clear that authorized copies of digital works would be
considered personal property in a relatively strong sense. Thus, say
that you pay for and download a copy of an article from the
201. Indeed, one of the reasons the Ninth Circuit's decision in MA has raised such a
sustained howl of protest is perhaps because it runs directly against such understandings.
Regardless of the overall theory one holds about copyright law in general, there is something
very intrusive about the idea that simply calling up on screen a document resting on my
computer in some way violates some unknown third party's rights.
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Internet. I think that it is safe to say that most individuals would
consider that copy to be their property, that is, most would feel that
they have some ownership interest over that particular copy of the
copyrighted work (putting aside, for now, the precise scope of that
interest). There it sits in a pattern of ones and zeros on your hard
drive, which you clearly own; you paid for it, and nothing,
202
practically speaking, keeps you from doing what you want withit.
Nothing indicates that you do not own that copy in some relatively
strong sense. Thus, it seems clear that the fact that a copy takes
digital form does not, by itself, prevent it from being regarded as a
piece of personal property.
Note, further, that this property interest appears to carry over
even if the copy is unauthorized. Say, for example, that a friend emails you a digital copy of a Far Side cartoon. You know that it is
highly unlikely that your friend obtained from Gary Larson the
right to send you a copy, so it is quite likely that, absent some valid
defense, the copy is an infringing copy. 03 Yet, many of the same
considerations apply. Again, there it sits on your computer hard
drive, which you own. You possess the copy, and nothing indicates
that the copy is not, in some strong sense, your property. Consider,
further, how you would feel if another friend, while using your
computer, accidentally deleted the cartoon from your computer.
Would you feel as though you had been deprived of something that
was your property? My sense is that most probably would. There
may be some underlying unease from the fact that the copy may not
be an authorized copy. Yet this feeling can still be consistent with
a feeling that you have certain rights in that particular, if
unauthorized, copy of the copyrighted work. To take a physical
property example, say that you purchase an unauthorized, bootleg
concert tape.20 4 Again, I would claim that most individuals would
202. Note that this would not be the case if certain technological protection mechanisms
were implemented to restrict usage. It is an interesting question to what extent individuals
would view such copies as their property.
203. One might question whether it even makes sense to think of the digital copy, the
magnetic pattern of ones and zeros, as a piece of physical property. After all, the hard drive
is the property, and the digital pattern is merely an arrangement of magnetized particles
sitting on the drive. Without getting into the metaphysics of this, I would observe that this
same issue is by no means unique to digital copies. For example, audio cassettes and VCR
tapes are physical substrates upon which magnetic (though analog) patterns are imbedded.
204. Although live performances are not "fixed" and are thus not, as a general matter,
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the
feel a strong property entitlement in that tape, regardless of
205
underlying validity of the copy, as a matter of copyright law.
At the same time, these understandings or instincts about digital
copy ownership are clearly not as robust or as firmly held as
understandings about physical property ownership. In particular,
the ubiquity of software licenses may have some impact on
conventional understandings about digital copy ownership, at least
with respect to software and perhaps, by extension, other digital
works. Because software is nearly always licensed (at least
purportedly2 ') to end users, individuals may be accustomed to
having a more limited ownership interest in digital copies of
software. 20 7 (There may be reason to doubt, however, the extent to
which such formal legal relationships have had an impact on
consumer understandings about their legal rights in the software.)
In addition, because conventional understandings about digital copy
ownership are not as clearly entrenched, they are also potentially
subject to change. 0" Indeed, because digital copies are so new,
understandings about digital copy ownership may yet change quite
a bit as digital copies become more ubiquitous.0 9 Finally, there may
be significant questions about the scope of any such property
interests in light of copyright law, given the extent to which the use
of digital copies implicates the copyright owner's exclusive right to
copyrightable, the underlying musical composition may be fixed. Furthermore, bootleg

recordings of live performances are considered infringing under a separate provision of the
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
205. Note that unauthorized copies ofcopyrighted works can be impounded. See id. § 503.
However, until such an action is successfully brought against the object to be impounded,
ownership, as conventionally understood, rests with the copy owner. Note further that this
situation is distinguishable from the situation in which the actual physical copy is stolen and
the purchaser knows that it was stolen. Under the latter situation, certain rules about
ownership of stolen property might possibly apply. The distinction here, however, is the
distinction between infringement of the "work- and theft of a "copy." In the infringement
situation, there is no issue regarding who actually owns the physical property.
206. Many of the licenses are shrink-wrap licenses, and thus raise the familiar concerns
about enforceability. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,1453 (7th Cir. 1996);
Lemley, supra note 160.
207. Note that a license to use the work is not inconsistent with ownership of the
particular copy of the work. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
208. Ubiquitous technological protection of copyrighted works, or "fared use," see Bell,
supranote 114, might seriously affect the extent to which individuals regard digital copies
as their property.
209. See, e.g., WHTE PAPER, supranote 10 (arguing for education of the public regarding
copyright law).
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reproduce. This latter question is, of course, the subject of this
Article. Despite these limitations on viewing digital copies as
personal property, however, the previous examples indicate that
there remains some underlying sense in which individuals consider
digital copies in their possession to be their property.
Taking as a given for the moment that such understandings do
exist, the next question is what relevance, if any, they hold for
copyright law in general. One possibility is that they should have
no relevance. That is, it may well be true that existing copyright
law evolved around conventional understandings about physical
property ownership. Yet this, by itself, does not help us determine
whether such understandings should be respected in the digital
context. If there exist strong arguments against recognizing such
understandings (for example, if such a recognition would result in
a radical destruction of incentives to create copyrighted works),
then these conventions should clearly give way. Over time,
individuals will come to understand the requirements of the law,
and conventions will change and adapt. Thus, it is at least quite
clear that we cannot rest solely on the existence of these
understandings, and that we must still engage in a more detailed
examination of their theoretical justifications.
Yet these understandings may have some relevance in our
consideration of such justifications, and in particular in our
consideration of their implementation.2 1 For example, conventional
understandings about "ownership" are extremely relevant to
questions of enforcement. Enforcement costs are an especially
relevant consideration in copyright law, because they are especially
high. Unlike many other areas of civil liability, copyright
infringement is often extremely difficult to detect, particularly if
done by many individuals, each on a limited basis."1 ' Common
experience teaches, moreover, that potentially infringing activity is
often quite widespread. To the extent that copyright law varies
210. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Custom,Adjudication and Petrushevshy'sWatch. Some
Notes from the IntellectualPropertyFront, 78 VA. L. REV. 129, 130-31 (1992) (arguing that
industry norms may not be efficient or desirable); Richard A. Epstein, International News
Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources ofPropertyRights in News, 78 VA.
L.REV. 85,128 (1992) (arguingthat courts should, undercertain circumstances, enforce wellestablished industry norms regarding intellectual property rights).
211. By contrast, it is usually pretty clear when someone has stolen your car.
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significantly from conventional understandings about the incidents
of digital copy ownership, enforcement costs will be high.2' Even
more problematically, a significant divergence between norms of
usage and legal requirements may lead to a disrespect for the
law.21" To be sure, in many areas there is often a divergence
between law and practice. And, indeed, the existence of substantial
unenforced liability does not mean that the legal rule should be
abandoned. Things might well be quite a bit worse without the
partially enforced liability. Indeed, many of the existing copyright
laws are rather counterintuitive and generally unenforced.214 Yet
where that divergence
becomes too wide, there may be reason to
215
rethink them.

Relatedly, such understandings may also be relevant in our
evaluation of how best to allocate entitlements between copy owners
and copyright owners in light of concerns about economic efficiency,
which will be addressed in more detail below. One requirement of
an efficient market is that consumers have accurate and complete
information about the goods that they are purchasing. If most
consumers have strongly held beliefs about the rights they have
when they obtain a digital copy of a copyrighted work, and if such
beliefs are at odds with the underlying legal regime, then this may
lead us to reevaluate the allocation of such rights. One possibility,
of course, would be to attempt to educate consumers about the scope
of their rights, in order to eliminate this information asymmetry.
Another possibility might be to assign the legal entitlement so as to
promote more accurate information about the nature of the goods
being acquired, in particular the scope of rights being acquired.216
This possibility will be discussed in more detail below.
212. The White Paper appears to recognize this in its recommendation that the
government engage in a campaign to educate the public about their copyright obligations.
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10.

213. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 578; Litman, supranote 3, at 41.
214. See Litman, supra note 3, at 41 (critiquing copyright law on precisely this front).
215. See id. at 48.

216. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 7 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner,
FillingGaps];Ian Ayres &Robert Gertner, Majoritarianvs. MinoritarianDefaults, 51 STAN.
L. REv. 1591 (1999) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarianvs. Minoritarian];Randy E.

Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821
(1992).
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At the very least, the above discussion indicates that the possible
existence of strongly held norms of copy ownership should be a
factor to consider in deciding whether and how to translate these
incidents of copy ownership into the digital environment. Thus,
even though this descriptive explanation for the incidents of copy
ownership does not provide us with a complete justification, at a
minimum it sheds some light on aspects of the incidents of copy
ownership. Moving on from this explanation, I now turn to some of
the normative justifications for the incidents of copy ownership.
B. BalancingIncentives and Access
One possible normative justification for preserving the conventional understandings described in the preceding section can be
found in the argument that preservation of the incidents of physical
copy ownership is necessary to preserve the balance of access and
incentives underlying copyright law more generally. As indicated
above, a number of commentators have suggested that the rights
enjoyed by owners of physical copies should be functionally
translated into the digital, online2F17 environment.

According to

these commentators, upon downloading a digital copy of a
copyrighted work, I should be permitted to access that work as
many times as I wish, whether or not literal copies of that work are
made in the RAM of my computer.219 Similarly, I should be
permitted to transfer that work to a third party over the Internet,
so long as I am careful to delete my own copy of the work, even
though during the course of such a transaction, copies of the work
are made.22 In short, digital works should be treated, to the extent
possible, as functional equivalents of physical copies; copyright law

217. Note that here (and elsewhere) I am focusing only on digital copies that have been
transmitted over a digital network. That is, I am not referring to digital copies that are fixed
in a transferable medium, such as a CD or a game cartridge. Indeed, the Copyright Act itself
recognizes a distinction between such copies and more fixed copies. See 17 U.S.C. § 109
(1994) (including video game exceptions to public display and rental restrictions).
218. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 112, at 273; Litman, supranote 3, at 40.
219. See Litman, supra note 3, at 46 (calling for an express privilege for ephemeral
copying- "If temporary copies are an unavoidable incident of reading, we should extend a
privilege to make temporary copies to all.").
220. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 112, at 273; cf Lemley, supranote 14, at 584.
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should preserve in the online environment rights broadly equivalent
to the ones enjoyed by owners of physical copies.
Underlying this view is a belief that existing copy owner rights
of access and transfer are not completely explained by the common
law concern with restraints on alienation of physical property (the
view addressed in the previous section), but instead, or in addition,
play an important role in copyright law as a whole. Although
commentators generally are not explicit in laying down the source
of this belief, it is possible to flesh out this idea a bit more. This
view appears to be based, at least in part, upon a notion that these
copy owner rights play a role in preserving some level of broad
consumer access to copyrighted works in the aggregate.2 2 1 That is,
the ability to check out a book from a library, to browse through a
book in a bookstore, to read a book that you own, to buy a book
used, and to borrow a book from a friend-together, these "rights"
result, in practice, in a level of consumer access to copyrighted
22 2
works that is worth replicating in the digital, online environment.
They are responsible for some of the free access to works, and the
attendant dissemination of ideas, that currently exists in the
physical world. In order to preserve some level of public access,
then, copyright law should construct online parallels to the rights
to browse and to borrow. 2 s
221. See Netanel, supra note 11, at 373 (describing some minimalists who insist that
longstanding, predigital limitations to copyright owner prerogatives must be maintained
even as [dligital network technologies will radically alter copyright markets"). But see
Litman, supra note 16, at 243 (disavowing attempts to maintain previous balance). As
Litman noted: "Now, I would surely argue that my claim to defend the old balance is the
more genuine one. But, the truth is, we all need to give it up. That balance is gone. Whatever
way we go, we will need to find a different balance." Id.
222. See Elkin-Koren, supranote 112, at 272 ("Browsing, however, is crucial for anynotion
of progress."); Mark Gimbel, Note, Some Thoughts on the Implications of Trusted Systems
for Intellectual PropertyLaw, 50 STAN. L. REV.1671, 1681 (1998) ("But the more important
justification-the one that has most often been advanced in defense of the [first sale]
doctrine-is that it promotes access to information.").
223. See Netanel, supra note 11, at 372:
Minimalist critics ... insist that the "free use zone" of the hard copy world,
including such uses as reading, viewing, or listening to an authorized copy of
a work, browsing in a bookstore or newsstand, lending a book or sound
recording to a friend, and borrowing from a public library, must be maintained
in cyberspace. They argue that the extension of copyright to the digital
equivalents of such uses would disturb copyright's traditional balance and
would amount to an unwarranted and unprecedented incursion into individual
liberties.
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As a theoretical matter, this view draws some support from what
Neil Netanel has termed an economically minimalist view of
copyright law. 224 Under this view, which appears to be the
instrumental view most often expressed by the courts and Congress
when speaking about copyright law, copyright law protects
copyrighted works in order to give authors an incentive to engage
in creative activity. However, the level of copyright protection
should be just sufficient so as to give rise to the creative activity,
and no more. Any more protection would have the effect ofimpeding
widespread access to works that would already have been created.
So, for example, if providing ten years of copyright protection would
provide sufficient incentive for creation of a particular work, any
more protection would simply have the undesirable effect of
depriving the public as a whole of free (or at least lower-cost) access
to the work thereafter. The minimalist view thus looks at copyright
law as effecting a balance of incentives and access, one that should
be carefully preserved, particularly against the claims of copyright
holders for greater control over their works.
Although the minimalist framework, as a theoretical matter,
accurately captures the essential considerations underlying
copyright law (that is, the basic balance between access and
incentives), lack of information and numerous practical difficulties
in applying the framework serve to limit its ability to generate clear
or effective results. The primary weakness of this theoretical
position, as even some of its proponents seem to realize, 22 is that it
is nearly impossible, at least with the tools currently available to
us, to determine how much copyright protection is "enough" to
induce an "acceptable" level of creative activity. With respect to a
single work, it might be possible ex post to estimate how much of a
return would have been sufficient to lead the author to engage in
the creative activity. (For example, we can ask roughly how much
224. See id. at 370.
225. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 3, at 31-32:
Indeed, it is conventional to argue that copyright holders should receive only
such incentives as are necessary to impel them to create and disseminate new
works. That analysis is less than helpful, though, as appears when one tries to
quantify the degree to which incentives are required. The questions"Howmany
people who do not currently compose symphonic music would do so ifsymphonic
music paid better?" and "How many current composers would write more stuff
if there were more money in it?" turn out to be imponderable and untestable.
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the author expected she would get.) Ex ante, however, authors in
the aggregate must make decisions about how to allocate their
efforts based upon the range of possible returns and the risks of
failure. 28 For resources to be allocated effectively to creative
activity, authors must have some information ahead of time about
their likely returns. However, it is nearly impossible to determine
ahead of time how much of a return is enough to generate an
"acceptable" level of creative activity.
In any event, the minimal incentive argument is rarely deployed
in such a work-specific manner. Instead, the economic minimalist
view attempts to strike a balance between incentives and access in
only the roughest fashion, based on a broad assessment of whether
there are "enough" works being created and whether free access is
being restricted "too much." Typically, the basis for comparison is
the status quo. That is, the question is whether the existing state
of affairs, in some rough sense, is broadly acceptable as a whole. 7
If it is, then we should endeavor to preserve the existing balance; if
it is not, then we should expand or contract copyright protection to
arrive at a new "balance." The minimal incentive argument thus
often takes as its starting point existing institutions and market
structures.
Although this approach provides a useful rough guide, it is also
limited in a number of ways. First, there is little in the economic
minimalist position to tell us whether the existing balance is an
appropriate one or whether any adjustment would lead to a better
state of affairs. Rather, the most that can be said about the existing
balance is that it is the existing balance. If that balance is not
intolerable, then there may be reasons not to feel any great urgency
one way or the other. There may indeed be something to be said
about incremental development of the law and a reluctance to
needlessly disturb settled arrangements and expectations. At the
very least, such an approach permits us to rely on existing market
structures and to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, new developments as they come along. Yet without any way of assessing even
the direction of such incremental development, the minimalist view
unfortunately provides little help in deciding difficult cases. Indeed,
226. See Goldstein, supranote 132, at 82.
227. See, e.g., Breyer, supranote 122, at 281.
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opinions about such cases will differ precisely according to whether
one believes the existing balance is tilted too heavily towards
authors or consumers.2 s
This problem is even more acute under conditions of rapid
technological change. Indeed, the prospect of trying to "maintain"
any given balance of incentives and access seems an almost
impossible task under such conditions. Over the past century, we
have witnessed numerous technological advances that have lowered
dramatically both the cost of disseminating copyrighted works and
the cost of copying them. We have also witnessed the introduction
and development of dramatically new forms ofmedia. Undoubtedly,
these technological changes have had some effect on the balance of
incentives and access in copyright law. New institutions have arisen
to take advantage of these new developments. Yet copyright law
itself has shown little ability to "maintain," in any meaningful
sense, a given level of incentive and access in the face of such
change, beyond, as mentioned before, ensuring that the balance is
not intolerably tilted to one side or the other. Accurate maintenance
of a given "balance" in the face of a new technology requires
accurate information about the effect of such technology, and such
information is notoriously difficult to come by.
In fact, it is probably much more accurate to say that the level of
incentive and access is a constantly shifting function of copyright
law and many other factors, such as technology, enforcement, and
general norms of usage.2 29 Attempts to maintain some preexisting
"balance" in the face of rapid technological change seem to pose a
very real risk of locking in existing institutions and preventing the
development of new markets that would take advantage of novel
features of the new environment. At most, the idea of maintaining
a balance has relevance only in those rare cases where technological
changes clearly and inappropriately shift the balance one way or
the other-for example, if a new technology would essentially
destroy the incentives for the creation of copyrighted works." ° Yet
228. This can also be affected by views on related, noneconomic issues, such as authors'

rights.
229. See I. TrotterHardy, Contracts,CopyrightandPreemptioninafDigitalWorld, 1 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995), at http:J/www.richmond.edujoltvlil/hardy.html.
230. An example on the other end of the spectrum would be the recent extension of the
copyright term by another 20 years (to life plus 70 years), for both future and existing works.
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past experience teaches that the net impact of a technology is
extremely difficult to predict ahead of time. The same technologies
that lower copying costs often dramaticallylower distribution costs.
So, for example, one commentator has predicted that
If copyright owners are able to charge for all browsing, fewer
people will be able to gain even limited access to information.
While, under the current regime, users are able to freely browse
through books in the bookstore or through different sections of
a newspaper, a regime that makes browsing an infringement
would restrict such behavior."'
Yet this ignores the fact that copyright owners and distributors of
copies already have many nonlegal mechanisms for restricting
browsing. Book publishers can shrink-wrap their books. Movie
producers can exclude individuals from "browsing" their films
before payingfor a ticket. Yet bookstores permit (indeed encourage)
browsing, and movie producers offer a nearly unending stream of
free previews. Moreover, this view does not account for ways in
which new market structures may evolve to give individuals even
greater access to information than before. For example, access to
news on the Internet is greater than ever before, despite the fact
that inexpensive technologies exist that would enable the New York
Times, say, to exclude readers from accessing the online version
without paying. This is no guarantee that the economics will not
change such that access will be restricted in the future. But it does
indicate that incentives exist for copyright owners to make access
available (whether for free or for a cost) to the public in general.
More broadly, it suggests that predictions about future market
structures are fi-aught with uncertainty. 2
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, codified at
17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Itis difficult (and impossible, with respect to existing
works) to see how the addition of 20 years to the already lengthy copyright term would have
any effect on incentives, given the minuscule present value of any such (highly speculative)
future revenue streams. Thus, in this extreme case as well, the minimalist view would
provide a rather solid answer.
231. Elkin-Koren, supranote 112, at 272.
232. Indeed, this is reflected in the diametrically opposed reactions to the net impact of
the Internet. Copyright owners typically view the Internet in somewhat apocalyptic terms,
as the world's biggest copying machine. See WME PAPER, supra note 10, at 64-66. Many
commentators, by contrast, worry that Internet technology will in fact have exactly the

1314

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1245

This suggests, then, that the minimal incentive argument
unfortunately does not provide a very useful justification for the
existing bundle of copy owner rights, or perhaps more accurately,
provides an adequate justification for now, but a more limited one
for helping us determine how copyright should respond to the
dramatic changes in copying technology.
At the same time, however, the minimal incentive position, even
if unable to generate more specific results, may be able to provide
some rough guidance, and this may be all that we can reasonably
expect from any theoretical framework, given the dramatic changes
in technology. That is, even though we may not be able to provide
a strong justification for the existing balance of access and
incentives, and even though we may not be able to predict
accurately how this balance might be affected by changes in
technology, where it is clear that a new technology will have a
significant impact on incentives-for example, by entirely
destroying incentives to create-then the minimal incentive
argument will provide clear answers. Thus, at the very least, we
may be able to use the minimal incentive position to ensure that, at
bottom, the basic incentive-providing role of copyright law remains
protected. Moreover, to the extent that the minimalist framework
counsels a more conservative approach to expanding copyrights in
the face of changing technology (based on the idea that copyright
law should only provide "enough" protection, and no more), the
minimalist approach suggests that Congress and the courts
at least
should wait for more information before acting. After all, past
claims about the incentive-destroying character of new technologies
have largely been unfounded. More fine-tuned judgments, however,
cannot easily be derived from this framework.
C. Maximizing Returns and Minimizing TransactionsCosts
An alternative to the minimalist framework is the economic
"maximalist" framework." ' Like the minimalists, maximalists
opposite effect, enabling copyright owners to exert unprecedented control over the use of
their works. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 112, at 272; Lemley, supra note 14, at 549.
Uncertainty caused by new technology frequently acts as a Rorschach test, reflecting one's
own hopes and/or fears about the impact of such technology.
233. Netanel calls this the "neoclassicist" approach. See Netanel, supranote 11, at 286-87
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adopt an instrumental approach to copyright law, but they differ in
important respects. Instead of focusing on the minimum incentive
necessary to induce the creation of creative works, maximalists
start from the position that authors should be entitled to control
nearly all economically productive uses of copyrighted works." 4 By
internalizing all of the potential benefits of the work, copyright law
can thus facilitate the economically efficient allocation of resources
to creative activity. 5 Broad access to creative works can be
maintained, despite the broad scope of copyright protection,
through licensing.2 3 That is, extensive author control over the use
of copyrighted works is not problematic, because subsequent uses
of creative works can be licensed by those who2 wish
to use the
7
works, and the only question is the proper price.
Under such circumstances, the primary limits on the scope of
copyright law come from the need to reduce transactions costs
associated with licensing uses of the work. For example, in certain
cases involving small scale, personal uses of a work (for example,
copying small portions of a work), the transactions costs associated
with securing a license (for example, locating the copyright owner,
negotiating a license, etc.) would likely outweigh the value of that
use to the user. Under such circumstances, the maximalist view
("Neoclassicists would accordinglytreat literary and artistic works as vendible commodities,'
best made subject to broad proprietary rights that extend to every conceivable valued use.
In this manner, neoclassicists contend, market pricing can direct resource allocation for the
marketing and development of existing creative expression in an optimally efficient

manner.") (citation omitted).
234. See Goldstein, supranote 132, at 82-83, 85; Netanel, supra note 11, at 286.
235. See Gordon, supranote 84, at 1389; Edmund Kitch, The Nature andFunctionof the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Netanel, supranote 11, at 286.
236. See, e.g., Bell, supranote 114, at 596-600; L Trotter Hardy, Property(andCopyright)
in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217. More specifically, licensing and perfect price
discrimination are seen as ways to minimize the deadweight loss from consumers who would
be willing to pay more than the marginal cost of the work, but less than the single, profitra mizing price that would otherwise be set by the copyright owner. See, e.g., Fisher,
PropertyandContract,supranote 2, at 1234-40 (discussing the economic advantages of price
discrimination); WendyJ. Gordon,IntellectualPropertyasPriceDiscrimination:
Implications
for Contract, 73 Cmu.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998) (noting limits of price discrimination
justification).
237. Maximalists also tend to downplay the extent to which copyright confers any market
power, pointing to the fact that substitutes exist for many copyrighted works..See Goldstein,
supra note 132, at 83-85; Landes & Posner, supranote 140, at 328; see also Edmund W.
Kitch, Elementary and PersistentErrors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property,

53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-38 (2000).
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dictates that copyright law should step in and transfer the right to
the user (for example, through the mechanism of fair use). 3 Some
commentators have also extended this rationale to cover those
instances when a license is refused for noneconomic reasons, such
as to prevent criticism or parody." Aside from limited circumstances such as these, however, copyright owners should be given
broad rights to control their works and the market should be
allowed 0to provide the appropriate balance of incentives and
24
access.

The advantage of the maximalist view over the minimalist view
is that the maximalist approach does not require any attempt
to "maintain" any existing balance of access and incentives in the
face of rapid technological change. Nor does it require express
judgments about how much protection is "enough" to give rise to an
"adequate" level of creative activity. Instead, the maximalist view
trusts that the market will evolve to a new and appropriate balance
with new markets and institutions, provided that initial entitlements are firmly set.4 1 Thus, the maximalist framework holds out
at least the possibility of providing clearer answers.
At the same time, it is important to note that the maximalist
view, though perhaps "cleaner" as a theoretical matter, is seriously
incomplete as a copyright theory. As an initial matter, its focus on
economic efficiency is subject to many of the standard critiques
of efficiency as a proper metric. 42 In addition, the maximalist
238. Goldstein, supranote 132, at 83-85; Gordon, supranote 2, at 1605.

239. See Gordon, supranote 2, at 1605; see alsoLydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market
FailureApproach to FairUse in an Eraof CopyrightPermissionSystems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 1 (1997) (highlighting problem of positive externalities).
240. To some extent, though not completely, the difference between minimalists and
maximalists is a difference over the means of accomplishing the same (or at least a similar)
goal. Both want to provide consumers with the greatest level of access to the greatest number
and variety of creative works. Minimalists believe that this is best accomplished through
ensuring broad access to copyrighted works, viewing existing incentives as generally
sufficient for the production of works. Maximalists, by contrast, believe this is best
accomplished through ensuring broad incentives to create many copyrighted works, viewing
licensing through the market as generally sufficient to ensure access once the works are
created.
241. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspaceand the Law of the Horse,1996 U. Cmu. LEGAL
F. 207,208,216.
242. Examples include its blindness to initial distributions of wealth, and its use of
"willingness to pay" as a measure of value, its reliance on the pricing mechanism to
accurately direct optimal investment in resources. See James Boyle, Cruel,Mean, orLavish?
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framework has been criticized for failing to account adequately for
the extent to which creative works are based upon, and draw from,
prior creative works.2' An optimal copyright scheme, in setting the
scope ofentitlements, would balance incentives for creating original
works against incentives for creating follow-on works. 2 " The
maximalist framework, by contrast, focuses primarily, if not
exclusively, on the original work, and leaves the creation of the
follow-on work to the licensing regime. Others have critiqued the
maximalist view for failing to consider significant positive
externalities from free access, which are not captured by a pure
licensing regime.2 45 Still others have critiqued the maximalist claim
that licensing will adequately address the problem of providing
sufficient access to copyrighted works. 6
Perhaps most seriously, however, the maximalist view does not
take into account noneconomic values. Instead, the maximalist
position views copyrighted works primarily as vendible commodities
and focuses almost exclusively on ensuring that a wide variety of
such works is produced at reasonably low cost. This last feature is
particularly significant, because copyright law, as discussed in more
detail below, expressly embodies a number of noneconomic values
(for example, criticism, parody, and the First Amendment).
Moreover, numerous commentators have advanced powerful
additional noneconomic theories, which shed interesting light on
the proper shape and scope of copyright law.' 7 Thus, although the
maximalist view provides a useful tool for evaluating some
EconomicAnalysis, PriceDiscriminationandDigitalIntellectualProperty,52 VAND. L. REV.
2007,2033 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"RightsManagement,"97MICH. L. REv. 462,510-11 (1998) (criticizing the maximalist views
of'cybereconomists); Gordon, supranote 2, at 1605 (discussing market failure in the context
of the fair use doctrine); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our
System of FreeExpression, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1879 (2000).
243. See Boyle, supra note 242, at 2031; Lemley, supranote 145, at 1037-38; Harvey S.
Perlman, Taking the Protection-Access TradeoffSeriously, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1835-36

(2000).
244. See Landes & Posner, supranote 140, at 335; Lemley, supranote 145, at 1037.
245. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1812
(2000); Loren, supranote 239.
246. See generallyYochaiBenklerAn UnhurriedView ofPrivateOrderingin Information
Transactions,53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Fisher, Propertyand Contract,supra note 2; see
also Boyle, supra note 242, at 2025-33; Cohen, supranote 245, at 1811; Gordon, supra note
236, at 1387.
247. See infra notes 278 and 282.
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economic aspects of copyright law, one must still consider the
limitations noted above, as well as potential noneconomic
justifications.2 This Article considers such justifications in the
following section.
Despite these significant limitations, the maximalist view sheds
some interesting light on the incidents of copy ownership. Under
the maximalist view, many of the existing incidents of copy
ownership can be explained as arising from the need to reduce
transactions costs. For example, under the maximalist view,
copyright owners should in theory be able to charge a royalty every
time a copy owner (or other person) reads a book or accesses a
particular copy of a copyrighted work.2 4 9 This would permit
copyright owners to fully capture the value of a particular copy to
that particular consumer (that is, those who read more, pay more),
thereby maximizing the total economic return on the work through
greater price discrimination."0 However, under the maximalist
view, copyright law should not in fact extend so far, because the
transactions costs involved in licensing every reading of a particular
work likely outweigh the value of that reading. In addition, the
extremely high cost (and low effectiveness) of enforcement of such
a right further undermines the efficiency of such a rule. Copyright
law thus properly transfers the right to read to the owner of the
copy, leaving the copyright owner only the ability to recoup such
value indirectly through the sale of copies.2 5 '
Similarly, the ability to transfer a given copy of a copyrighted
work may also be justified as responding to a concern over
248. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1606 (recognizing noneconomic reasons for market
failure); Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failureand the
Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 310 (1993) (noting that in a parody
transaction 'refusal to license is based on a noneconomic motive"); Netanel, supra note 11,
at 310 (identifying a branch of neoclassicism that derives support from "new institutional
economics").
249. See Litman, supranote 3, at 32 ("If we rely on the simple economic model, we are led
to the conclusion that every enhancement of the rights in the copyright bundle is necessary
to encourage the creation of some work of authorship.").
250. Note that this claim has come under strong attack recently from a number of
commentators. See sources cited supra note 243.
251. This justification, like many economic attempts to explain preexisting rules, has a
certain "just so" quality to it. See Landes & Posner, supra note 140, at 328. Certainly the
claim is not that the enacting legislature in fact considered these issues in coming up with
the operative legal rules. Rather, the claim is that, whatever the motivating factor, these
rules can be understood to have certain economic functions.
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transactions costs. Certainly, lending or selling a book to a friend
would seem to constitute a use of that work that would be too costly
to license and too difficult to enforce. However, as such activity
increases in scale, concerns about transactions costs diminish, and
the maximalist view lends support to conferring a right upon the
copyright owner. So, for example, under the maximalist view, the
limits on commercial lending of software and recorded music may
be justified, not only because they prevent facilitation of piracy, but
also because they permit authors to appropriate the economic value
that would arise from lending a work to the public. 2 Thus, we
would expect maximalists to support extension of such a public
lending right to videotapes and even perhaps to booksY In each
case, concerns about transactions costs are minimized because
institutions (video rental stores
and libraries) exist to reduce the
4
cost of licensing such use.2
The incidents of physical copy ownership may also serve an
additional, closely related economic function by reducing information costs through clearly delineating a standard, default bundle
of "rights" acquired by the copy owner in the sale or transfer of a
physical copy. That is, purchasers of physical copies may hold
certain understandings about what it means to own physical
property. 5 To the extent copyright law respects such understandings, this facilitates the development of a standard default
bundle of rights and lowers potential enforcement problems. So, for
example, when I purchase a CD, I know relatively clearly what it is
I am purchasing. A standard, clearly identified bundle reduces
information and bargaining costs. Moreover, where the bundle of
rights is a bundle that every purchaser presumably desires, then it
may reduce costs simply to attach the bundle automatically to the
standard sale transaction. Conversely, attempts to significantly
change existing patterns of ingrained behavior could be quite costly
252. See Kernochan, supranote 163, at 148-270.
253. Books may be a special case, insofar as libraries are expressly subsidized by the

Copyright Act, presumably because of their social value in serving as a repository for, and
facilitating public access to, books. Cf. S.J. Liebowitz, Copyingand IndirectAppropriability:

Photocopying of Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945 (1985) (providing evidence that journal
publishers price discriminate). Note, however, that a strict maximalist view would require
that these costs be licensed as well.
254. See Merges, supra note 184, at 1302-03.
255. See supraPart II.A.
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and, in the end, unsuccessful (at least in the physical environment).
Accordingly, under a maximalist view, the incidents of copy
ownership may be explained by such potential enforcement costs.
The maximalist view suggests, then, that whether many of the
incidents of physical copy ownership should be translated into the
digital environment depends largely on the likely degree of
transactions costs. Thus, for example, the ability to access, or
"read," a digital copy in one's possession should not be translated
into the digital environment if mechanisms exist or can be
developed that would drastically lower the cost of obtaining a
license to access or read. Similarly, the ability to sell or otherwise
transfer a digital copy should not be translated into the digital
environment if cheap mechanisms could be developed to monitor
and restrict such transfers. If such technologies can be developed,
then the transactions costs associated with licenses may be so low
that the underlying rights should properly be retained by the
copyright owner. That is, there may be no reason to deviate from
the default maximalist position that such rights should belong to
the copyright owner.
Indeed, several commentators have argued precisely for this
result.2 56 Moreover, the White Paper (and by extension the DMCA,
which was based upon the White Paper's recommendations)
enthusiastically embraces the conclusion that the Internet in fact
will drastically lower the cost of licensing. According to the White
Paper, copyright owners, using the technology of "trusted
systems," 7 will soon be able to cheaply monitor levels of consumer
usage of digital copies (for example, the number of times a copy is
accessed) and assess "micro-charges" for such usage (for example,
by debiting an electronic "e-cash" account).2 5 8 Digital copies will
256. See Bell, supra note 114, at 564-67, 618-19; see also Hardy, supra note 236.
257. See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright ManagementSystems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997); Mark Stefik, Shifting the
Possible:How TrustedSystems and DigitalPropertyRights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital
Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997) (discussing the technology of trusted
systems).
258. Julie Cohen has discussed a number of noneconomic concerns associated with such
systems. See Cohen, supranote 150; see also Bell, supra note 114, at 564-67 (evincing a more
favorable view of trusted systems); Pamela Samuelson, Will the CopyrightOffice be Obsolete
in the Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 58 n.18 (1994) (discussing
documents that "rat"on you).
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soon have "copyright management information" attached to them,
which will tell users how and where to contact the copyright owners
in order to secure licenses. Similarly, systems maybe created in the
future that would monitor or control the transfer of digital copies.
Thus, according to the White Paper, the potentially dire implications ofMAI are in fact not terribly worrisome, because users will
still be able to access, use, and transfer digital documents by
obtaininglow-cost licenses from the copyright owner. Similarly, and
for the same reasons, the scope of fair use online should be
appropriately reduced in the digital context to account for the
reduction in licensing costs.2 59 Indeed, the DMCA, reflecting the
views set forth in the White Paper, implements measures designed
to give added support to the development of such a regime. More
specifically, the DMCA gives added support to trusted systems by
2 60
imposing liability for circumventing copy protection technology;
by banning distribution of certain circumvention technologies;26 1
and by protecting copyright management information from
262
tampering.
In staking out such a position, however, both the DMCA and the
White Paper, even apart from the more fundamental critiques
mentioned above, pass far too quickly over the potential problem of
transactions costs and place entirely too much reliance on the
development and implementation of new technology.2 6 Indeed,the
maximalist approach to copyright law has been criticized for failing
to take seriouslythe real-world impact of transactions costs, despite
acknowledging their existence, 264 and the White Paper appears to
open itself up to precisely this criticism. As an initial matter, the
White Paper provides scant support for its prediction about the
future existence of low-cost licensing. Whether low-cost licensing
(and the attendant technology to implement and enforce such) will
in fact evolve requires a prediction about the future shape of
technology, and as already noted, such predictions are notoriously
259. See Bell, supra note 114, at 571-73.
260. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
261. See id. § 1201(a)(2).
262. See id. § 1202.
263. Note that I am focusing here on the transactions costs issue. The maximalist position
is also open to more basic critiques regarding its use of economic efficiency as a metric and
its failure to consider noneconomic values. See, e.g., Cohen, supranote 245, at 539-59.
264. See, e.g., id. at 497-504; Netanel, supra note 11, at 309-24.
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difficult and error-prone." 5 Although there are reasons to believe
that such technology might develop, it is certainly unwise to rely too
much on the development of such technology, particularly where a
faulty prediction would result in substantial restrictions in the
ability of consumers to access copyrighted works.
In addition, even if such technology develops, the cost of licensing
may still be too high in relation to the value of certain uses to
warrant a change in the distribution of legal entitlements. The
value associated with reading or accessing a digital copy in one's
possession may be quite low. In addition to the cost of negotiating
a license, the potential user must also factor in the time needed to
find the copyright owner and to secure permission from that owner.
So, for example, assume that you receive a digital copy of an image
by e-mail from a friend. The time and effort spent seeking a license
to open that image may well exceed the minimal value associated
with viewing that image, even if technological mechanisms exist to
reduce the cost of such a transaction. If this is the case, the net
result of the rule in MAI would simply be to prevent a mutually
beneficial use of the image (or, more likely, the result would be
widespread disregard of the operative legal rule).
In the face of such uncertainty about future technology, the
maximalist framework generally prefers to err on the side of
granting rights to the copyright owner. In part, the reasoning is
that the cost of such an error will generally be less than an error in
the other direction, because conferring the right on the copyright
owner will at least permit the opportunity for the market to come
up with private mechanisms to reduce the cost of licensing.266 By
contrast, if the entitlement is conferred upon the user, then it is
generally more costly for the copyright owner to contractually
265. See Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in
Markets for Ideas: Copyright and FairUse in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INTL REV. L. &
ECON. 209, 210-17 (1985) (noting that the market-failure approach to fair use requires
judicial prediction about what the market will look like). At the same time, however, such
predictions are generally less difficult than the predictions about overall market structure
required by the minimalist approach. See supra note 47.
266. Collective rights organizations such as the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers (ASCAP) and the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) are typically heralded
as examples of private mechanisms that reduce transactions costs. See Merges, supra note
184, at 1295-96. However, such organizations are also subject to significant inefficiencies and
concerns about monopoly power. See Netanel, supranote 11, at 376.
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secure a promise not to engage in the activity from all consumers.
Thus, it could be argued that, even if the net result of the
technology is uncertain, copyright law should at least give the
market a chance to work before transferring the entitlement.
There may be reasons, however, to believe that this approach is
not warranted in the case ofthe right to read and/or transfer digital
copies." 7 Copyright owners in the digital environment, unlike
similar owners in the physical environment, may well have an
increased ability to secure compliance with use restrictions through
technology.' If a copyright owner wishes to charge a user for a
certain amount of access to a digital work, it can do so more
effectively in the online world, through implementing a technology
that restricts such access. 9 This ability to engage in self-help
suggests that it may make sense to place the burden of implementing such measures on the copyright owner, rather than placing
the burden to seek out a license more diffusely on those who happen
to receive copies of the work.
In addition, such a requirement would avoid the problem of
divergence between the conventional understandings discussed in
the first section of this Part and the actual rights acquired by the
user. That is, giving the copyright owner the right to control
reading appears to run counter to established instincts and
conventions about digital copies. We might, therefore, expect that
such a move would raise substantial costs in terms of enforcement
or in terms of widespread disregard of the operative legal rule, as
users will not have adequate information about precisely what it is
they have acquired. Or, more generally, such misinformation may
have a distorting impact on the market. However, if technology
limits what can be done with the copy, then information about the
scope of the license is effectively disclosed and the possibility of
mistake reduced. 70 Thus, placing the burden of self-help upon the
267. See, e.g., StanleyBesenet aL,An EconomicAnalysisof Copyright Collectives, 78 VA.
L. REV. 383 (1992); Netanel, supranote 11, at 376-82.
268. Indeed, the possibility of such technological control has led some commentators to
worry about possibly restricting the scope of such control in order to preserve some areas of
free consumer access. See Cohen, supranote 257, at 981-82; Litman, supra note 3, at 46.
269. This is in sharp contrast with the physical environment, where the copyright owner
would face the insuperable task of seeking out every potential user and securing a license
from each one.

270. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 216 (discussing how courts and
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copyright owner may in fact assist in conveying information for
market transactions, reducing the potentially distorting impact of
information asymmetries.2 71
To summarize, then, the maximalist framework provides some
economic justification for the existing incidents of copy ownership
and some guidance about what we should consider in deciding
whether, and if so how, to translate these incidents into the digital
context. As a general matter, the framework favors granting rights
to copyright owners when possible and relying upon the market to
sort out the various rights and uses in copyrighted works. However,
careful attention must be paid to transactions costs and other ways
in which the digital marketplace may depart from the neoclassical
ideal. It is this final point that has been largely neglected by the
White Paper.
This conclusion does not end our analysis. Even though the
maximalist framework appears to provide a justification for the
distribution of rights between copy owner and copyright owner, we
must still consider whether there exist additional, noneconomic
justifications for the incidents of copy ownership. As already
mentioned above, the maximalist framework does not capture
interests that are not economic. This is perhaps the most significant
limitation to that approach, because many noneconomic values
clearly play a vital role in copyright law. Might the existing
distribution of rights also reflect some accommodation of
noneconomic interests and values, and if so, should such interests
legislatures should set default contract rules); Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian vs.
Minoritarian,supra note 216 (critiquing the use of penalty default provisions as a means to
facilitate the disclosure of information between contracting parties); Ayres & Talley, supra
note 100 (addressing divided entitlement concept and concluding that divided ownership
facilitates trade). But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate
Bargaining?A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 232 (1995) (arguing that the
central thesis of Ayres & Talley "that liability rules facilitate bargaining is not adequately
supported by the information-forcing argument in their article").
271. Note also that the maximalist view does not address market failures that are not
attributable to transactions costs. For example, Lydia Loren has argued that there are
positive externalities that result from certain amounts of free access to copyrighted works,
externalities that are not captured in licensing transactions. See Loren, supra note 239.
Similarly, low transactions costs do not adequately address refusals to license based on noneconomic reasons, such as a desire to avoid criticism. Thus the maximalist view fails to
capture such important substantive values as criticism and the First Amendment. These
values will be addressed expressly in the following section.
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be translated into the digital environment? It is to these interests
that I now turn.
D. PromotingNoneconomic Values
Although U.S. copyright law is broadly characterized as
instrumental in its approach, it has also had a history of being
influenced, at times, by noninstrumental considerations. Perhaps
most prominently, the rhetoric of authors' rights and Lockean
notions of labor-desert have had some influence on the shape of
copyright law.272 Partly in response to the growing international
character of the copyright markets,27 the Copyright Act itself has
been amended to recognize, in a very limited fashion, certain moral
rights of integrity and attribution for a limited category of works of
visual art.27 Some commentators have argued, moreover, that
much of the recent judicial and legislative expansion of copyright
law can be explained as resulting from increasing receptiveness to
such arguments. 75 Certainly, judicial opinions often include
language that has natural rights or labor-desert overtones. 7 6 Yet in
the end, such theories provide little concrete guidance over the
272. See generally Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property,68 CalKENT L. REV. 609 (1993) (arguing that creators of intellectual property have greaterrights
by ownership); Gordon, supra note 84 (noting special burdens scholars place on copyright
law); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988)
(discussing Lockean and Hegelian property rights theories); Alfred Yen, Restoring the
NaturalLaw: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 517 (1990) (discussing
noneconomic justifications for copyright law).
273. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereinafter "Berne Convention").
274. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos.,
538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting preliminary injunction requiring thatABC no longer edit
the original programs as performed by Monty Python). Integrity and attribution may raise
some interesting issues in the digital environment, insofar as digital copies are inherently
more susceptible to (often undetectable) manipulation. It may be very difficult to tell when
a digital copy has been changed. This issue is outside the scope of this Article.
275. See BOYLE, supranote 16, at 25-34,47-50; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright:
The Metamorphosis of "Authorship,"1991 DuKE L.J. 455, 457-63. But see Mark A. Lenley,
Book Review, RomanticAuthorship and the Rhetoric of Property: Shamans, Software and
Spleens: Law and the Constructionof the InformationSociety, 75 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1997)
(reviewing Boyle and arguing that expansion is due instead to unthinking protection of
"property"); Netanel, supranote 11, at 307 (arguing that expansion isdue to acceptance of
maximalist views).
276. See, e.g., Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23-25.
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precise scope and shape of copyright law. There appear to be few
limiting principles to many of these noneconomic theories.
Questions about how much reward an author "deserves" are hard
to answer with any degree of precision, and are likely to affect
results only when equities of a particular case point substantially
in an author's favor.
With respect specifically to the incidents of copy ownership, it is
difficult to see how notions of labor-desert, in particular, have much
to say. The idea that an author deserves the.fruits of his or her
labor seems to shed little light on why copy owners retain a right to
read and access their copies. There may be a sense in which we feel
an author does not deserve to control access to the copy after he or
she has parted with title to it, but this sense is not terribly
illuminating. Perhaps more relevantly, notions of desert frequently
underlie arguments of copyright owners to peel back parts of the
first sale doctrine. For example, arguments for a public lending
right for books or for resale royalties for textbooks and CDs are
often couched in terms of what the author deserves. Copyright
owners argue that these practices unfairly deprive them of the
fruits of their creative labor. Thus, notions of desert seem, like the
maximalist approach, to lend support to the basic expansion of
copyright owner rights and reduction of the first sale doctrine.
However, as mentioned above, such notions give little guidance
about the precise level and scope of protection.
More recently, some commentators have advanced and developed
noneconomic theories that focus not so much on the natural rights
of authors, but instead on the precise shape and structure of the
market for creative works created by the existing copyright laws.Y
Roughly speaking, instead of focusing on the inputs to creative
activity, these theories focus on the outputs of a particular legal
regime. And instead of focusing only narrowly on the number,
quality, and price of copyrighted works produced, as the economic
approaches tend to do, these theories ask whether the types of
works, and the levels of access to them, satisfy some broader,
277. See generallyElkin-Koren, supranote 9 (analyzing how copyright law may shape the
online environment and digital technology, and arguing against liability for online bulletin
board operators); Fisher, FairUse Doctrine,supranote 2, at 1744-94 (advancing a "utopian"
analysis if society's "ambition [was] ... to advance a substantive conception of a just and
attractive intellectual culture").
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noneconomic value. In some sense, these approaches are
instrumental in that they focus on the ultimate output and
consequences of the copyright laws, yet they differ in their more
expansive measures for the suitability of the output.
One recent example is the theory advanced by Neil Netanel 78
Netanel advances a copyright theory based broadly on the idea that
U.S. copyright law plays an important role in developing the
conditions necessary for a democratic civil society. It does this by
using the market as a mechanism to enable the robust production
of creative works free of government subsidy or control. 7 9 At the
same time, however, the democratic paradigm has something to say
about the precise shape and scope of copyright protection. Because
copyright law, under Netanel's view, is not exclusively calculated to
maximize returns to copyright owners, limits exist on the scope of
copyright protection, limits dictated by the broader copyright goal
of producing and supporting the conditions for a thriving
democratic civil society."0
Such substantive theories about the ultimate shape ofthe market
for copyrighted works are understandably subject to a great deal of
controversy and disagreement. An advantage of the economic
theories discussed above is that they focus on the part of copyright
law that is relatively (though not completely) uncontroversial: its
role in facilitating the production of creative works. Furthermore,
the maximalist view has the advantage that it at least purports to
leave difficult questions of value up to the market as a whole. 1 Yet
this is, at the same time, a significant weakness in the maximalist
view, because substantive considerations have clearly played an
important role in shaping copyright law in the past. Indeed, the

278. See Netanel, supra note 11, at 373.
279. See id. at 347-55.
280. See id. at 362-64; see also Fisher, Property and Contract,supra note 2 (advancing
social-planning theory to copyright on the Internet); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinionsand

Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998) (suggesting that aesthetics is a relevant
consideration in judging copyright cases). But see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
Democracy:A CautionaryNote, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1933 (2000).
281. This is, of course, largely illusory, because the market paradigm itself naturally
embodies certain value judgments, that is, a preference for works that appeal to the tastes
•
ofthe market and that can be commodified. See, e.g., Margaret Chon,Postmodern?rogress".
Reconsideringthe Copyrightand PatentPower, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993); Cohen, supra

note 245, at 1800.
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limits on copyright law imposed by the First Amendment
(conventionally understood as expressed through the fair use and
idea-expression doctrines) are a clear example of a substantive
value, as are the express references in the Copyright Act to
criticism and education. And indeed too narrow a focus on
production may blind us to the qualities of what precisely it is that
copyright law is producing.
It therefore makes sense to ask whether any substantive
considerations about the shape of copyright law can shed light on
the incidents of copy ownership. That is, do the abilities to read,
transfer, lend, and rent physical copies of copyrighted works serve
any noninstrumental and substantive values? Do they have an
influence on the shape of the market for copyrighted works? To the
extent that they do, any instrumental approach to digital copies
should perhaps be modified to account for such noninstrumental
values. Once again, such values are subject to potential
disagreement. At the same time, however, they may give rich
insight into the precise shape and scope of copyright law.
One possible value is an interest in preventing overcentralization
of access to copyrighted works and promoting distributed
circulation of copyrighted works. This interest can find some
indirect support in writings on the importance of what is sometimes
called "semiotic democracy."" 2 Under this view, consumers have a
legitimate interest, not only in securing and being able to consume
a wide variety of intellectual goods at low cost, but also in being
able to use, manipulate, and transform such goods so as to be able
to derive new meanings from such goods.2"' This view holds that
this ability to utilize and manipulate intellectual works is an
inherent part of deriving such meaning, both for the individual
282. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and PoliticalAspiration: Mass
Culture, Gender Identity, and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221 (1992) [hereinafter
Coombe, PublicityRights];RosemaryJ. Coombe, ObjectsofPropertyandSubjects ofPolitics:
IntellectualPropertyLawsandDemocraticDialogue,
69TMx.L.REv. 1853 (1991) [hereinafter
Coombe, Objects ofProperty];Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks
as Language in the Pepsi Generation,65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Fisher, Property
and Contract, supra note 2, at 1217-18; David Lange, At Play in the Fields of The Word:
Copyright and the Constructionof Authorship in the Post-LiterateMillennium, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 139; Michael Madow, PrivateOwnership ofPublicImage:
PopularCulture and PublicityRights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127 (1993).
283. See Netanel, supra note 11, at 373.
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consumer and for the community at large.2 84 In some ways, it is a
theory about how users consume (or should be permitted to
consume) intellectual works. This view has had particular impact
in trademark law and the right of publicity.2 5 Critiques based on
the value of semiotic democracy have decried the increasing
centralization and expansion (particularly through the antidilution
provisions) of trademark owners' control over the use and meaning
of their marks,"8 and celebrities' increasing control over the use
and meaning of their images.2 7 Giving trademark owners and
celebrities too much control over such meaning prevents consumers
from using such cultural symbols to create new meanings.288
Certain features of copyright law appear expressly to support
semiotic democracy as an independent value. Most obviously, the
provisions in the fair use doctrine that protect criticism and parody
appear designed specifically to give users the freedom to craft new
meanings based on the underlying copyrighted work. Thus, a
copyright owner has no right to prevent a critic from citing portions
of the work, from interpreting the work in a certain fashion, or from
printing critical remarks about the work.2 89 Similarly, under certain
284. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 112, at 272 ("Any creation of knowledge depends on

exposure to new information. We refine our ideas about the world through interaction with
others' ideas, feelings, beliefs and discoveries. Alaw that allows owners to charge money for
any such interaction is detrimental to any vision oflearning and growth."). Elkin-Koren also
predicts that
If copyright owners are able to charge for all browsing, fewer people will be able
to gain even limited access to information. While, under the current regime
users are able to freely browse through books in the bookstore or through
different sections of a newspaper, a regime that makes browsing an
infringement would restrict such behavior.
Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 245, at 1816-19 (suggesting that there may be substantial
benefit to incomplete copyright owner control).

285. See Madow, supra note 282, at 134-35 (arguing that the right of publicity threatens
the ability of the public to recast and reshape celebrity images).
286. Foran interestingexample, seeDoesthe DistortedBarbieViolateMattel'sCopyright?,
at http//www.netprojects/censored/censored.htm (discussing Matters request that the
website remove Barbie from its page because of copyright infringement).
287. See, e.g., Madow, supranote 282, at 144-47 (discussing lawsuit over postcard of John
Wayne wearing lipstick).
288. See Coombe, Objects ofProperty, supranote 282; Dreyfuss, supra note 282. But see
Justin Hughes, 'Recoding- IntellectualPropertyand OverlookedAudienceInterests, 77 TEX
L. REv. 923, 925 (1999) (suggesting that individuals may have an interest in having stable
meaning for cultural objects).
289. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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circumstances, a copyright owner may not prevent a parodist from
taking certain elements of the work and recasting them in a critical,
transformative, or humorous light.29 ° These provisions thus
expressly preserve the right of individuals to define new meanings
from copyrighted works.2 91 There are, ofcourse, limits on the etent
to which individuals can engage in such reinterpretations and
transformations. Indeed, the underlying existence of the derivative
work right is, at some basic level, in tension with an interest in
semiotic democracy. However, at least some elements of existing
copyright law appear to recognize this value, to a limited extent. 2
Perhaps less obviously, certain incidents of copy ownership can
be seen also to further such goals, or, at the very least, to act as a
protection against overcentralization of control of copyrighted
works. So, for example, the rights to transfer, lend, and rent copies
of a copyrighted work, combined with a right to access such works
freely, ensure, as a practical matter, that alternate avenues exist
for acquiring access to copyrighted works. Once a particular copy of
a work is placed into the stream of commerce, the copyright owner
gives up control over most uses of that work. He or she cannot
control or monitor by whom the work is read, how many times it is
read, in what context it is read or used, or to whom it is
subsequently transferred. Thus, individuals can obtain access to
works, not only from the copyright owner (or an authorized source),
but also from third parties, from friends, in libraries, in used book
stores, or by chance. In this way, certain characteristics of physical
copy distribution, along with the background legal framework, place
a limit on the control copyright owners can exert over their works,
once disseminated.29 To be sure, these incidents of copy ownership
290. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
291. In addition, express statutory provisions, such as the compulsory "cover" license for
musical works, seem to acknowledge the need, in some instances, for reinterpretations of
existing works. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (compulsory licensing of musical
works). Note, however, that this is a particularly limited right, since the statutory provisions
impose limits on the extent to which subsequent performers can vary the underlying musical
work.
292. Cf Hughes, supra note 288 (discussing utility ofusing intellectual property laws to
protect cultural objects from recoding).
293. See Cohen, supra note 245 (arguing that digital property rights should be redefined
to place greater emphasis on social welfare); Elkin-Koren, supranote 112, at 272 ("Random
access to information is essential for individuals' ability to shape their interests, preferences,
and positions.").
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do not have the same transformative potential found in derivative
works. At the same time, however, they do serve a decentralizing
role, ensuring that individuals at least have the potential to
encounter
the works without having to engage the copyright owner
294
directly.

Although an interest in decentralized access was quite clearly not
an express consideration in the drafting of the bundle of copyright
rights, the role played by the physical copy in supporting such an
interest may nevertheless be a role worth protecting in the online
environment. Indeed, there are reasons to think that this role may
have added importance in an online environment. If accessing and
transferring digital works requires permission from the copyright
owner (as under MAI), then access to copyrighted works in the
digital environment may well be centralized in a manner not found
in the physical environment.295 To gain access to a copyrighted
work, each consumer will be required to access the work from the
copyright owner or an entity authorized by the copyright owner to
distribute digital copies of that work. 29 Broad access to, and
dissemination of, works outside the control of the copyright owner,
will generally not be privileged, because it will run afoul of the
underlying exclusive right to reproduce.297 Thus, centralization of
access to copyrighted works may well be a feature of
the digital
298
environment, at least under a rule governed by MA.

294. See Cohen, supra note 245, at 1816 ("It is at least as likely that access and
transformative reuse are two sides of the same coin-that creativity cannot be predicted ex
ante; that the nature of the creative process requires adventitious access and reuse....").

295. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 348 (noting that "imposing liability on BBS
operators hinders rather than promotes the potential of digital technology as a genuinely
democratic medium. In fact, such liability will restrict the free flow of information by
encouraging a more centralized control over content").
296. See generally id. at 355 (discussing distribution of copyrighted work to the public).
297. See ida at 348-50 (analyzing the potential of copyright law to frustrate the potential
for increased social dialogue on the Internet).
298. See id. at 386-87 ("While the acquisition of a book involves a single purchase that
provides the buyer with property rights over the book, accessing information on-line requires
an ongoing relationship between users and providers of on-line services. In the absence of
analogous rights to those granted under first sale doctrine, users' freedom to access and use
information becomes more vulnerable. In a digitized environment, this creates a sweeping
right for the copyright owner.") (citation omitted); Elkin-Koren, supra note 112, at 268
("Employing copyright principles in cyberspace... may jeopardize the new opportunities
introduced by cyberspace for decentralizing social dialogue.").
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Some concrete examples may help to give some shape to this
observation. Say, for example, that I want to view the copy of the
Far Side cartoon that my friend e-mailed to me. To do so, under the
rule set forth in MA!, I will first need to obtain permission from the
copyright owner. Even if the cost of obtaining such permission is
trivial (that is, even if there are technological systems that handle
this automatically), my access to the work will have been monitored
and approved by the copyright owner. Or, to take another example,
say that I read an interesting article on the New York Times
website, and want to forward it to a friend. I am concerned about
copyright liability, so instead of copying the text of the article and
sending it to my friend, I forward her the address of the web page.
Once again, access is centralized. Rather than a direct exchange
between me and my friend over the contents of the article, that
exchange is now mediated by the New York Times.2 99
At first glance, the above examples may appear rather unproblematic. After all, in each situation, access has been obtained
without much in the way of hassle or trouble. This is not a case
where copyright law is actually reducing access; rather, it is just
changing the nature of that access very slightly. Yet upon closer
examination, there may be reason to be concerned about the nature
of that change. Where once my interaction with my friend regarding
the Far Side cartoon or the New York Times article was direct and
unmediated, now my interaction is mediated by the copyright
owner. That is, the copyright owner now becomes a party to our
exchange. Note that this is particularly acute in the New York
Times example. Before I get a chance to tell my friend what I think
of the article, the New York Times will have a chance to present
that article to my friend in the way that it wants to. The interaction
now becomes mediated. Copyrighted works now circulate, if at
all, through the copyright owner, rather than directly among
individuals.

299. Something very close to this situation occurred in the recent case LosAngeles Times
v. Free Republic, 34 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1453, 1454 (C.D. Cal. 2000). In that case, the Los
Angeles Times and the Washington Post sued a website that allowed users to post articles
from the newspapers along with critical comments for purposes of engaging in debate and
discussion. The district court granted summary judgment for the newspapers, dismissing
Free Republic's fair use argument.
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Indeed, a somewhat ironic feature of MAI is that it may restrict
the ability of consumers to engage in the distributed access to, and
consumption of, copyrighted works in the face of a technology that
appears to increase the very ability of consumers to engage in such
consumption to an extent never before seen. Digital copies are
uniquely malleable-they can be easily transformed, recast, and
distributed among others. Thus, unlike previous technologies,
digital technology increases the opportunity for consumers to
participate activelyin deriving meaning from copyrighted works, to
use them as raw material for their own creations, and to share
them with others.00 Whereas in the past the contents of a book or
a television broadcast were not easily susceptible to such
manipulation, today digital works are in fact subject to a good
degree of such manipulation. And whereas in the past the sharing
of books or information required the sometimes costly transfer of
physical copies, now such works can be transmitted and shared
nearly without cost. Accordingly, the rule advanced by MAI may
have the effect of greatly hindering such freedom of use, and
centralizing access to copyrighted works.
Some of the negative implications of centralized access have been
cogently analyzed by both Niva Elkin-Koren and Julie Cohen.3"'
According to Elkin-Koren, copyright law reflects the centralized
structure of the physical print medium, and applying copyright
concepts mechanically to the online environment will result in
undesirable replication of this structure in the inherently
decentralized environment of the Internet. She concludes that
copyright law must instead be applied to the digital environment in
a way that preserves and promotes democratic interests in social
300. It is certainly an open question to what extent individuals will in fact choose to
engage in such meaning-making. See Hughes, supra note 272. It may well be that interest
in such active participation in the works will not be great. However at the very least, the
rule inMAI seems to hinder the possibility of such a development.
301. See Cohen, supra note 257, at 161; Elkin-Koren, supra note 9; see also Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the
PublicDomain, N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacyand the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. RV. 373 (2000); Jonathan Zittrain, What the
Publisher Can Teach the Patient:Intellectual Propertyand Privacy in an Era of Trusted
Privication, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1226 (2000) (arguing that "[the elements of the
information technology revolution that worry intellectual property holders carry parallel
significance for individuals as personal data holders," particularly with regard to medical
data).
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dialogue. 0 2 Julie Cohen has advanced a related argument, focused
not so much on copyright law but on the implications of a substitute
for copyright law, the technological protection of digital works. 03
Cohen argues that the development of technological systems to
monitor access to, and usage of, digital copies poses the potential of
infringing upon the privacy and First Amendment. interests of
consumers. 34 That is, under such a regime, copyright owners would
track and collect information about the reading habits of
individuals. Cohen argues that implementation of, and statutory
support for, such technologies may violate a "right to read
anonymously," which she derives from the First Amendment. 0 5
Both Elkin-Koren and Cohen thus advance specific noneconomic
critiques of extensive, centralized copyright owner control in the
digital environment, though neither of them has focused specifically
on the idea of copy ownership.
Thus, as a general matter, a strong argument can be made that
the incidents of physical copy ownership in fact lend support to a
legitimate interest in decentralized consumption of, and access to,
copyrighted works. Although clearly not an express part of the
design underlying copyright law, this interest is one that is, as a
descriptive matter, currently served by the existing incidents of
copy ownership in physical copies. The incidents of physical copy
ownership carve out an area in which individuals are free to
acquire, consume, and share copyrighted works largely as they
wish, free from copyright owner control. Indeed, the desire to
facilitate the creation of such a robust, secondary market has been
a hallmark of physical property law's reluctance to enforce
restraints on alienation. And, as mentioned at the outset of this
Part, it is a feature of changing technology that it forces us to
reexamine aspects of the status quo and expressly consider whether
we wish to preserve such aspects in the new environment. Given
that some de facto protection of such an interest is a feature of our
existing balance of rights, it is legitimate to ask whether to attempt
to preserve this feature in the online environment, and specifically
302. See Elkin-Koren, supranote 9, at 410-11.
303. See Cohen, supra note 257.
304. See id. at 162.
305. See Cohen, supranote 150; see also Cohen, supranote 245 (highlighting other ways
in which intellectual works are different from market commodities).
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whether the idea of digital copy ownership should be used to
preserve such a feature, questions to which I will turn in the next
Part.
At the same time, however, these concerns once again rest on
certain expectations about the future shape of the online
environment, expectations which may not come to pass. It may be
that, even under a realm of relatively centralized copyright owner
control over content, access to such content may be broader and
more widely distributed than ever. Distribution of digital
documents may be handled through additional third parties, such
as virtual bookstores. Repositories and archives may develop to
address the difficult problem of storing digital documents
permanently."' Fair use may operate to privilege distribution of
certain types of documents. Moreover, if individuals truly value the
ability to acquire and consume works free from copyright owner
control, perhaps the market will evolve to satisfy this interest.0 7 In
short, predictions about overcentralization could well be
premature."' 8 New market structures are extremely difficult to
predict, and until such structures develop, action on this front is
likely premature. Thus, even if the incidents of physical copy
ownership do appear to serve a noneconomic value in facilitating
decentralized meaning-making, we need to think carefully about
how to implement this in the digital environment.
At the same time, there may be reasons to doubt the ability of the
market to adequately provide such decentralized access to
copyrighted works, even if consumers desire, and are willing to pay
for, such access. One possibility is that copyright owners may not
accurately assess the potential risks and benefits of exploiting a
new copyright market. Although firms can generally be expected to
assess such risks and benefits accurately, more recent research into
institutional behavior has highlighted the ways in which
institutional and bureaucratic conservatism can skew assessments
306. See InternetArchive, at http'/www.archive.org.
307. A good example of this principle in action is the consumer rejection of DIVX as a
competing standard for movies onDVD. See LindseyArent,Ding-Dong, Divx is Dead,WREn
NEWS, June 16, 1999, available at http'i/www/wired-com/news/business0,1367,
20259,00.html.
308. Moreover, the centralized control that broadcasters currently have over the
distribution of their copyrighted works has not prevented healthy use of, and
reinterpretation of, cultural images. See, e.g., alt.tv.simpsons.
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of economic self-interest."0 9 Indeed, the copyright industries in
particular have witnessed many historical examples where
entrenched industries failed to recognize the beneficial impact of
potential markets and new technologies.3 10 Second, other market
imperfections, such as transactions costs, may practically hinder
the ability of such a market to be served. Third, there may be
external benefits to decentralized access that cannot be captured in
the market for access."' 1 Thus, there is no guarantee that the
copyright industries will accurately serve such a market for
distributed access.- What is needed, therefore, is a careful
assessment of likely possibilities and a concomitant consideration
of the values identified in this section.
IV. OWNING DIGITAL COPIES
Having surveyed a number of possible theoretical justifications
for the incidents of physical copy ownership, we are left in the end
with a characteristically complex and unstable mix ofjustifications.
The analysis above suggests that, at least as a descriptive matter,
these incidents of physical copy ownership-the ability to read,
lend, and transfer-result largely from preexisting understandings
about what it means to own physical property, understandings that
copyright law acknowledges in numerous ways. At the same time,
however, these incidents have come to play a rather complex and
multifaceted role within copyright law as a whole. These incidents
of copy ownership give rise, in practice, to a certain balance of
copyright owner rights and consumer access in the physical
world, 12 although this observation is not terribly helpful in deciding
309. See Netanel, supra note 11, at 312-13. See generally THRAINN EGGERTSSON,
ECONOMIC BEHAVIORAND INSTITUTIONS (1990)(exploringneoclassical economics); OLIVERE.
WILLIAMSON,

THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

OF CAPITALISM:

FIRMS,

MARKETS,

RELATIONAL/CONTRACTING (1987) (discussing transaction cost economics).
310. The most famous example is the VCR, which the television and movie industries
widely feared would destroy the market for broadcast and movies, but which wound up
expanding the market tremendously and enriching the very industries that had so vigorously
opposed the new technology. Along those lines, it is interesting to consider the current
dispute over the distribution of MP3s over the Internet. See Amy Harmon, DealSettles Suit
Against MP3.com, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at C1.
311. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 239 (highlighting problem of positive externalities).
312. And, indeed, to numerous real-world institutions, such as libraries, used book stores,
etc., that rely on such incidents.
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how to adapt to rapid technological change. Somewhat more
helpfully, the incidents of copy ownership play a role in reducing
transactions costs and in setting up an easily identifiable default
bundle of rights. Finally, these incidents of copy ownership seem to
serve a number of additional purposes, in particular, facilitating
distributed access to, and use of, copyrighted works, free from
centralized control by copyright owners.
The question for this Part to address is whether and, if so, how
the functions played by the incidents of physical copy ownership
should be preserved in the digital, online environment. In this Part,
I will argue that the economic and noneconomic functions played by
the incidents of physical copy ownership should be recognized in the
digital environment, and that this recognition should take the form
of an unlimited right to access digital copies in one's possession and
a more limited right to transfer such copies to others. I will explore
some of the implications of these recommendations through a
number of concrete examples and show how these recommendations
support the economic and noneconomic values identified above. I
will then discuss different ways of implementing these recommendations. Finally, I will address a number of anticipated objections.
A. Toward a Theory of DigitalCopy Ownership
1. A Right to Access
The analysis in the previous Part strongly suggests that those
who own or possess a digital copy of a copyrighted work should
obtain an unlimited ability to access, read, or use that copy,
assuming that no contractual or technological limitations otherwise
exist to restrict such an ability. Under this view, then, once an
individual has acquired physical possession of a digital copy, that
individual should be permitted to access that copy as many times
as he or she wishes, even if such access results in a copy being made
in the RAM of the computer. So, for example, say that a friend has
sent me a Far Side cartoon by e-mail. The fact that that image
currently resides on the hard disk of my computer should, under
such a rule, entitle me to access that image as many times as I
want, without having to seek permission from the copyright owner
and without worrying about the availability of a particular defense
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to infringement. Under this rule, then, possession leads to an
unrestricted right of access.
Such a privilege satisfies and preserves a number of the purposes
that the ability to read serves in the context of physical copies. As
an initial matter, such a rule may well be consistent with the
maximalist concern with reducing transactions costs, provided one
takes such costs seriously. Notwithstanding the White Paper's
assertions to the contrary,3 13 the existence of low-cost and
ubiquitous licensing is not at all guaranteed in the online
environment. Accordingly, substantial risk exists that a contrary
rule would bar (or at least chill) much socially desirable access to
copyrighted works, or, almost equally troubling, lead to widespread
disregard ofthe legal rule, if low-cost licensing were not ubiquitous.
Moreover, even if low-cost licensing systems are eventually
implemented, the transactions costs associated with licensing
certain micro-uses of works may still outweigh the value of such
micro-uses to the consumer, particularly when we are considering
one-time access.
Furthermore, other, noneconomic goals advanced by an unlimited
right to read suggest that counting too heavily on the potential
development of low-cost licensing is unwarranted. As already
discussed above, the ability to read a physical copy freely plays a
role in ensuring some degree of distributed consumption of
copyrighted works free from copyright owner control. In the digital
context, such a value would be greatly undermined if copyright
owners were given control over all computer-aided uses of digital
copies.31 In order to access a digital copy, the possessor of the copy
would in theory require permission from the copyright owner, or
some specific statutory privilege. Although, in practice, licenses
would likely be granted to cover many such uses, the effect of such
a rule would be to require such licenses, thereby giving copyright
owners a potential veto over certain types of consumption. Such a
result seems deeply at odds with an interest in semiotic democracy.
At the very least, it would have a chilling effect on the ability of

313. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 10, at 183.
314. See Elkin-Koren, supranote 112, at 288.
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individuals to access works free from central control. Moreover, it
would raise serious privacy concerns, as Julie Cohen has noted.31
Recognizing such a right to access also seems quite consistent
with many of the conventions underlying the possession of digital
copies. As discussed in the previous Part, there is a sense in which
digital copies in one's possession are "owned" by those who possess
them. A rule imposing liability on the unauthorized access of such
copies would be deeply at odds with existing (albeit somewhat
nascent) understandings about what it means to possess a digital
copy, and would likely meet much resistance, leading to significant
unenforced liability. Conversely, a rule that conferred upon copy
owners a right of access would correspond with such conventional
notions and therefore reduce information and enforcement costs. By
creating a relatively well-defined right to access, such a rule would
contribute to a relatively well-defined default bundle of rights
associated with possession of a digital copy. Owners of digital copies
would have a clear right to access the copy; such a right would not
be subject to the vagaries of fair use. In addition, such an allocation
of the entitlement would have an effect of reducing information
asymmetries in the market for such works. To the extent that
copyright owners wish to limit a copy owner's use of a certain copy
(whether through licensing or technology), the copyright owner will
have to make such limitations express, thus ensuring that the
purchaser understands precisely what it is that he or she is
purchasing.
At the same time, such a rule would not unduly undercut
copyright owner incentives, a concern that copyright law must
always take seriously. Accessing a digital copy does not, as a
general matter, create a substitute for that copy; rather, it is merely
a necessary step to consuming an existing copy. Accordingly, the
underlying purpose of the reproduction right would not be
undermined by allowing such access. Rather, the effect of such a
rule would merely be to keep the reproduction right from unduly
interfering with values served by the right to read in the physical
environment. Reproductions of digital works that actually resulted
in the creation of functionally equivalent (and substituting) copies
would still constitute infringement. Thus, the underlying purpose
315. See Cohen, supra note 257, at 161.
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of the reproduction right would still be preserved, while serving the
additional values mentioned above.
Note that this argument for preserving a right to access does not
depend, as the minimalists would have it, on some notion of
maintaining an overall balance of access and incentives. As already
noted above, the task of maintaining any meaningful balance of
access and incentives in the face of dramatic technological change
would be difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, an unlimited right to
access digital works, in conjunction with other aspects of digital
technology, may well result in a radically different balance of access
and incentives, one that we would be hard pressed to predict at this
point. Instead, the support for a right to access comes from a desire
to preserve some of the functions that the right serves in the
physical environment, through reducing transactions costs,
facilitating distributed consumption of works, and acknowledging
conventional notions and norms of property ownership.
The existence of a right of access does not mean that copyright
owners are entirely without recourse in seeking to regulate access
to their works. That is, even without the right to control access to
the copy, copyright law will still provide copyright owners the
ability to prevent other types of copying that pose a threat to their
economic interests. Most notably, the proposed rule says nothing
about how an individual came into possession of the particular copy
to which he or she would, under this rule, have an absolute right to
access. So, for example, say I load an unauthorized copy of Microsoft
Word onto the hard drive of my computer, thereby creating another
copy of that software package. Under the proposed rule, I would
have an absolute right to use the pirated software as much as I
want. Yet I would still be liable for the initial act of copying the
software onto my computer. This is no different from the hard-copy
context, in which copyright law would bar me from making a copy
of the book, but not from reading it once I had made the copy. Thus,
copyright owners still have the ability to protect their economic
interests; the rule merely prevents them from extending their
interest to include control over the use of, or access to, a given
digital copy, for the reasons set forth above.
It could be argued that, if copyright owners can assert
infringement claims based on an individual's acquisition of a copy
of a work, then why is the right to view the work important? After
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all, in every case where an individual accesses a work, won't there
necessarily have been a prior reproduction, that is, an act of
copying? Although this will be true in many cases, it will not be true
in all cases. For example, accessing a digital copy given to you on a
floppy disk or CD-ROM would be a case in which the access right is
implicated, but not the prior reproduction right. Similarly,
accessing a work from a website results in a RAM copy without
prior creation of a copy, 16 unless the browser is caching the work
on your hard disk. There may also be cases in which the initial
copying was privileged (say, by fair use), but the subsequent
viewing might not be privileged. More generally, there may be
implications regarding who is liable for the reproduction. Again,
take the example of the e-mailed Far Side cartoon. In that case, the
friend who sent it to you might be liable for causing a copy to be
made. However, you would not be liable for viewing the copy.
Finally, where statutory damages can sometimes be awarded for
each separate act of infringement, the distinction between the
initial reproduction on your hard drive and subsequent acts of
access becomes significant. Thus, there are many ways in which
such a distinction may be relevant. 17
Another question raised by the proposed rule is whether
copyright owners should be able to get around the entitlement
through contract or through technological means. For example,
should copyright owners be permitted to use technology to restrict
the number of times a copy owner can access a copy or to meter and
separately charge for each act of access? Or, alternatively, should
copyright owners be able to contract around this right to access, by
securing an agreement from the copy owner ahead of time? And if
so, should copyright owners be permitted to do this using the
increasingly common practice of shrink-wrap or click-wrap
agreements?
316. Note thatthis may, however, implicate the public displayright. See Reese, supranote
128.
317. This state of affairs would be similar, in some respects, to the way in which the First
Amendment permits the state to regulate the sale and distribution of obscene material, but
prohibits the state from criminalizingpossession ofat least certain types of obscene material.
Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (allowing states to regulate the sale and
distribution ofobscene material), with Stanleyv. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that
the state may not punish mere private possession Qf obscene material).
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These questions are a subset of questions raised in the broader
ongoing debate over the desirability and enforceability of so-called
"copyright substitutes.""'8 Much has been written about the extent
to which copyright owners should be permitted to vary the default
3 19
bundle of copyright entitlements through these mechanisms, and
an in-depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
The focus of this Article has rather been on establishing the scope
of the underlying entitlements, because individuals will continue to
possess digital copies in the absence of such restrictions. However,
without engaging in too in-depth an analysis, the conclusions in this
Article suggest some initial responses.
As to technological limitations on the ability to access digital
copies in one's possession, the preceding analysis suggests that such
limitations should generally be permitted. Such limits do in fact
restrict the ability of individuals to access copies in their possession
and therefore may be suspect in light of the identified interest in
permitting distributed access to copies of copyrighted works free
from central copyright owner control. At the same time, however,
concerns about transactions costs may be limited if the systems are
already in place and permit low-cost licensing. Furthermore,
uncertainty about the scope of entitlements conveyed will be
limited, because the limits will be apparent. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, copyright law as it currently stands provides no
framework for disabling technological attempts to control access,
and any attempt to regulate technology at this early stage and
without sufficient knowledge raises substantial risks.20

318. See, e.g., Goldstein, supranote 118.
319. See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Fisher, Property and
Contract,supranote 2; David Friedman, In Defense ofPrivateOrderings:Comments on Julie
Cohen's"Copyrightandthe JurisprudenceofSelf-Help," 13 BERKELEYTECH.L.J. 1151(1998);
Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:The Law and PolicyofIntellectualPropertyLicensing,
87 CAL. L. REv. 111 (1999) [hereinafterLemley, BeyondPreemption];Lemley, supranote 160;
DavidNimmeret al., The Metamorphosisof Contractinto Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997).
320. This is not to say that we will never have sufficient information. That is, it may well
be that, in a number ofyears, such technological limits become ubiquitous and result in such
substantial harm to the public interest that legislation restricting their implementation
would be warranted. However, at this point, there is certainly insufficient information upon
which to base such an action.
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By the same token, however, legislative efforts to lend additional
support to such technological protection mechanisms, as
exemplified in the DMCA,3 2' are inappropriate. As an initial matter,
they seem terribly premature. Thus far, there is scant evidence that
such mechanisms will not be sufficiently successful without
legislative support. Even worse, however, the DMCA imposes
significant additional limits on the ability of individuals to
manipulate and access digital copies within their possession. Thus,
the DMCA prevents individuals from circumventing technological
protection mechanisms, even if the purpose is to engage in fair uses
of the underlying works.122 Furthermore, the DMCA prevents

alteration of copyright management information attached to the
digital copy." Both of these limitations are sharply at odds with
the interest in preserving some ability on the part of copy owners
to consume and access their copies free from copyright owner
control. Thus, the interest in preserving opportunities for
decentralized consumption of works would counsel strongly against
such legislative support.
With respect to contractual measures, if an agreement limiting
access to the work were voluntarily entered into and negotiated by
the parties, there would be little objectionable, either under basic
contract law principles or copyright law. However, the difficult
question is raised by shrink-wrap or click-wrap agreements-for
example, if the digital copy came attached with a click-wrap
contract, which the copy owner would have to "assent" to before
obtaining access to the work. The ubiquitous use of such
agreements threatens to supplant copyright law, and the balance
reflected within copyright law, with what would effectively be
"private legislation." This is a complicated issue, and much has
been written about it.

24

Again, without engaging in an in-depth

analysis of the issue, I would note that I concur with the view set
forth by Mark Lemley and others, who have persuasively argued
that such agreements should only be enforceable under limited
circumstances. 32'
321. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1999).
322. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

323. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
324. See supranote 2.
325. See Lemley, Beyond Preemption,supra note 319; Lemley, supra note 160.
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Having established that a right to access is desirable, a number
of different potential avenues exist to doctrinally implement such
a right. Perhaps most directly, it could be implemented through
judicial abandonment of the rule in MAI. That is, once RAM copies
are considered insufficiently fixed to constitute "copies" within the
meaning of the Copyright Act, computer access to possessed digital
copies is no longer problematic. This would be an ideal solution.
Commentators have already highlighted the numerous failings in
the original opinion. 26 Ample doctrinal grounds exist, based on the
legislative history and policies underlying the Act, to reach such a
result. Moreover, many of the problems discussed in this Article
result directly from the rule in MAI and the White Paper's adoption
and extension of that rule. Unfortunately, most of the cases that
have since been handed down have followed the result in MAI. 2 '
Furthermore, portions of the DMCA appear to give added support
to the rule in MAI." Accordingly, judicial abandonment of the rule
may not be quick in coming."2 9 Although several commentators have
noted that the result in MA is not a foregone conclusion, I fear this
is increasingly looking like wishful thinking.
A second option would be to establish a right to access by
amending or interpreting section 117 to expressly include not only
computer software, but all digital works."' By privileging the
incidental copying of computer software necessary for the use of
such software, section 117 already expressly recognizes a number
of the values of copy ownership set forth above. Extending this to all
digital works would merely recognize that the same issues that
exist for computer software also exist for all digital copies. Indeed,
there is no reason to distinguish between bits representing software
326.
327.
328.
329.

See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supranotes 12 and 45.
See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c)-(d) (Supp. V 1999).
In addition, the type ofcase that would give rise to such an overruling is probably less

likely to be litigated. As discussed above, the results of the lines of cases can be explained to
some extent by the particular factual circumstances, which involved activity that a court
could view as free riding. The more direct case against a consumer reading a document is less
likely to be litigated. This does not, however, suggest that we should be unconcerned about
these results, because uncertainty about the state of the law may well have a chilling effect
on activity, even if a case is never brought.
330. See Cate, supra note 81, at 1453 (proposing a similar interpretation of fair use
doctrine); see also Litman, supranote 3, at 41 (proposing right of ephemeral copying).
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and bits representing other copyrighted materials; the same issues
exist for both types of works. In both cases, ownership of a digital
copy of a copyrighted work is essentially meaningless without some
privilege to access or use it. Thus, under such a result, an amended
section 117 might look something like this:
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Digital copies.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a digital copy of a copyrighted
work to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that work provided: (1) that such a new copy or
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization or
access of the work in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or (2) that such a new copy or
adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival
copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of
the copy should cease to be rightful. Any exact copies prepared
in accordance with the provision of this section may be leased,
sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which
such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or
other transfer of all rights in the copy. Adaptations so prepared
may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright
331

owner.

A number of additional issues would be raised by such an
approach. First, regarding the interpretation of the term "owner,"
are possessors of infringing copies "owners" within the meaning of
section 117? Current case law seems to indicate they are not. That
is, those who possess infringing copies of software are not privileged
by section 117 to make the copies-on the hard drive or in the RAM
of the computer-necessary to utilize the software."3 2 To make this
331. One of the legislative alternatives to the DMCA contained a similar provision,
although it did not pass. See DigitalCopyright Clarificationand Technology EducationAct
of 1997, S. 1146 (Sept. 3, 1997):
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement to
make a copy of a work in digital format if such copying(1) is incidental to the operation of a device in the course of the use of a
work otherwise lawful under this title; and
(2) does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.
332. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354,1360
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (interpreting section 117 in light of legislative intent).
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option truly effective, the term "owner" would have to be
interpreted broadly to encompass those who possess even
unauthorized copies. Alternatively, the text of the statute could be
changed from "owners" to "possessors." Such changes are supported
by the rationales already discussed in this section. Under the
amended section 117, therefore, anyone possessing a digital copy of
a copyrighted work would be entitled to access that copy, even if his
or her access resulted in copies being made in the RAM of the
computer.
The second issue raised by the proposed amendment concerns the
ability of parties to contract around this right to access. Although
few cases have expressly addressed this question, the cases
interpreting the term "owner" to exclude certain licensees indicate
that copyright owners currently may be permitted to contract
around this. Such an ability to contract around the underlying
entitlement, however, should be subject to the considerations
already set forth above. 33 A final issue is raised by the last two
sentences of section 117, which give rise to a limited right to
transfer copies. The desirability of this change will be discussed in
the subsequent section on the transfer right.
A legislative amendment such as the one suggested above, though
desirable, may, practically speaking, be unlikely, given that recent
copyright legislation (for example, the DMCA and the recent
extension of the copyright term) appears to be moving in precisely
the opposite direction, driven by ever-increasing deference to the
interests of the copyright industries.3 ' Thus, an alternative would
be to rely upon judicial interpretation of the existing section 117 to
include digital copies of other works. Although such an
interpretation is not to be found in the text of section 117, it would
be consistent with the overall purpose of the section. Indeed, as
mentioned above, in light of the purposes of section 117, there is no
reason to distinguish between digital copies of software programs
and digital copies of other works. In both cases, the same issues of
access are presented. Moreover, such an interpretation would
recognize that when Congress enacted section 117 it did not
333. As noted above, larger questions about the potential ubiquity of contractual and
technological controls are beyond the scope of this Article.
334. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
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anticipate the now widespread distribution of other types of works
in digital form. Thus, such an interpretation, though activist, would
not be entirely at odds with the doctrinal sources.
A third, and least attractive, option would be to privilege the
right to access judicially through fair use. This would be an
acceptable solution-though not as desirable as judicial abandonment of MAI altogether-only if the privilege were established in a
sufficiently broad fashion, that is, privileging all RAM copies or all
rights of access. If, by contrast, the courts were to proceed in a caseby-case fashion (as seems more likely), privileging some access but
not others, then fair use would not sufficiently establish the scope
of the right to access. Instead, as discussed above, whether a
particular use would be "fair" would be subject to substantial
uncertainty. This is clearly not an optimal solution. More broadly,
given the above analysis highlighting the centrality of the ability to
access possessed copies, there is something a bit odd about treating
the ability to read or access a copy as "fair use." In some sense, such
a use is the use-it is the reason for having a copy in the first place.
Thus, a number of different avenues exist through which a right
to access digital works in one's possession could be implemented. In
the end, recognition of such a right to access would be consistent
with much of the criticism that has been directed against the result
in MAI and the position advanced by the White Paper and reflected
in the enactment of the DMCA. In many ways the substantive
proposal is nothing new. In one sense, the end result is no different
than the functional result proposed by many of the economic
minimalists. At the same time, however, the above analysis makes
clearer precisely why we should be so concerned about preserving
a right to access digital works in our possession. We should be
concerned, not so much because such a right preserves any
preexisting balance of access and incentives in the physical
environment. As Jessica Litman has noted, that balance no longer
exists and is likely gone forever." '5 Instead, we should seek to
reestablish such a right of access because it serves a number of
important functions within copyright law, functions we cannot
easily do without, unless we are willing to undertake a more
substantial refiguring of existing copyright law.
335. See Litman, supranote 3, at 40.
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Indeed, grounding a right to access in these considerations has a
number of additional implications that suggest that the balance of
access and incentives might be quite different. In particular, the
interest in facilitating semiotic democracy suggests that in the
digital context, the concept of access should be broadly construed.
That is, if we take the interest in semiotic democracy seriously, a
strong argument can be made that access should include not simply
the right to make just those RAM copies that are minimally
necessary to read or listen to a copy; rather, truly meaningful access
should encompass the right to make any copies necessary to
consume the work and derive meaning from it. As already noted
above, digital copies are incredibly malleable. Accordingly, digital
copies present individuals with ever greater opportunities to
actively engage with the digital copies in the process of consuming
them. In the past, such opportunities were rather limited; a book is
relatively fixed, and one can do little more than read it, or perhaps
highlight or annotate it. In the digital context, individuals similarly
may wish to highlight or annotate digital texts electronically. But
even more significantly, they may wish to engage in many more
activities, such as taking clips of music, transforming images, and
combining copies in various ways. To the extent that these activities
are, or become in the future, part of consuming digital copies of
copyrighted works, a right of access that includes these activities
would more fully realize the increased opportunities presented by
digital copies, rather than limiting such opportunities to those
currently available.
Indeed, a number of cases in the software context already appear
to recognize and lend support to such a view. Courts have, for
example, held that owners of copies of software may make
additional copies of such software to the extent necessary to study
and reverse engineer such software."3 6 In other cases, courts have
recognized the rights of owners to modify software in certain ways,
changing the way they experience it."37 And, as mentioned above,
the Copyright Act itself appears to recognize certain rights to adapt
and modify software as necessary to use it.338 These cases all appear
336. See Sega Enterp. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
337. See Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
338. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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to recognize that, where software is concerned, an owner of a copy
should be permitted to make certain additional copies in the process
of consuming and making use of such software. Although these
cases have thus far been limited to software, the first copyrighted
work to be widely distributed in digital form, these considerations
are equally applicable to all works in digital form, and thus lend
support to a similar right to copy and manipulate digital copies to
the extent necessary to access and make use of them.
A full account of such a broader conception of access is beyond the
scope of this Article. Such an account would need to examine
carefully the ways in which digital works can be consumed and
transformed by owners in the course of consuming such works. It
would also need to make distinctions between different types of
such uses, drawing lines between ones that have an impact on
underlying incentives and ones that do not. It would also need to
take into account the extent to which the market would be expected
to provide low-cost opportunities to license such uses. However, this
at least illustrates how the interest in semiotic democracy can
provide results that differ from those that would follow from the
minimalist approach.
2. A Right to Transfer
The status of a right to transfer digital copies is not so clear cut
as the right to access them, and it raises additional complications.
As an initial matter, free transfer of digital copies would appear to
fulfill a number of the functions fulfilled by the free transfer of
physical copies noted above. First, permitting free transfer can be
squared with the maximalist concern about reducing transactions
costs, provided such costs are taken seriously. As noted above, some
commentators have suggested that in the digital environment,
copyright owners may be able to easily monitor transfers of digital
copies and charge copy owners "micro charges" for each transfer. 9
Again, however, this view is many times too optimistic in its
assessment of the likely scope of transactions costs online. Even in
the digital environment, tracking every transfer of a given copy
would be a nontrivial task. And as with the right to read, the ability
339. See Bell, supra note 114, at 619; Stefik, supra note 257, at 146.
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of technology to enable low-cost licensing of such transactions is not
yet established. Thus, even a maximalist framework can provide
some support for a right to transfer, again assuming that
transactions costs are taken seriously.
Second, a free right to transfer digital documents certainly
supports an interest in decentralized access to copyrighted works,
free from copyright owner control. Without such a right, access to
digital copies would have to be obtained directly from the copyright
owner or someone authorized by the copyright owner. Under such
a regime, access to copyrighted works would be centralized to a
degree not found in the physical environment.34 Moreover, such a
centralization of access would not only fail to duplicate the existing
decentralization found in the physical copy world; it would also
hinder the increased potential for decentralized access presented by
distribution of digital works online. A right to transfer digital copies
is thus strongly supported by the above-identified interests in
decentralized access to copyrighted works. To the extent individuals
can freely circulate, disseminate, and share digital copies, access to
copies of copyrighted works will come from different sources, and
the process of decentralized meaning-making will be facilitated.3 4 '
Finally, conventional understandings about the meaning of
"owning" a digital copy may provide some limited support for a
right to transfer. Just as a right to access a copy in one's possession
seems like a natural incident to possession of that copy, so too does
a right to forward a copy to one's friend. Again, the copy sits on
one's hard drive, and transferring the copy to a friend is nearly
costless. Nothing prevents one from sending that article.
Significant complications arise, however, in the implementation
of such a right to transfer, because in the Internet environment
there exists no direct analog to the transfer of a physical copy. The
key difference is that on the Internet, transfer of a digital copy
always results in the creation, not only of temporary RAM copies of
a work, but also of an additional, relatively more permanent copy
of the digital work. Unlike the transfer of physical copies, no
physical property changes hands in the transfer of a digital copy

340. See Elkin-Koren, supranote 9, at 386.
341. See id. at 387-91 (discussing bulletin boards and discussion groups).
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over the Internet. 42 Rather, the same pattern of digital ones and
zeros is sent through the Internet and then replicated in the storage
device of the recipient. Where there was once only a single copy,
now there are at least two equally functional copies. This raises
complications because, unlike RAM copies, copies made as a result
of a digital transfer are in fact perfect substitutes. Indeed, the
electronic transfer of a digital document is functionally equivalent
to the creation of a copy-transferring and copying are basically the
same thing.
As a result, a right to transfer digital copies directly implicates
the incentive concerns underlying the reproduction right." If
unlimited transfers were permitted and resulted in unlimited
copying, then the potential would exist that copyright incentives
would be seriously undermined. For example, if I had an unlimited
right to transfer digital copies of a certain movie, I would have an
unlimited right to give perfect digital substitutes to my friends (and
strangers, for that matter). Thus, under such a regime, copyright
incentives could be expected to be affected to such an extent that
even the very rough minimalist concern about preserving at least
some degree of incentive would be triggered. Thus, as much as we
would like to promote transfer of digital files from one person to the
next, such transfer directly undermines the incentive rationale that
is central to copyright law.
This lack of a precise digital analog to copy-transfer sheds some
interesting light on the recent dispute over the sharing of MP3s
using "peer-to-peer" networking services such as Napster and
Gnutella.3 " As will be familiar to many, Napster is a software
program that permits individuals to share files resting on their
computers with other Napster users over the Internet. Napster has
342. Note that digital copies can sometimes be transferred without reproduction. For
example, a copy stored on a floppy disk or a CD-ROM can be handed over to someone else in
exactly the same fashion as a book or other type of physical copy. These cases present no
problems, because they fall under the conventional physical copy situation.
343. It may also implicate the public distribution right. The first sale doctrine only applies
to copies that are "lawfully made," that is, copies that are authorized or privileged in some
fashion. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). Thus, transfer of any unauthorized copies, even if
privileged as amatter of reproduction, would have to leap an additional hurdle ifimade to the
"public."
344. See A&MRecordsv.Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd inpart,rev'd
in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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primarily been used as a mechanism for downloading unauthorized
copies of copyrighted music in a compressed, MP3 format."4 A
number of record companies filed suit against Napster on grounds
of contributory copyright infringement, and, as of this writing, a
federal appellate court had affirmed on the merits a preliminary
injunction against Napster, although it remanded to the district
court for a narrowing of the injunction. 46
Putting to one side the merits of the specific legal claim, the
debate over Napster highlights the tension that exists between
transferring digital copies and reproduction. Many of the
arguments in the popular press about Napster have been over the
proper characterization of the activity being undertaken by Napster
users. 47 Supporters of Napster have called the activity"sharing" or
"trading" files.348 The record companies have called the activity
piracy. 49 In the specific factual context presented by Napster, the
record companies' characterization seems to me a bit more accurate,
because as a factual matter, the primary use and value of Napster
appears to have been to obtain free copies of music. However, in
some ways, both characterizations are accurate: Napster users are
both sharing and copying because, in the online environment, the
two acts are the same.350
345. According to court papers filed in the suit, over 80% of the files transferred through
Napster were of copyrighted songs. See id. at 903 & n.6.
346. See A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
347. See Catherine Greenman, Taking Sides in the Napster War, N.Y. TUIES, Aug. 31,
2000, at GI; John Markoff, Many Take, but Few Give on Gnutella,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21,2000,
at C4.
348. See'Brad King & Swaroopa Iyengar, NapsterCopies "Sony"Defense, WIRED NEWS,
Oct. 2, 2000, at http'//news.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,39191,00.html.
349. See Brad King, RIAA Chief- Piracy is Doomed, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 2, 2000, at
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,39188,00.html.
350. By way of illustration, assume, for the moment, that Napster users were in fact
motivated by a sincere desire to "trade" or"share" music, and that they were not interested
in increasing the sum total of available copies. For example, say that a group of Napster
users trafficked in obscure and hard-to-find blues recordings, and that they in fact were not
motivated primarily by obtaining free music, but were instead more concerned about
disseminating, discussing, and sharing a particular type of music within a close community
of shared interests. Indeed, these users would be perfectly happy if, in trading or sharing a
particular copy, they were temporarily deprived of access to, or use of, that copywhile it was
being accessed or used by another. Even under such circumstances, however, the
reproduction right would be implicated, because sharing over the Internetnecessarilyresults
in copying. By contrast, if sharing were accomplished purely through mailing of physical
copies, there would be no problem. The basic point is that, in the online context, sharing
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Given the identity between transferring and copying digital
copies of copyrighted works, one possible response is that the right
to transfer must give way. After all, the right to prevent
unauthorized copying is absolutely central to copyright law; it is the
main way in which copyright owners can obtain a return on their
creative efforts. To the extent the transfer right undermines these
efforts, it must give way. This is essentially the position adopted by
the White Paper. In my view, however, this outlook is too
pessimistic, particularly in light of the important interests served
by the right to transfer identified above. At the very least, we need
to look at whether it would be possible to preserve some of these
values while not unduly undermining the purpose of the basic right
to control reproduction.
Various measures could be taken to attempt to replicate
functionally the results of a transfer of a digital document. For
example, a "transfer" could be effected by sending a copy and then
deleting the original. Although an additional copy would in fact be
created, the net effect would be equivalent to a transfer, because no
additional permanent copies would be created."5 ' Indeed, the
transaction could be completely automated by technology, so that
a single push of a button could effect both transmission and deletion
nearly simultaneously." Thus, under such a rule, digital copies
could be "transferred" so long as the transferor is careful to delete
the original copy. Such an arrangement is not unprecedented;
section 117 contains similar provisions, which permit the owner of
a copy of software to alienate that copy provided he or she deletes
all additional copies from his or her computer.3 53 Thus, such an
approach could be implemented either legislatively through an
amendment of section 117 to include other digital copies, or
judicially through a bright-line fair use ruling. Indeed, one of the
legislative alternatives to the DMCA contained just such a
3 54
provision, although it did not pass.
without reproduction is not possible, at least under current technology.
351.
352.
353.
354.

See Lemley, supra note 14, at 584.
See /
See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
See DigitalEra CopyrightEnhancementAct, H.R. 3048 (Nov. 14, 1997):
(f) The authorization for use set forth in subsection (a) applies where the owner
ofa particular copy or phonorecord in a digital format lawfully made under this
title, .... performs, displays or distributed the work by means of transmissions
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However, there is something decidedly awkward about this
arrangement, both as a practical and theoretical matter. In
particular, such an arrangement seems to force digital documents
artificially to behave like physical documents, neglecting the ways
in which digital documents are in fact quite different.
Compensating for, rather than taking full account of, the features
of a new technology seems like a bad idea: it artificially replicates
certain conditions while ignoring other differences resulting from
the new digital medium." Moreover, permitting such an arrangement raises additional concerns about enforcement. That is, it is not
clear that users could be adequately trusted to delete the originals
after sending out a copy. Of course, the same enforcement
difficulties currently exist with respect to policing unauthorized
copying through Internet transfers. However, expressly authorizing
such transfers, without being adequately able to ensure that the
original copy is deleted, risks increasing the distribution of works
without a compensating elimination of the original copies. That is,
copy owners, knowing that transfer is permitted, might engage in
more transferring while, at the same time, neglecting to fully
satisfy the conditions that privilege such a transfer (whereas, at
present, the legal proscription against transfers of any such kind
may serve to limit the number of such transfers). In other words,
the temptation would be to keep the original copy. More generally,
there is something quite nonintuitive about such a transaction,
particularly since no true physical copy analog to such a transaction
exists.
If a rule allowing free transfer results, in the end, in the creation
of numherous additional unauthorized copies, then the interest in
free transfer may have to give way to the underlying copyright
interest in preserving the copyright incentive. Indeed, the free
transfer of copies in the physical context is already limited in cases
presenting too great a risk of piracy. Thus, for example, the
commercial rental of recorded music and software is generally
prohibited, despite the fact that such restrictions impinge upon the
to the recipient, if that person erases or destroys his or her copy or phonorecord

at substantially the same time the reproduction of the work to the extent
necessary for such performance, display, distribution, is not an infringement.
355. See Litman, supranote 3, at 26.
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idea of physical copy ownership. 56 These are examples where
copyright law restricts the right to free alienation in cases where
the-underlying incentive is threatened too much. Furthermore, the
interest in free alienation seems more attenuated with respect to
digital copies than with physical copies. After all, the disfavoring of
restraints on alienation is derived from notions ofphysical property
ownership. Although digital copies are in some sense "owned," the
value of "alienating" digital copies seems much weaker, given that
no physical property typically changes hands in such a transfer.
Moreover, even if we could be assured that individuals could be
counted upon to delete copies after they transferred them,
permitting free transfer may have other unanticipated effects on
the market for digital copies. As noted above, the transfer and
sharing of physical copies typically involves some degree of cost,
and this cost serves to place a practical limit on the amount of
transferring and sharing of physical copies that occurs. For
example, borrowing a CD from a friend entails some degree of
cost-calling the friend, asking to borrow it, getting the CD,
returning it, etc. Similarly, library copies of books are only
imperfect substitutes for purchases, because there is a cost
associated with having to go to the library, find the book, and
return it. In the online context, however, transferring digital copies
entails virtually no cost. Sending a digital copy of a music CD to a
friend can be nearly instantaneous, involving almost none of the
physical-world costs. Thus, even if technological means could be
used to ensure that no additionalcopies were made in the course of
a transfer, the ease of transfer of existing digital copies in the end
might well lead to a greater substitution of lending for
purchasing,5 ' and have a correspondingly greater impact on
copyright incentives.35 This might not be a bad thing: if copies were
widely shared in this fashion, presumably the market and pricing
for copies would adjust accordingly. 5 9 However, it is possible that
356. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1XA) (1994).
357. This is another illustration of the way in which existing copyright law depends on a
certain level of friction in the markets for copyrighted works.
358. Consider, for erample, how often one listens to any given music CD' in a year. If
individuals could freelytransfertheirdigitalmusic albums, one could envision awebsite that
pooled individual music CDs, enabling members to check out and share the CDs when
needed.
359. See, e.g., YannisfBakos et al.,SharedInformationGoods, 42J.L. &ECoN. 117(1999)..
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copyright incentives might be so undercut as to raise the minimalist
concern about having at least some level of incentive for the
creative activity. At the very least, recognizing an unlimited right
to transfer raises these additional complications.
A nice illustration of the above point can be found in the
introduction of (and subsequent lawsuit over) myMP3.com. 6 0 In
361
early 2000, MP3.com introduced a service called myMP3.com,
which enabled owners of particular music CDs to insert a CD into
the CD-ROM drive of their computer, and then virtually "upload"
that CD onto MP3.com's servers. 6 2 In actuality, MP3.com already
had a copy of the CD on their servers, and no songs were actually
copied from the user's CD (MP3.com had already copied the entire
CD itself-this was the basis for the infringement claim); the
insertion of the CD into the CD-ROM merely served to verify that
the user in fact possessed a copy of the CD. 63 The benefit of the
service was that, once a CD was "uploaded" onto MP3.com's servers,
the user could subsequently access and play the CD from any
computer connected to the Internet. All the user had to do was
enter his or her password to obtain access to the CD. The case was
eventually settled, after MP3.com lost a pretrial motion in which it
claimed that its copying of the music onto its servers constituted
fair use,"' with MP3.com agreeing to pay a license fee to the
various record companies in exchange for the right to provide the
service to its users. 65
The myMP3.com example serves as an illustration of the way in
which "sharing" of copies of copyrighted works may have radically
different implications in a context in which the costs of sharing are
near zero. In effect, myMP3.com greatly increases the potential for
sharing to substitute for purchases. Using myMP3.com (or my own
server connected to the Internet), not only can I access my CD from
anywhere in the world, but I also can give out my password to
friends so that they can access the CD from anywhere in the world.
Given the small fraction of time in which an individual listens to
360. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
361. See id. at 350.

362.
363.
364.
365.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 353.
See Harmon, supra note 310.
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any given CD at any given time, a single copy could thus substitute
for hundreds of purchases, even if that copy could only be accessed
by one person at a time. Imagine, for example, that twenty of my
friends and I set up a server connected to the Internet, purchase a
single copy ofvarious CDs, "load" them up onto the server, and then
agree to share those files. These few copies of the CDs could replace
many, many purchases. 6 6 The net impact is that, where costs of
sharing are much lower, sharing may be able to substitute for
purchases to a much greater degree.
The complexity associated with the right to transfer, the
uncertainty about the shape of future market structures, and the
relatively less robust way in which the transfer right supports both
the economic and noneconomic values identified above all suggest
that copyright law should not recognize an unlimited right to
transfer digital copies-at least not yet. That is, unlike the right to
access discussed in the previous Section, there should be no
unqualified right to transfer a digital document from one person to
another, at least if that transfer necessarily gives rise to the
creation of another fixed digital copy (thereby implicating the
reproduction right). Rather, transfers of digital documents that
result in such copies would, as a doctrinal matter, continue to be
analyzed under the standard infringement analysis. This would
apply even if an individual deleted his or her own copy after
sending it to another.
To say that there would be no unlimited right to transfer is not
to say, however, that transfer would never be privileged. Indeed, the
fair use doctrine can still operate to permit a certain degree of
digital copy transfer, fulfilling, on a case-by-case basis, many of the
economic and noneconomic functions served by the transfer right in
the physical context. As with fair use in general, much would
depend on the particular circumstances. So, for example,
forwarding to a friend by e-mail an interesting article would result
in the creation of an additional copy, thereby implicating the
reproduction right. However, such an action might well constitute
fair use, much as photocopying an interesting article and sending
it to a friend might constitute fair use. By contrast, forwarding a
366. Note that this type of sharing might be limited bythe public performance right in the
underlying musical works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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friend by e-mail the latest version of Microsoft Word would not
constitute fair use.

Cases in which a copy is sent and the original is deleted would
also be subject to a fair use analysis, though the considerations
involved might be somewhat different. As a general matter, the
transfer of a digital copy would, in the first instance, be analyzed as
a reproduction of that work. The question would be whether the
deletion of the original copy, under the particular circumstances,
should privilege the original act of copying. In making this
determination, the courts could look to a number of factors. As an
initial matter, the deletion of the original copy would lend support
to a finding of fair use, because the action would not tesult in the
net creation of an additional copy. Thus the harm to the market. 7
for the work would not be as great as in the case where the original
copy is not deleted. At the same time, a court would need to
examine whether the recipient could have obtained his or her own
copy from the copyright owner.
Consistent with the identified value in reducing transactions, the
easy availability of the work for purchase elsewhere would be a
relevant factor. So, for example, if I wanted to share with a friend
a digital copy of a song, the inability of my friend to easily obtain
that song on the Internet or the unavailability of a transfer license
should lend support to privileging a transfer. Conversely, the easy
availability of the song elsewhere would cut against the privilege,
because concerns about transactions costs would be reduced.
Similarly, consistent with the identified value in preserving
opportunities for distributed access and meaning making, courts
would examine the nature of the use,368 being particularly attentive
to uses that lend support to this value. Thus, if the transfer of the
copy occurs in a context in which such a value is seriously
implicated (for example, as part of a dialog, sharing among friends,
etc.), a court might find fair use even if the work were easily
available online. This interest in distributed access would be a new
consideration in fair use analysis, since up to now distributed
access has not been a significant issue or concern in a world of
physical copies.
367. See id. § 107(4).
368. See id. § 107(1).
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Such an approach is admittedly far less satisfying, insofar as it
establishes no clear rule for dealing with transfers of digital copies.
A good deal of uncertainty will thus continue to surround many
given instances of transferring, and it may take some time for the
courts to develop clear rules in this area. Many of the objections
mentioned in the first part of this Article (for example, the expense
and uncertainty associated with litigating fair use claims) would
apply to such a result. However, given the complexity of the
transfer issue and the general inability to predict with any degree
of certainty how future markets will develop, it appears to be the
best alternative.
Moreover, by at least laying down a default rule, this proposal
may make it easier for market structures to develop. Absent any
indication to the contrary, those who acquire digital copies of
copyrighted works will understand that, as a general matter, they
are not acquiring (and should therefore not be paying for) any
absolute right to transfer that digital copy. If users in fact value the
ability to transfer digital copies over the Internet, they can attempt
to license the right from the copyright owner. Alternatively,
copyright owners may develop low-cost technological mechanisms
to permit some limited distribution of their works. 6 9 The market
has, up to now, developed some limited mechanisms for sharing
digital works. For example, certain online computer games promote
sharing through "spawning" technology.3 70 In addition, certain
technological protection standards for digital music incorporate the
ability to make a specific number of copies.Y If no such
mechanisms develop, however, fair use can act to preserve a
number of the identified values on a case-by-case basis.
Even though the above analysis does not result in a prescription
markedly different from the status quo, it at least makes clear what
is being lost by the lack of an analogous transfer right in the online
environment, and this itself may have implications on how these
369. The standards battle between DVD and DIVX may provide some empirical evidence
about the extent to which consumers value the unlimited right to transfer copies of
copyrighted works. The DVD standard permits unlimited transfers of the embedded movies,
whereas the DIVX standard limited this right, subject to licensing. DIVX ultimately failed.
See Arent, supra note 307.
370. See, e.g., Starcraft,at http-/Aww/battle.net/scc/faq/multi.html.
371. See Lori Enos, RTAA Unveils DigitalMusic ID Plans,E-coiMERCE TIES (Oct. 13,
2000), at http-/www.ecommercetimes.com/newstarticles2000/001013-4.shtml.
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cases are decided. In moving from a physical environment to the
digital environment, and applying our existing copyright laws to
this environment, we are losing the previously clearly established
right to share copies of copyrighted works in a clearly privileged
manner. Thus, courts should be sensitive to the transactions costs
involved in obtaining licenses to transfer and be more willing to find
fair use in order to lend some support to this value in distributed
access, when possible. As mentioned above, where such transactions
costs appear high, courts should be free to find a right to transfer.
This is particularly important, given that courts, up to now, have
not had to worry about presenting such an interest.
More importantly, the above analysis clearly indicates that, in
the online context, there will be fewer opportunities for clearly
privileged sharing of copyrighted works, free from centralized
copyright owner control. Access to copyrighted works will thus be
relatively centralized, and the opportunities presented by the
Internet for greater distributed circulation of such works will not be
fully realized. To the extent that we are concerned about such
values (and I argue that we should be), we should remain vigilant
for opportunities to promote more distributed forms of access. One
example not directly tied to the transfer right is the archiving of
digital materials. To the extent online archives begin to come under
attack on copyright grounds, the courts should be particularly
sensitive to the fact that such archives, if appropriately structured,
may play a significant role in ensuring distributed access to
copyrighted works. Similarly, the legislature should monitor the
development of the market in digital works and, to the extent that
technological protection measures begin to limit distributed access
to digital works as a practical matter, perhaps legislate measures
to ensure that such access is available.
B. Alternatives andAnticipated Objections
Having sketched the outline of a possible notion of digital copy
ownership, we can now compare it to a number of alternative
approaches to adapting copyright law to the digital environment. To
begin, such a concept of digital copy ownership is certainly
preferable to a regime governed by the rule in MAJ, as much of the
previous analysis suggests. The rule in MAI essentially ignores the
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complex function played by the incidents of copy ownership in
existing copyright law. Because these incidents are not expressly
preserved in the Copyright Act, the MAI court treats them as
having no relevance for copyright purposes, and accordingly finds
them trumped by the expanded scope of the reproduction right in
the digital environment. As the above analysis has demonstrated,
however, these incidents of physical copy ownership in fact play a
more complex role within copyright law and therefore deserve
independent consideration.
Furthermore, fair use provides only a partial solution to the
problems raised by MA!. As indicated above, case-by-case
adjudication of access to copyrighted works is not an adequate
response and should be avoided if at all possible, because fair use
is costly to litigate and fraught with uncertainty. Rather, the goals
served by the incidents of physical copy ownership are best
preserved by a clear rule privileging a copy owner's right to access
digital works in his or her possession. Fair use may, however, be an
adequate response to the closer question of the right to transfer
digital documents. Because the right to transfer inadequately
serves the functions of the physical copy, and because of
countervailing considerations with respect to underlying copyright
incentives, the ability to transfer may properly be subject to fair use
analysis. Thus, fair use is only a partial solution. 7 2
A number of commentators, faced with the implications of MAI,
have called for more radical changes in the Copyright Act. 3 In
particular, these commentators have focused on the fact that
copyright law's emphasis on the copy is a product of a particular
technology and market structure. In the physical realm, a focus on
copies makes sense because copies are easy to identify and serve as
a rough proxy for use. 74 Copies in the digital environment,
however, are no longer easy to identify, nor do they serve as

372. See WHITE PAPER, supranote 10, at 79-82 (noting that courts may reject the fair use

doctrine in the context of online commercial transfers); Lemley, supra note 14, at 583
(discussing computer network transmission rights).
373. See Litman, supranote 3, at 46; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supranote 16, at 25-26. Some
have gone even further to suggest that copyright law should be abandoned in the online
environment, and that authors will have to develop new ways of obtaining returns on their

creative works. See, e.g., Barlow, supranote 7.
374. See Elkin-Koren, supranote 9, at 383; Litman, supra note 3, at 36.
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adequate proxies for use, according to these commentators.3 75
Instead, copying is now a ubiquitous feature of the digital online
environment. Accordingly, these commentators argue that copyright
law should abandon its focus on the creation of copies and address
the issues of access and use. To these commentators, the proposals
I have advanced above would likely appear as improper attempts to
shoehorn new technology into an older and outdated model.
Although commentators are not generally too explicit in describing
what a new copyright law would look like, they have sketched out
some of the outlines. 6
In my view, however, this response raises more questions than it
answers. As an initial matter, enacting widespread legislative
change in the copyright context is not an easy task. The most recent
major overhaul of the Copyright Act in 1976 took more than twenty
years to complete and involved extensive negotiations among
interest groups. I doubt Congress would be willing to devote the
necessary resources to such a change. (Indeed, the recent enactment
ofthe DMCA suggests that, even if Congress were to engage in such
a restructuring, the results might move copyright law in a direction
that most of these commentators would find objectionable.)
Moreover, restructuring copyright law to abandon its focus on the
copy would indeed be a major change, given, as indicated above, the
extent to which the physical copy plays an important role in
existing copyright law. Such a reconstruction of the Copyright Act
would give rise to substantial legal uncertainty, as the existing body
of interpretive case law would be largely rendered useless and a
new body of case law interpreting these new sets of rights would
need to be developed. The process of coming up with a new
structure would itself be fraught with uncertainty, given the
difficulty of predicting the impact of changing technology. At the
very least, such radical change should await better information
about the likely structure and scope of the digital marketplace.
375. See Litman, supranote 3, at 37.
376. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 8; Litman, supra note 3, at 37 (discussing possible
changes in copyright law to accommodate modem technology).
377. But see Peter Menell, The ChallengesofReforming Intellectual PropertyProtection
for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. Rsv. 2644 (1994) (noting that legislators will have
access to information if they wait, but that any subsequent legislation will be diffictilt to pass
because by that time interests will have become entrenched).
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In the absence of such information, the onus rests on supporters of
more radical changes to provide a sufficiently detailed and
convincing legal and market structure. None of the existing
proposals comes close.
On a more substantive note, abandonment of the copy is also
unwarranted because the focus on the copy still serves one of the
core purposes of copyright law. Digital copies of copyrighted works
can still act as substitutes for the original copy. Indeed, they can be
substitutes more perfect than any in the physical world.
Accordingly, digital copies still pose the same basic threat to
copyright incentives. If competitors and consumers are free to make
and sell copies, then the price of copies will be driven down to the
marginal cost of making them, and the creator will not be able to
recoup the cost of creation. Thus, copyright law should not refuse to
recognize the relevance of copies. Rather, it should be more selective
in deciding which types of digital copies are truly threats to the
underlying incentive structure. So, for example, incidental copies
made in the routers across the Internet do not pose a threat, nor do
the copies made in a computer's RAM. What is called for, then, is a
sensitive translation of the notion of the copy into the digital
environment.
A sensitive translation does not, however, entail wholesale
translation of every functional equivalent in the physical context.
Some commentators, instead of calling for abandonment of copyright law's focus on the copy, have instead called for nearly literal
translation of existing copy owner rights into the digital context.
Thus, the ability to read and the ability to transfer must be
preserved if at all possible.37 Yet much of the above analysis
suggests that we can only discuss translation of the incidents of
physical copy ownership intelligently once we have an understanding of the function they serve with respect to some larger
theory or framework for copyright law. This Article has tried to
identify these theories and interests and to engage in such a
contextual translation of the idea of copy ownership.
Some might argue that these notions about digital copy
ownership have in fact already been supplanted by an alternative
legislative framework. The recently enacted DMCA gives
378. See Elkin-Koren, supranote 9, at 392.
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substantial support to a market structure based, not on ownership
of digital copies, but rather on technological protection of such
copies and contractual licensing.3 79 Similarly, the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which is
currently being considered by many states, provides added support
to the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses. Thus, under this view,
much of the analysis set forth in this paper is largely beside the
point, because these noncopyright mechanisms will trump any
underlying right to access or transfer.
As an initial matter, the enactment of the DMCA and the
potential adoption of the UCITA do not obviate the relevance of the
above analysis, because there will still be instances in which digital
copies are possessed without any attendant technological protection
or without any express or implied licensing provisions. Even in a
world in which technological or contractual limitations are common,
there will still be many copies of copyrighted works that are
unencumbered by either technology or contract. For example, works
that have been improperly freed from their technical or contractual
restraints may be circulated over the Internet. Similarly, in some
cases, copyright owners may not find it worthwhile to incur the
additional costs of contractual or technological protection for their
works. In such cases, copyright law will need to set the default rules
for the use of such copies.
Moreover, the nature of the default rules will have some impact
on the ultimate effect of the above measures. To take one example,
if digital copy owners have an unlimited right to access copies
in their possession, then copyright management information
purporting to set terms of such access is unenforceable. Similarly,
the nature of the default rules will have an impact on the extent to
which copyright owners utilize these alternative mechanisms for
controlling consumer use of digital copies. By making the default
rules clear, however, the above analysis will allow both copyright
owners and users to make informed decisions about the extent to
which such measures will be used and are needed. Thus, the
structure of the underlying distribution of rights is still relevant,
despite the possibility of widespread licensing and self-help.

379. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1999).
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Finally, some may object that the above proposal does not
adequately deal with the potential piracy threat posed by the
advent of digital technology. That is, under this view, the
development of digital technology and the Internet greatly
decreases the cost of making and distributing copies. Without an
expansion in copyright protection, incentives to create works will be
undermined. By simply translating existing copyright law into a
digital environment, the above proposal does not adequately deal
with this new threat. Indeed, this argument is one advanced by
many copyright owners in support of both the White Paper and the
legislative proposals currently before Congress.
It is quite unclear to me, however, how the rule in MAI addresses
this concern. If the concern is the increased potential for piracy
presented by digital copying, then surely increasing the already
underenforced substantive rights will have little impact on reducing
piracy. Rather, it will only have the impact of making infringing
much activity that was previously not infringing, thereby leading
to increasing disrespect for existing copyright laws. Furthermore,
it is not clear at all that the advent of digital technology will in fact
have the feared results. 8 0 Just as digital technology reduces the
costs of copying, it also reduces the costs of distribution for
copyright owners and the costs of detecting infringement.8 1
Moreover, the copyright industries have always tolerated some
degree of unauthorized copying. The question in the digital
environment is how much, and the net impact of digital technology
cannot yet be predicted with any certainty. Certainly, the
substantive distribution of rights should not be used to address this
problem.
CONCLUSION

The advent of digital technology is dramatically changing the
familiar landscape of copyright law. As copyrighted works become
distributed increasingly in intangible, digital form, the courts will
continue to struggle to adapt our existing copyright laws, developed
in response to the realities of the physical hard-copy world, to a
380. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 583.
381. See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 265, at 228.
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much different world, one in which these realities no longer hold. In
this Article, I have attempted to provide a number of guideposts, to
help courts considering the conceptual challenges presented by this
change. Copyright law can, in fact, be adapted to the new realities
of the digital environment, but such adaptation will need to be
undertaken carefully with a solid understanding of the theories
justfying copyright protection and a realistic skepticism about the
ability to predict future technology and market structures.

